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The principal aim of this dissertation is to seriously consider what accounts of fashion 
and dress can offer—have indeed already offered—to philosophy. In recounting these 
histories, I have two primary goals. The first is to show that, despite the breadth of primary 
literature on the subject, fashion and dress have not been meaningfully taken up as sites of 
continuing philosophical inquiry. The second is to provide a foundation upon which 
continuing work on the subject may be done in the discipline of philosophy. Regarding the 
first, it will be my contention throughout the dissertation that the philosophical disregard for 
fashion can indeed be accounted for on philosophical grounds.  
There are two primary motives accounting for fashion remaining in philosophy’s 
closet: 1) the metaphysical subordination of appearances to essences; and 2) the feminization 
of fashion, and subsequent subordination of the feminine within philosophy. It is my view 
that the “feminization” of fashion, or the designation of clothing as a uniquely feminine 
concern, has perpetuated its erasure as a meritorious topic of philosophical concern.  
The five major chapters of the dissertation can be divided into two thematic sections. 
Section I comprises Chapters II, III, and IV, and centers on the project of “recovery,” or 
rather, the project of “raiding” philosophy’s closet for new (old) tools to wield in the 




political implications of a metaphysical schema in which clothing is made to be “only” or 
“merely” about the world of appearances.  
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“Philosophy again and again finds itself in pursuit of the real truth hidden behind 
the merely apparent, taking thought to discover what is as opposed to what seems 
to be the case, and confident that the wisdom worth loving will endure. 
Philosophy may, then, take itself to have a natural antagonism to fashion, as well 
as a perfect antipathy to any interest in clothes—those wrappings of the 
wrappings of the mind—those superficial goods situated at least two removes 
from reality, from the philosopher’s perdurable realm of ideas.” 
—Karen Hanson, 
“Dressing up, Dressing Down: The Philosophic Fear of Fashion” 
“How, then, comes it, may the reflective mind repeat, that the grand Tissue of all Tissues, the 
only real Tissue, should have been quite overlooked by Science—the vestural Tissue, namely, of 
woollen or other Cloth; which Man’s Soul wears as its outmost wrappage and overall; wherein 
his whole other Tissues are included and screened, his whole Faculties work, his whole Self lives, 
moves, and has its being?” 
— Thomas Carlyle, Sartor Resartus 
I. INTRODUCTION
FASHION AND PHILOSOPHY 
Introduction 
A philosophical history of fashion has been long in the making, or fashioning. From 
Diogenes to Diderot, Benjamin to Barthes: philosophers of all stripes have given in to 
fashion’s pull and have attempted to reconcile its ever-changing, ephemeral nature with the 
philosophical search for wisdom: less ephemeral, more a priori. In recounting many of the 
key moments and thinkers of this history throughout the dissertation, I will show that 
analyses of fashion and clothing alike have produced insights central to the theories and 
frameworks of the thinkers I focus on throughout. In other words, my principal aim is to 
seriously consider what accounts of fashion and dress have to offer—have indeed already 
offered—to philosophy. In recounting these histories, I have two primary goals: the first is 
to show that, despite the breadth of primarily literature on the subject, fashion and dress 
have not been meaningfully taken up as vital sites of continuing philosophical inquiry. The 
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second is to provide a foundation upon which continuing work on the subject may be done 
in the domain of philosophy. In regards to the first, it will be my contention throughout the 
dissertation that the philosophical disregard for fashion can indeed be accounted for on 
philosophical grounds.  
There are two primary motives which account for fashion remaining in 
philosophy’s closet: 1) the metaphysical subordination of appearances to essences; and 2) 
the feminization of fashion, and subsequent subordination of the feminine within 
philosophy. It is my view that the “feminization” of fashion, or the designation of clothing 
as a uniquely feminine concern, has perpetuated its erasure as a worthy candidate for 
philosophical inquiry. I understand “feminization” itself as roughly synonymous with the 
concern for, or love of the world of appearances that has itself been denigrated throughout 
the history of philosophy. I thereby take the “feminization” of fashion as an extension of 
the subordination of appearances to essences I track in the first major section of this 
introduction. The dissertation’s major chapters will both account for and work to disrupt 
these two suppositions.  
Before detailing each chapter in detail, I will first attend to these two major 
motivations in respective sections. Before detailing the relevant metaphysical history in the 
first section, it is worth saying a few things here about how I conceive of and treat 
metaphysics as a feminist philosopher. A critical stance towards metaphysics adopted by 
feminist philosophers in particular is based on an “argument that [metaphysics] is 
politically pernicious,” as Johanna Oksala puts it (2016, 22). The argument is as follows: 
“Metaphysics should be resisted because it masks an effective ideology of oppression. As 
numerous feminist thinkers have demonstrated, the devalued side of each ontological 
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suppositions as mind/body, nature/culture, reason/emotion, and animal/human, for 
example, has been attached to femininity and this has led to and upheld oppressive practices 
and conceptions about women” (22). But challenging, let alone changing social reality 
involves disputing the naturalization of binaries, hierarchies, and conceptions of (human) 
nature which rely on metaphysical paradigms that have for long—that continue to—
privilege certain categories over others. I take there to be a critical difference between a 
project of feminist metaphysics and that of feminine metaphysics. Whereby the former 
challenges the naturalization of biases and prejudice as unchangeable or immutable “facts” 
about human nature (as essences of human nature), the latter merely reverts the problematic 
dualisms that feminist metaphysics, and feminist philosophy more generally, takes issue 
with from the beginning. My aim in laying out this distinction is to situate my own project 
squarely with the former, not the latter.  
The femin-ist challenge to metaphysics is in its criticism of the history of 
metaphysics as being immune or immutable to social and historical forces, as well as in its 
highlighting of the relevance of bias and prejudice in perpetuating naturalized metaphysical 
truths and dualisms. In other words, it is not that immutable truths dictate “natural” 
hierarchies among persons, but that bias and prejudice fuel the justification of 
naturalization with an appeal to the metaphysical. I understand feminist metaphysics itself, 
then, as a methodological “undoing” of the reign of the metaphysical a priori: specifically, 
its function to instantiate and re-instantiate metaphysical “truths” about—for example, and 
of special interest for my project here—sexed and gendered differences in particular. 
Therefore, my “method” is to trace the history of metaphysics in order to redress it by 
arguing throughout the dissertation that the “universal truths” upheld by metaphysics have 
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in fact been conditioned by bias and prejudice alike. In detailing what I call the 
subordination of appearances to essences throughout this first major section of this chapter, 
my aim is to “set the stage,” so to speak, for my dissertation’s challenge to this 
subordination. 
But what is metaphysics if not, well, metaphysical? In other words, how is a 
feminist metaphysics possible?1 Here I follow both Christine Battersby (1998) and Johanna 
Oksala (2011; 2016), who each develop a “new” metaphysics borne out of their respective 
critiques of metaphysics as both universalizing and ahistorical. For instance, Battersby 
proposes feminist metaphysics as a project of recovery by suggesting that metaphysics is 
not a monolithic tradition with a set canon. Battersby’s aim is to re-place women in 
metaphysics in a dual sense: first, by arguing that their elision in the history of metaphysics 
has been intentional but is not necessary for a functional metaphysics; and second, by 
thinking metaphysics anew from the place of the female-subject position (cf. 1998, 2). As 
to the former, Battersby writes that in the history of western metaphysics, woman have 
been seen as “fall[ing] outside ‘essence’—or the defining characteristics of a species or 
thing—in ways that have been supposed to make it a mistake to look for an essence of 
female nature or experience” (1). In terms of the latter, Battersby writes: “I am not positing 
an ‘other’ form of subjectivity which is that of the ‘feminine’ or ‘female’ subject. Instead, 
I am asking what happens if we model personal and individual identity in terms of the 
female” (2). 
Like Battersby, I contend that “woman” has been excluded from the history of 
Western metaphysics, and that she has been intentionally and willfully constituted as mere 
1 This question alludes to Johanna Oksala’s chapter title of the same name. See “How is Feminist Metaphysics 
Possible” in Feminist Experiences (2016). 
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appearance: understood, as Battersby puts it, as “unrepresentative of that distinctive, 
underlying ‘essence’ of humanity that philosophers have associated with ‘truth’” (cf. 1998, 
1). Unlike Battersby, however, I do not seek to “model” identity on either female or 
feminine subjectivity. Instead, I employ a similarly deconstructive approach to the history 
of Western metaphysics in order to expose long-maintained prejudices for the sake of 
excavating and cultivating a philosophy of fashion: a topic which Battersby pays no mind 
to as a meaningful part of—a meaningful force of—the perpetuation of the metaphysical 
dualisms and subsequent domination/subordination dyad she sets out to revert.  
Johanna Oksala concentrates—more concretely than does Battersby—on the 
linguistic dimension of metaphysics, or, on the histories, effects, and influences of 
language and syntax on metaphysics, and vice versa. As Oksala puts it: “…it is vital that 
any attempt to construct an alternative metaphysics responds to this challenge adequately” 
(2016, 29). Following Foucault, Oksala suggests that a feminist metaphysics must consider 
the “strong emphasis on the historical, social, and political aspects of the constitution of 
reality” emphasized by the linguistic turn (29). Language, in other words, is not only or 
just “an abstract grid of intelligibility,” but a “social and historical practice incorporating 
power relations” (30). Bracketing the issue of Foucault’s commitment or non-commitment 
to metaphysics, Foucault (at the very least) denies any conception of metaphysics as 
identifying “universal structures of reality” (32). Conducting an ontology of the present, 
opposed to an ontology in general or as such, historicizes and politicizes metaphysics alike 
by rendering it vital to the project of problematization: to the “possibility of contesting and 
transforming ontology understood as the sedimented and normally taken-for-granted 
background” (33). As Oksala puts it, the politicization of ontology is not merely a process 
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of “unmasking,” but of “redescription” or rewriting (33).2 
 Like Oksala, I take (feminist) metaphysics to be commensurate with the project of 
a (feminist) ontology of the present. In other words, the project of a feminist metaphysics 
is to unmask and redescribe the taken-for-granted which, in turn, displays both the 
contingency and historicity of metaphysical schemas. In their understanding of 
metaphysics and metaphysical schemas as both situated and historical, I follow both 
Battersby and Oksala. However, rather than turning to Foucault as Oksala does, my method 
bears more similarities to that of Battersby, who mines the history of philosophy for 
alternative readings of identity that would normatively resituate metaphysics as beginning 
with woman, and not treating her as “phenomenal” or as “mere appearance.” My project, 
however, does not have the same normative impulse. Instead of mining, I raid the history 
of philosophy’s proverbial closet in order to prepare for a new avenue of philosophical 
inquiry: that of philosophy’s relationship to fashion and clothing. 
 
The Metaphysical Subordination of Appearances to Essences 
Beginning with Plato, the mimetic paradigm maintains that “truth” or essence is located 
beyond the world of appearances in a metaphysical or transcendental world of ideal forms 
(cf. Plato 2001; cf. Beistegui 2012). While by no means the only trajectory in the history 
of metaphysics, the Platonic schema remains a dominant one: worth interrogating for its 
enduring force and influence. With Plato, the world of appearances becomes a world of 
 
2 While she says little of the historical a priori in her discussion of feminist metaphysics, it is worth noting 
the conceptual identification that is actually taking place. In order to excavate or to problematize an ontology 
of the (historical) present, one must employ a conception of the a priori as equally historical (cf. Foucault 
2002). For further discussions of the historical a priori, see Allen and Aldea’s edited collection on the subject 
(2016), particularly their introduction (Allen and Aldea 2016) and Carr (2016). 
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“mere” appearances: the incorrect (or false) realm of philosophical judgment. In John 7:24, 
Jesus implores his followers to “stop judging by mere appearances, but instead judge 
correctly.” The charge of judging by mere appearances comes from a Biblical distinction 
between the human and the divine: while human persons “look at the outward appearance,” 
the Lord “looks at the heart,” because he “does not look at the things people look at” (1 
Sam 16:7). From a Biblical perspective, then, remaining in the world of appearances is 
tantamount to rebuking the divine, since judging others by their “mere appearance” is a 
way of feeling righteous without actually being righteous, i.e. without truly following the 
wisdom of God. Just as Biblically “correct” judgment involves going beyond the judgment 
of appearance, philosophically “correct” judgment, too, often involves a forsaking of the 
world of appearances for the metaphysical or for the ideal. Inward essence (or the divine) 
is traded in philosophy for the metaphysical. 
Appearances are made to be “mere,” or insufficient, when they become 
subordinated to a deeper, “truer” reality than that which we encounter through appearances. 
The distinction inaugurated a metaphysical and philosophical trajectory whereby the search 
for wisdom and truth necessarily subordinates the world of appearances for that of another 
world or realm. The subordination is significant, for it signals that a bias against aesthetics 
is in fact built into the pursuit of metaphysics. Even Platonic and Aristotelian inquiries into 
aesthetics—a domain in which discussions of fashion would seemingly reign—subordinate 
the aesthetic to the metaphysical in such a way that confirms this bias as a structural 
component of a long-reigning metaphysical method.3 Book 7 of Plato’s Republic is 
3 Despite important differences between Plato and Aristotle, scholars like Miguel Beistegui maintain that the 
Platonic schema holds out. Aristotle’s subversion of the imagic from a source of skepticism to a source of 
learning and potential truth nonetheless maintains wedded to the minimally dualistic structure between the 
sensible and the intelligible. That is, even though mimesis functions pedagogically for Aristotle, it always 
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infamous for its depiction of the “Allegory of the Cave,” where the shadows on the cave’s 
walls represent the appearances that are not to be trusted: the images that exist not only as 
mere appearances, but as shadows of the real, later conceived in more detail in Book 10 as 
the “original.” There, Socrates ponders the work of art as a special kind of image. But, 
special as it is, the work of art is still thematized in the language of deception, conceived 
there as imitation or mimesis (μίμεσις). In the Sophist, Plato writes that certain images may 
resemble the originary truth from which they exist as mere derivatives, and these images 
in particular may even be able to act as a ladder between appearance and essence, 
essentially capitulating to the same pedagogical function as the cave’s shadows (2015, 128-
9). As Julia Kristeva writes of Plato’s Cave in Intimate Revolt: “…trapped by deception, 
sensation for Plato is necessarily false, for it is always subordinated and flawed in relation 
to the intelligible” (2003, 53). In the Republic, the figure of Socrates warns not only against 
images, but of the “luxurious city”—what he calls the “fevered state”—characterized by 
“the manufacture of all kinds of articles…that have to do with women’s adornment” (1963, 
619). In his plight against physical desire, the body, and sensation more broadly, Socrates 
insists that philosophers keep their distance from “smart clothes and shoes and other bodily 
ornaments” (1963, 47). 
Aristotle departs from Plato in subverting the image from a source of skepticism 
(as it is in Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave”) to a source of learning and site of potential truth. 
Despite this, however, he remains committed to the minimally dualistic structure forged by 
Plato between the sensible and the intelligible, conceived in Aristotle as the distinction 
between hyle and morphe, or between form and matter (Aristotle 1992; cf. Aristotle 1996, 
points beyond the object it imitates. This renders “truth” as located in the intelligible realm only, while 
appearance remains “merely” sensible (cf. Bestegui 2012). 
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6). Aesthetic objects may be a source of knowledge themselves for Aristotle, who 
distinguishes between knowledge of “matter” and knowledge of “forms” (cf. 1992, 27-28). 
However, all art is itself guilty of a fundamental mimesis: of “imitating” nature (Aristotle 
1992, 27). Even the pleasure derived from art, and the “knowledge” one might attain from 
it, is itself dependent, on Aristotle’s account, on having some prior familiarity with—some 
implicit or a priori understanding of—that which is being represented. As he writes in the 
Poetics, people “take delight” in seeing images because “what happens is that as they view 
them they come to understand and work out what each thing is (e.g. ‘This is so-and-so’). 
If one happens not to have seen the thing before, it will not give pleasure as an imitation, 
but because of its execution or colour, or for some other reason” (1996, 6). As John Sallis 
puts it, on Aristotle’s account “one can learn through the image only if it is recognised as 
an image of the thing itself” (1995, 177). In other words, the image or aesthetic object is 
not taken on its own terms, but always subordinated to its original or originary essence or 
form.   
Kant concedes, as did Plato and Aristotle, that learning happens primarily, or at 
least initially, by imitation.  Kant decries mimesis as a subordinate form of aesthetic 
pursuit, writing in the Critique of Judgment that genius is “entirely opposed to the spirit of 
imitation” (2001, 187). Aristotle wrote that human beings have “a strong propensity to 
imitation and in learning their earliest lessons through imitation,” and Kant that “learning 
is nothing but imitation” (1996, 6; 2001, 187). For Kant, imitation is “on the natural path 
of inquiry,” but is by no means its height (187). In the Critique of Judgment, the beautiful 
gives way to the understanding that there exists a power of judgment with its own 
corresponding principle: the principle of judgment. The judgment of the beautiful—
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especially of nature—is in a very necessary sense the access point to the principle of 
judgment: a threshold to an understanding of judgment as a faculty in itself. While 
judgments of the beautiful refer to objects that exist in nature, judgments of the sublime 
only refer to that which exists in the mind (2001, §27-8, 140-8). Importantly, beauty is a 
“symbol” of morality which gives morality its sensible form only (2001, §59, 225-228). 
Symbols for Kant are “representations based on mere analogy” (226). As such, they 
constitute a realm of mimetic appearances. Beauty, contrasted with reason for Kant, 
becomes feminized (cf. Gatens 1991; Klinger 1997; Mann 2006). Kant writes that “to find 
perfection in a thing requires reason … and to discover beauty in it requires nothing but 
mere reflection (without any concept) on a given representation” (2001, 310). The 
“purposiveness of form in appearance is beauty” (48). The purposiveness of form in 
appearance is a contrast to the purposiveness of the faculty of reason. As I will argue in 
great detail in Chapter II, the process of reason’s ascension (in its full realization of itself) 
is not a sex or gender-neutral one, and reason (sexed male and gendered masculine) is 
indeed catalyzed or propelled up the ladder on account of Eve’s folly in the Garden of 
Eden. In feeling shame and covering herself up with the original clothing—that tiny fig-
leaf—reason is able to direct itself away from “instinct” (sexual temptation) and come into 
its own as a properly human faculty, separate from the animal (for whom instinct reigns, 
on Kant’s view) (cf. 1786/1999, 224). Aesthetic representations therefore only serve, as 
Kant writes, “contingent” rather than essential functions: means to reason’s ultimate end 
(cf. 2001, 49).  
Even though human beings only ever experience mere appearances for Kant, and 
not things as they are in themselves, Kant conceptualizes the faculty of reason in terms 
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which dislocates “truth” from their phenomena (1999, 104).4 The developmental (or 
epigenetic) account of reason proffered by Kant creates a hierarchy which subordinates 
appearances to the “understanding,” not unlike the Platonic “ladder” or the Aristotelian 
claim that pleasure in aesthetic objects is really, or truthfully, a pleasure of the 
understanding. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant conceived of himself as departing 
from a Platonic metaphysics that split sensibility from intelligibility by positing that it is 
not possible for human persons to have a priori knowledge of the intelligible world, for it 
is a world completely independent to the human mind (1999). However, Kant replaces the 
world of Platonic forms with reason, and the first critique is especially concerned with the 
possibilities of human reason to have a priori knowledge. Metaphysics thereby becomes 
in Kant the “inventory of all we possess through pure reason” (1998, 104). As I will argue 
in Chapter II through a novel reading of Kant’s “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human 
History,” the exclusion of femininity and of women from the realm of reason is achieved 
by Kant through the function of clothing—and the feminine shame it inaugurates—in 
catalyzing a reason distinguished from femininity (cf. 1999). 
Kant’s “departure” from Platonic metaphysics nonetheless functions to re-
instantiate its most problematic dualism: that between the sensible and the intelligible 
which once again wrenches essences from appearances. For Hegel, however, there is no 
essence that does not itself appear. That means that for Hegel, the distinction between 
essences and appearances is likewise a problem for Kant as it is for Plato. For Hegel, 
essence is instead conceived as the movement of reflection: “the movement from nothing 
to nothing and thereby back to itself” (2010, 346). In understanding essence more as the 
4 Kant’s thesis on transcendental idealism (the transcendental aesthetic) maintains that human beings only 
ever experience mere appearances, and not things as they are in themselves. 
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history of how something comes to be (to exist), rather than as a mysterious metaphysical 
property—whether knowable or unknowable is beside the point—Hegel subverts the 
traditional metaphysical distinction subordinating appearances to essences. As Stephen 
Houlgate puts it, rather than a conception of essence conceived as fundamentally distinct 
from appearance, it is conceived in Hegel as “that which is responsible for all seeming 
immediacy” (2011, 141, emphasis mine). Houlgate continues: “Illusory immediate being, 
or seeming, ceases thereby to be something distinct from essence and comes to be seen as 
essence’s own seeming or the ‘seeming of the essence itself’” (2011, 141, emphasis 
original; Hegel 2010, 398). Conceived by Hegel as the “movement of reflection,” essence 
comes to designate the movement of this “seeming,” or, as Houlgate puts it, the “process 
of seeming to be immediate being and of seeming to be distinct from such seeming 
immediacy” (141). 
 However, not all “appearances” are treated equally by Hegel, as evidenced by his 
discussions of clothing and dress in the Lectures on Fine Art Volume II in particular (1975). 
There, despite its function in making the expressive body really “shine forth,” modern 
clothing for Hegel is itself is “without significance” because it is “purely sensuous” (745). 
Hegel contrasts the “purely sensuous” with “true” beauty or proper sensuous expression, 
understood as art which manifests the true freedom of spirit (the “expression of the spirit”) 
(726). In proper sensuous expressions of the beautiful, there is not the “mere” appearance 
of freedom, but freedom itself (699, 702, 719, 725, 741). However, these beautiful objects 
are themselves subject to scrutiny, and not all objects of beauty qualify. For Hegel, true 
beauty is only found in works of art that are “created freely” out of the “spirit of the artist” 
(725). In sculpture, only the “posture” of the figure is able to express the spirit; everything 
13 
else is merely “imitation” (786-7). 
Against the complaint that modern sculpture is often “compelled to clothe its 
figures,” Hegel defends clothed sculptures (1975, 742). The prejudice, he writes, comes 
from the view that “no clothing can match the beauty of the form of the human body” 
(742). But the elicitation of sensuous beauty (of properly sensuous beauty) is not actually 
fully realized in sculpture for Hegel, since it is only through “posture” that it sculpture is 
able to express spirit at all (786-7). This means that it does not matter very much for him 
whether or not clothing, in sculpture, fulfills the function of expressing spirit. Scholars 
have convincingly shown that “Spirit” is gendered masculine for Hegel, and that women 
and the feminine alike are subordinated in the Phenomenology (Chanter 1995; Willett 
1990, 1994; Oliver 1996; Kane 2015). In the subject’s trajectory from “consciousness” to 
“Spirit,” for instance, Kelly Oliver shows that woman is the “essential unconscious element 
of consciousness,” or, the “spirit behind the Spirit” (Oliver 1996). As Hegel writes: “The 
feminine […] does not attain to consciousness of it [the ethical], or to the objective 
existence of it, because the law of the Family is an implicit, inner essence which is not 
exposed to the daylight of consciousness” (1977, 274, fn. 457). 
Like Kant, Hegel also locates a dual “genesis” of shame and clothing. But unlike 
Kant, for whom the burden of shame rests squarely on Eve’s shoulders—or rather, on her 
clothing—Hegel makes no mention of Eve. However, inflections of gendered differences 
are nonetheless present in Hegel, who writes of the Fall that “man becomes conscious of 
his higher vocation to be spirit and he must therefore regard what is animal as incompatible 
with that and struggle to conceal, as incompatible with his higher inner life, especially those 
parts of his body—trunk, breast, back, and legs—which serve purely animal functions or 
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point to the purely external and have no directly spiritual vocation and express nothing 
spiritual” (742). On my view, the identification of women, the feminine, and clothing alike 
with “nothing spiritual” continues to reproduce the essence/appearance distinction Hegel 
is especially concerned with overcoming.  
Hegel contrasts the “pure” or “absolute” beauty of Greek sculpture with “concrete” 
beauty: its most developed form. Since true freedom is not merely metaphysical or 
idealized for Hegel—since freedom itself can actually appear in itself (appearance as 
essence)—it must appear not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Clothing capitulates to the 
“abstract” when it does not authentically reflect the person and environment of the time 
(750-1). It is Hegel’s criticism of sculpture that its subjects are often clothed in “ideal” 
garments opposed to garments which reflect the “inner life” of the person (750). Consider 
a contemporary analogue in the form of magazine editorials, where the subjects wear, but 
do not own, the clothes that they wear. For her recent editorial spread for Vanity Fair, 
Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez received (Republican) backlash aimed at her 
wardrobe, to which she retorted in a tweet that “you don’t keep the clothes” (2020). 
 The incident illustrates two points. The first is a point that Hegel makes against the 
idealizing tendency of clothing. The expensive garments do not and did not signify AOC, 
but rather, a particular vision or version of the Congresswoman for Vanity Fair audiences. 
Hegel thought fashion ought to be “real” rather than “ideal,” and in fashion he saw a 
fundamentally idealizing tendency—abetted by fashion’s temporal configuration as 
ephemeral, and thereby, as juxtaposing the “real” or the concrete and lasting—that would 
make it very difficult, if not impossible, for “clothing” to escape (1975, 749).  In his Letters, 
Hegel writes that against the “idealization” of extravagant costumes donned by the majority 
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of seventy guests to a luxurious New Year’s Eve party in 1808, he “opposed a note of 
realism by donning a valet’s uniform coat belonging to the Court doorman, along with his 
wig” (1808, 156; cf. Valvo 2016, 546). In the valet, no doubt, Hegel saw at least an 
analogue of the “slave” central to his conception of the master/slave dialectic in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), published just one year earlier, for he returns again to the 
figure of the valet in the Philosophy of History ([1821] 2000). Although Hegel was by no 
means a critic of capitalism per se, he was an astute observer, like Denis Diderot, of the 
material avarice of the upper-classes that continued to perpetuate class distinctions (Hegel 
1991; Diderot 1767; cf. Buchwalter 2015). Clothing has played a key role in “keeping 
people in their place” in the most literal senses. Not only did Hegel recognize this, but 
endeavored to illustrate the point by donning the valet uniform in a performance of “class 
drag” (Valvo 2016, 546). 
The second point that the Vanity Fair backlash illustrates is that clothing plays a 
role in alienation. In Elements of a Philosophy of Right, Hegel conceptualizes the 
“alienation of personality” as the disqualification of ownership (1991, 96). Just as a home 
“owner” with an outstanding mortgage possesses but does not actually own their home, so 
too do the subjects of fashion editorials “possess” without “owning” their garments. Hegel 
writes:  
If today a portrait is to be made of an individual belonging to his own time, then it 
is essential that his clothing and external accessories be taken from his own 
individual and actual environment; for, precisely because he is an actual person 
who here is the subject of the works of art, it is most necessary that these 
externalities, of which clothes are essentially one, be portrayed faithfully and as 
they actually are or were (748).  
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Hegel clearly seems to be concerned with the “alienation of personality” that happens when 
clothing is made to idealize its subjects. The “rent the runway” phenomena, where designer 
clothing can be temporarily rented (not owned), would certainly make Hegel squirm, and 
confirm all of his worries about the insidious ability of fashion to make its subjects into 
who they wish they were, and not who they actually are. 
The only kind of bodily ornamentation that qualifies as truly beautiful, sensuous 
expression on Hegel’s view is the actor’s mask. Hegel’s admiration for Antigone is well 
known; he makes no secret of masking his praise for the text throughout his works, from 
the Philosophy of Religion to the lectures on aesthetics. His commentary on tragedy gives 
special attention to the mask. In an aside in the Aesthetics, he writes:  
Just as it is essential that sculpture be the work of human hands, so his mask is 
essential to the player— and not as an external condition from which artistic 
consideration must be abstract; or, so far as we have to abstract from it, that is as 
much as saying that art does not contain within itself the true and proper self (1975, 
443-444).
I take this to mean that the mask is not external in the sense that it does not simply cover 
the face of the actor in order that the art of the play can manifest itself. The mask is also 
not external in the sense that it is “external” to the personality of the actor: Hegel’s concern, 
outlined above, that garments may function to alienate the personality. For the actor, 
however, it cannot be the case that the mask is an “external” or idealized object, since it 
would imply that there is no autonomy or freedom to the work of art itself for Hegel: that 
there remains an essence/appearance distinction. The mask, then, is the giving of 
expression to our human freedom which brings us to our own truth.  
In Marx and Engels, the metaphysical distinction between essences and 
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appearances is, likewise as it is for Hegel, rejected for a conception of essences that appear, 
or for a unificatory schema which would not subordinate that which appears to an 
underlying metaphysics (1998). Thinking is not governed by an “intelligent principle,” but 
by ever-evolving material conditions, including the fact of whether or not material needs 
have been met.5 Thought is not necessarily a separate substance from the body (mind versus 
matter) but becomes alienated from it when it likewise becomes alienated from the means 
of production. For Marx and Engels alike, the industrialization of textiles in particular 
becomes a locus from which to develop their conception of historical materialism. Engels’ 
father owned large textile factories in Salford (Manchester) and he occasionally worked in 
one of the mills. In observing that the deterioration of clothing stimulates its own (renewed) 
production—catalyzing a system, a dialectic between production and consumption—Marx 
and Engels refine and support their conception of materialism as both historical and 
dialectical. History unfolds as the result of dialectics: in this instance, the dialectic between 
production and consumption.  
 But the dialectic is itself built into the production process. Prophesying the later 
development of “fast fashion,” Marx observes that quickly deteriorating materials were 
used precisely in order to stimulate production at a greater pace (1993, 91). It is not the 
case that the theory and methodology of dialectics was created ex nihilo from Marx and 
 
5 Philosophical materialism is not immune to metaphysics nor to the distinction between essences and 
appearances I have been tracking. Materialism itself may be considered a response to the metaphysical 
problem between essences and appearances, although new problems emerge for the theory: namely, the 
problem of how things change without a governing metaphysics. The main issue of materialism had since 
then been, as Auguste Comte put it, “explaining the higher level in terms of the lower level,” that is, 
explaining how matter (and not “mind” or “soul”) causes or effects more matter (cf. Wolfe 2016, 1). If 
everything is understood as matter, then thinking, too, would need to be understood as something like matter 
acting on matter. But if matter is instead understood as having an inertial force of its own—a force which 
causes itself to happen and to change—then it must also be the case that this process is very much unlike the 
process of “thinking” as human persons conceive of the term: that is, as a mental process ultimately related 
to but disconnected from the body. 
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Engels lounging in respective armchairs. Instead, this revelation in historical materialism 
was generated from their experience witnessing the production process in the textile mills, 
and their experience of quickly deteriorating clothing, crafted from cheaper material. In 
other words, the experience of the mills gave rise to the theory, and not the other way 
around. In this way, the phenomena of fashion became theoretically generative for Marx 
and Engels as thinkers. What would have become of historical materialism, if not for two 
of its most celebrated figures taking clothing seriously as objects of inquiry and catalysts 
of thought?  
Both Nietzsche and Marx believed that religious metaphysics either devalues or 
subordinates the material world.6 Metaphysics for Nietzsche is the “transference of herd 
standards” into the realm of the ideal (204). In other words, metaphysics stands for nothing 
else but the naturalization of dominant values into the world of the eternal: a normative 
world of ideals for Nietzsche. Similarly, Marx writes that “just as it is not religion that 
creates man but man who creates religion, so it is not the constitution that creates the people 
but the people which creates the constitution” (1977, 30). In both thinkers there is not only 
a rejection of the essence/appearance dyad, but a rejection of the existence and function of 
an “essential” realm to dictate, or rather, to justify (human) action, including governance, 
as having metaphysical justification.  
The problematization of the essence-appearance distinction is imperative both to 
Nietzsche’s critique of theological metaphysics and to his ultimately positive project of 
6 For Marx in the Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right,’ private property becomes imbued with a religious 
quality or character. It becomes the “highest thought form of th[e] brutality” of private property. It is only 
when the “other-world of truth” has “vanished” that the “truth of this world” may be established (1977, 132). 
For Nietzsche, the mimetic paradigm upheld by religion results in nihilism. The value of essences over 
appearance is not an inalienable one, but a constructed one (1967, 125, 161, 204). 
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creative life-affirmation: in conceiving of the individual as an aesthetic project or a real-
life mannequin to be dressed. Mannequin, after all, means “artificial man” (cf. Critchley 
2015). In The Gay Science, Nietzsche writes that “to give ‘style’ to one’s character” is a 
“great and rare art!” (2001, 163). In giving “style” to one’s character, one dresses oneself 
as one would a mannequin. Having no underlying “essential” human nature, the artificial 
man or mannequin becomes its authentic self only through a (literal) self-fashioning. While 
it is much more than clothes that make the person, they are not without meaning or 
significance for Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche’s affirmation of the world of “appearance” is predicated not only on the 
critique of the metaphysical as such, but on its collapse. We might say that the conception 
of appearances as “mere”—the “mere-ing” of appearances—is itself the product of the 
dualism between this life and another, sustained by the belief in a theological metaphysical 
world-view. In other words, the “depth” of Nietzsche’s thought rests precisely in his 
reclamation of the surface as a vital and informative place of meaning-making and of self-
fashioning. As Nietzsche writes in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: “body I am entirely, and 
nothing else; and soul is only a word for something about the body” (1978, 34). It is not 
that the (clothed) body is juxtaposed to the inner workings of the self or the soul, but that 
the body is the starting point for meaning-making. Nietzsche’s ultimate resistance to the 
metaphysical naturalization of values functions as a significant reminder that clothing 
exceeds and often subverts its supposed “essential” meanings: or rather, that it is not tied 
to them. 
Nietzsche’s rejection of a two-worlds system, or of the appearance-reality dyad, 
results in a fervent affirmation of the world of appearances: and with it, a profound 
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reconsideration of the meaning(s) of clothing, especially in its relation to the body. In The 
Birth of Tragedy, he introduces the concept of “aesthetic justification” as an understanding 
of life as a work of art (1999; cf. Noble 2018, 6). Nietzsche writes: “only as an aesthetic 
phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified” (1999, 33). This is not l’art pour 
l’art, or art as surface phenomena existing for its own sake, but art (including existence 
understood as aesthetic) as a vital force: as its own source of truth (or essence) (Nietzsche 
2005, 170-1; cf. Noble 2018). Aesthetic justification is key for Nietzsche in overcoming 
nihilism, itself conceptualized as destabilizing the primacy of another-world over this-
world. The affirmation or the justification of the self as an aesthetic being is thereby an 
important means of overcoming the metaphysical dualism which would subordinate this 
world—the world we live in—to any other. He rejects the paradigm, introduced in Plato 
and Aristotle, that art, images, and appearances constitute the “illusory world” (2005, 171). 
The “fight against purpose in art” is therefore a fight against finding an “essence” which 
would subordinate the medium to the message: a “moralizing” tendency in and of itself 
(2005, 204). Affirming oneself as an aesthetic being affirms the reality of this world as the 
world.  
When Nietzsche invokes masks and masking, as he frequently does, he often does 
so in irony—in a “playful” way—to indicate that there is no truer or deeper “essence” of 
subjectivity underneath the mask. Nietzsche’s playful ways are developed into an ontology 
of play by Eugen Fink later on, who locates fashion as one if its primary sites (cf. Fink 
1969). In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche writes that “the person of today couldn’t wear 
a better mask… than that of your own face” (2006, 93). This is not to say that as a mask, 
the face indicates something like psychological interiority. Instead, the language of 
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masking is what permits Nietzsche to develop an ontology of self-creation or self-
fashioning. Instead of a dyad between appearances and reality, reality is the world of 
appearances, and aesthetics is not to be subordinated to other philosophical endeavors (to 
ethics or epistemology for instance), but instead enjoys a primacy in Nietzsche’s thought. 
Husserl’s injunction to “return to the things themselves” may be considered a robust 
refusal of the metaphysical subordination of appearances (and consequently, of things) 
outlined so far (2001, 168). And indeed, I find many resources for cultivating a philosophy 
of fashion in phenomenologists like Husserl, Fink, and Merleau-Ponty most especially (see 
Chapters IV and VI). For Husserl, intuition is an act of perception, understood as a bodily 
capacity, and not an act fulfilled with recourse to a priori knowledge or understanding (like 
it is for Plato and Aristotle). In other words, neither intuition nor perception are ideal acts 
or categories, but are only (and ever) fulfilled in and through worldly engagement; they do 
not “exist” in any metaphysical register without such a world. “Essences” are only present 
in eidetic intuition in their “corporeal identity,” meaning, as Merleau-Ponty puts it later on, 
“we never have before us pure individuals, indivisible glaciers of beings, nor essences 
without place and without date” (1968, 115). I see in phenomenology a methodological 
refusal of the essence/appearance distinction which would discount appearances as 
unworthy of philosophical attention (or even trust), although there still remains a minimally 
dualistic structure in phenomenology between essences and appearances, albeit a less 
pernicious one. 
Despite its reorientation to the sensible world, phenomenology has been critiqued 
as metaphysics. Jean Wahl, for instance, wrote that Husserl “separates essences from 
existence,” and Jacques Derrida infamously labels Husserlian phenomenology as a 
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“metaphysics of presence” (Wahl 1942, n.p.; Derrida 2011). Briefly, Derrida’s forceful and 
important critique of Husserlian phenomenology suggests that in prioritizing (sensible) 
presence, it also privileges an ultimate point of origin for existence which functionally 
produces age-old metaphysical dyads, like those between origin and accident, essence and 
appearance, speech and silence, and so on and so forth. In other words, the absolute 
assurance that there is being indicates to Derrida a privileging of being over non-being, and 
therefore, the continued maintenance of metaphysics instead of its overcoming.7 However, 
there is a difference between an essence/appearance dyad in which appearances become 
either subordinated or naturalized to essences, and an essence/appearance dualism which 
functions to think critically about the nature of appearances. While Derrida’s critique is 
certainly warranted against the early Husserl in particular, for whom the search for 
“essential” features of consciousness was central, I do not take the criticism to dampen the 
productive potential of phenomenological inquiry into fashion and clothing. 
Husserl’s early work, especially his elaboration of the method of the epoché as a 
suspension from the world of the natural attitude, and even his emphasis on the “silence of 
primary consciousness,” all fuel Derrida’s critique of phenomenology as metaphysical (cf. 
Derrida 2011). Husserl, especially in his later works, gets very little credit for developing 
a conception of essence as both bodily and as fundamentally historical (cf. 1970). In other 
words, the Husserlian conception of “essences” actually challenges the problematic 
paradigm of essences I have tracked throughout. In making essences fundamentally 
7 For Derrida, dualisms always produce hierarchies: dualisms are always dualisms of dominance and 
subordination. The production and reproduction of dualisms is for Derrida the fundamental “metaphysical 
gesture,” and in phenomenology—in its search for the essential structural features of consciousness—he sees 
no exception (1998, 236). Derrida writes: “An opposition of metaphysical concepts (speech/writing, 
presence/absence, etc.) is never the face-to-face of two terms, but a hierarchy and an order of subordination” 
(1982, 195). 
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historical, Husserl elevates the quest to understand the world of appearances without also 
naturalizing or subordinating them. 
Merleau-Ponty develops these aspects of Husserlian phenomenology more fully. 
His emphasis on the reversibility of visibility/invisibility, his concept of the world as flesh, 
of the chiasmic nature of perception, and so on, may all be read as attempts to deepen the 
anti-metaphysical thrust of phenomenology. The development of a non-dualistic ontology 
is not novel to Merleau-Ponty, and as I will show in Chapter VI, is both indebted to Husserl 
and is itself fruitful for developing a positive conception of dress and clothing that do not 
capitulate to the metaphysical subordination I track throughout the dissertation. In his 
introduction to the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty, coming to Husserl’s 
defense, writes that “Husserl’s essences are destined to bring back all the living 
relationships of experience, as the fisherman’s net draws up from the depths of the ocean 
quivering fish and seaweed” (2012, lxxix). In “Eye and Mind,” he writes that “the gradient 
[of perception] is a net we throw out to see, without knowing what we will haul back in it” 
(1964, 160). There is indeed a conception of “essence” in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty alike, 
but they are conceptions of essence which are non-ideal, and which do not fully submit to 
the metaphysical mismanagement that Derrida accuses.  
Merleau-Ponty departs from Husserl in his much more robust development of a 
non-dualistic ontology, or ontological monism (2012). While essences are non-ideal in 
Husserl, the absolute primacy of transcendental consciousness is difficult to shirk, or to 
square with the idea that Husserl really is the anti-metaphysician he set out to be. 
Phenomenology is not free of metaphysics, but neither is it guilty of reproducing its most 
pernicious dualisms. Against the mimetic paradigm, Merleau-Ponty writes that “painting 
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celebrates no other enigma but that of visibility” (1964, 166). But it is not only 
phenomenology’s attention to visibility that makes it a methodological ally for a project 
about fashion, but its reorientation to other sense modalities as constitutive of experience. 
In other words, it is not only the realm of the visual that constitutes appearances. Touch, 
the way one feels in particular clothing, for instance, informs perception, (including self-
perception).  
 I take it as absolutely essential that we are not to mistake “progress” in 
metaphysical debates for progress in their real-life iterations. The “fashion police” have a 
strong normative force that should not be underestimated. It is not the case that just because 
Nietzsche proclaimed that “there is no ‘being’ behind the deed,” and Butler—taking up 
Nietzsche’s invitation—wrote that “there is no gender identity behind the expressions of 
gender,” that the (feminist) metaphysical issue is at all settled (Nietzsche 2006, 26; cf. 
Butler 1990, 34). So far, I have said very little about the specific ramifications of the 
metaphysical distinction I have been tracking for a conception of clothing. It is my view 
that the same suspicion, distrust, or worry about the world of appearances that has 
characterized so much of philosophy’s history is indelibly tied to its subordination of the 
feminine, a subordination which is itself characterized by a “distrust” of feminine 
appearance, especially as manifest in clothing. I turn now to the feminization of fashion 
that has supported the subordination of appearances, or, as Karen Hanson puts it, a 
philosophical “hostility to fashionable dress” (cf. 1990, 107). 
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The Feminization of Fashion 
Of all “appearances,” fashion may be among the most distrusted. Karen Hanson has argued 
that both feminism and philosophy share an unexpected alliance in their mutual distrust of 
fashion: a mutual hostility to fashionable dress (1990, 107). An “anti-femininity” has 
gripped feminist philosophy, both implicitly and explicitly. Entire texts devoted to the 
subject of feminine subjectivity have little to say about clothing and its role in the 
construction of femininity (Brownmiller 1984; Hekman 2014). Many who have tackled the 
subject head on have dismissed fashion and dress on the grounds that femininity is a 
derivative or byproduct of masculinity, or that its constitution as a set of signifiers for 
oppression and subordination means that it cannot be reclaimed or resignified on its own 
terms (Bartky 1990; Jeffreys 2005). There are those whose rejection of the fem/masc-
subordination/domination dyads have taken the form of valorizing and celebrating that 
which has historically been put down, subordinated, and dismissed (Irigaray 1985a, 1985b; 
Wolf 1990; Scott 2005; cf. Whitford 2014). This approach, characterized by Luce Irigaray 
and Linda Scott, constitutes what I have called feminine metaphysics: a metaphysics which, 
in its reversal of the binary, risks reproducing it. It also characterizes what Sandra Bartky 
criticizes as a liberal feminist approach which would seek in feminine clothing the power 
of individual choice in signifying or resignifying meaning and value.  
The social constructivist approach to gender, taken up by many feminist 
philosophers, has not propelled a sympathetic treatment of femininity as a social construct 
(Bartky 1990). This is due at least in part to the fear of capitulating to the “eternal 
feminine,” especially prevalent in the landmark work of Simone de Beauvoir (2010). The 
rejection of essentialism in feminist theory has often meant overlooking nuances and 
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complexities in certain strains of feminist thought, like that of Irigaray, who was at the least 
attempting to really think and thematize femininity (cf. Deutscher 2002; Grosz 2011; 
Chanter 1995; Salamon 2018b). Beauvoir’s critique of femininity is motivated by the worry 
that “femininity” has become a code-name for—has become commensurate with—
subordination. In becoming naturalized onto women in particular, femininity becomes a 
state of achievement (one becomes who one is as a woman by being feminine) disguising 
its true reality: a mechanism of enforced subordination. For Beauvoir, “femininity” is 
another word for “domination.” 
Anti-femininity is its own essentialism. I follow Julia Serrano when she writes that 
the “antifemininity tendency may represent the feminist movement’s single greatest 
tactical error” (168). Serrano shows how the seeming incompatibility between feminism 
and femininity capitulates to a “sexist interpretation of femininity,” understood as the 
function of sexism to subordinate femininity to masculinity. One way that this happens is 
through the interpretation of feminine self-presentation as existing solely to entice or attract 
men, and thus, an interpretation of femininity as a discourse of heterosexual normalization 
(cf. 2007, 172). Even when femme subjects do not dress with this expressed aim in mind, 
theorists like Sandra Bartky write that femininity nonetheless continues to work against 
them, or to perpetuate their own subordination (1990). Many feminist Foucauldians argue 
that femininity is a discursive exercise which functions to maintain the hegemony of a 
patriarchal order (cf. Bartky 1990; Jagose 2010; McRobbie 2015). For instance, McRobbie 
writes that “overly and demonstrably feminine” appearance in the workplace functions to 
appease women’s desire to be sexually attractive to men without threatening men in 
presumably dominant positions on the corporate ladder. The discourse of femininity, then, 
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functions to appease women by giving them the option to “have it all,” albeit, at their own 
expense. 
Antifemininity maintains a “unilateral” view of femininity: the view that femininity 
cannot simply signify differently just because the expressed aim or intention of the 
individual femme or feminine subject differs from that of its public reception. For Serano, 
the unilateral view of femininity is equivocal to the myth of the eternal feminine. In other 
words, the view that femininity must be rejected on account of its function as a discourse 
of oppressive, heterosexual normalization ends up reifying femininity as a set of “eternal” 
signifiers. As Serano and many other scholars have attempted to show, the unilateral view 
of femininity is itself not only a historically and culturally specific one, but is white, 
middle-classed, and cis-sexed (cf. Gilman 2002; Skeggs 1997; Serano 2007; cf. Dahl 2010, 
2012, 2019). While clothing is often treated as if it is inherently or naturally sexed—as if 
certain garments naturally correspond to differing bodies—many garments have 
undergone radical alterations and (gendered) determinations that challenge the view that 
the concern with aesthetic presentation somehow belongs to, or inheres in femininity.  
Femininity has not been given the same treatment as other “discourses.” In failing to 
account for its historical specificity, to interrogate its constitution, to question its 
metaphysics, and to investigate its possibilities, the silence as well as the outright 
repudiation of femininity by (feminist) philosophers has perpetuated its status as a 
(seemingly) universal discourse or set of signifiers. 
Contrary to the “myth of the eternal feminine,” femininity as it has come to be 
known today (at least in the West) is itself largely the product of a specific historical event: 
the Great Masculine Renunciation. The Great Masculine Renunciation marks a symbolic 
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historical moment at the end of the 18th century, in England and France predominantly, 
when adornment, refinement, and ornamentation were renounced as central defining 
features of masculine dress, and relegated thereafter to the feminine (cf. Flügel 1930). 
Inspired by Enlightenment ideals and philosophy, men relinquished their claim to beauty 
in favor of a pursuit of reason, understood as its antithesis. Elevated social status was 
previously achieved by the prevalence of impractical clothing (and their signification of 
luxury). However, this shifted in alliance with the Enlightenment, as the (masculine) ideal 
of “utility” gradually came to replace the previous ideal of beauty (cf. Kremer 2020). A 
similar phenomenon seized the U.S., when Benjamin Franklin famously gave up his wig 
during the revolution (cf. Peiss 2011).  
The “becoming” feminine of fashion is significant and reveals an important insight 
that my dissertation will take up: that the gendering (and subsequent maligning) of dress is 
a historically contingent fact and not an ahistorical, a priori, metaphysical truth. It is my 
view that the “feminization” of fashion, or the designation of clothing as a uniquely 
feminine concern, has perpetuated its erasure as a meritorious topic of philosophical 
concern. I understand “feminization” itself as roughly synonymous with the concern for, 
or love of the world of appearances so denigrated throughout the history of philosophy. I 
thereby take the “feminization” of fashion as an extension of the subordination of 
appearances to essences I have tracked throughout the introduction so far. Specifically, I 
understand the making-feminine, and the policing of femininity in particular, as a mode of 
maintaining the metaphysical dyad between essences and appearances, and of the 
subordination of the latter to the former in particular. Aesthetic presentation (and 
especially, perceived mis-representation) continue to perpetuate the “appearance-reality 
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contrast” between the biologically sexed body and one’s gender presentation in particular: 
where the “reality” (one’s sexed body) is taken to be the truth of one’s gendered 
presentation. This metaphysical view, which subordinates the world of appearances for the 
world of essences, is also at the heart of the natural attitude about sex and gender, where 
gender is understood as an extension of one’s biological sex.  
I understand a hesitancy to take up fashion and clothing in feminist theory in terms 
of the distinction I made at the beginning between feminist and feminine metaphysics. For 
instance, feminist theorists have been and ought to be concerned with the reification of 
feminine qualities as natural or as naturalized onto feminine bodies, themselves often 
understood or read as cis-gendered bodies. The refusal of such a naturalization is a refusal 
of a femin-ine metaphysics which would only reify the “myth of the eternal feminine.” A 
femin-ist metaphysics, however, should still attend to (the history of) femininity as a 
valuable source of insight for feminist projects. In not taking up fashion and clothing, 
appearances continue to be subordinated to essences in a number of ways significant for 
feminism. The abandoning of ornamental, bright, decorative clothing by men during the 
“Great Renunciation” has been linked to the influence of Enlightenment ideas and ideals, 
specifically, the rise of utility or function over beauty and the beautiful (cf. Bourke 1996, 
Flügel 1930, Kremer 2020). As Flügel put it, the phenomenon of renunciation refers to the 
time when men “abandoned their claim to be considered beautiful… [and] henceforth 
aimed at being only useful” (Flügel 1930, 111). On my view, the renunciation clearly 
indicates a case where metaphysical schemas influence social life. I will say more about 
the genesis and history of these ideals in Chapter II.  
I turn now to another concrete example which illustrates how metaphysical 
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schemata influence experience. The natural attitude about sex and gender informs the 
“rhetoric of deception” prevalent in violence against transpersons understood as “liars” or 
“deceivers.” This is the archetype of the trans person as the “deceptive transsexual” (cf. 
Serano 2007). While clothing is not taken up or thematized in Gayle Salamon’s early work, 
it becomes vital in her more recent work on Latisha King, where she questions the vital 
role of gender norming in clothing as it played out in the death of Latisha King in 2008 (cf. 
2018). On February 14, 2008, fourteen-year-old Brandon McIninerney shot and killed 
fifteen-year-old Latisha King during a shared class at E.O Green Junior High School in 
Oxnard, California. Having previously disclosed her affection for McIninerney, the 
shooting is considered to be motivated by McIninerney’s own bias towards Latisha’s 
gender identity.  
Clothing plays a vital and under-theorized role in the production and enforcement 
of the disjunction between the body’s “felt sense” and their “corporeal contours” (cf. 
Salamon 2010). At the time of the shooting, the Ventura County Star wrote that Latisha 
“dressed in feminine attire and told friends he was gay” (2018a, 27). Both Latisha’s 
“telling” and her “dressing” function as two different modes of expression that “announce 
two different kinds of identification, the first of gender and the second of sexuality” (27). 
The rhetorical separation of Latisha’s dual transgressions—her gender expression and her 
sexuality—enabled the media to erase her transness. As Salamon argues, the erasure was 
facilitated by the refusal of the media to conceptualize the interrelation between gender 
(dressing) and sexuality (telling). Latisha’s case clearly illustrates to Salamon that non-
normative gender expression is seen as provocative in a way that normative gender 
expression is not: that is, that non-normative gender expression incites or provokes 
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violence. Salamon writes: “in suggesting that Latisha’s gender expression provoked 
Brandon McInerney to violence, they [the legal team] suggested in essence that by 
expressing her gender identity, Latisha authored her own murder” (2018a, 30). Trans 
embodiment is not the only way that feminine forms of gender expression become 
understood as inherently violable, but it is one of the most socially and politically pressing, 
as trans women continue to be violated and murdered at an alarming rate (cf. Human Rights 
Campaign 2020).  
In 2002, four men beat and killed Gwen Araujo in Newark, California. The men 
claimed that Araujo was to blame for her “sexual deception.” They are quoted as saying: 
“Sure we were angry. Obviously she led us on. No one knew she was a man” (Bettcher 
2007, 44). Araujo was subject to “sex verification” understood as “identity enforcement”: 
Araujo’s identity was understood to be whatever was disclosed by her genitals, and not by 
her own identification as a trans woman.  The mark of “deception,” somehow “confirmed” 
by the disjunction between genitalia and gender expression, both justifies the attribution of 
blame (the trans person is blamed for their deception), and thereby authorizes retribution 
(punishment for deceiving others). Even those who have undergone genital reconstruction 
surgery, Talia Mae Bettcher contends, have still been represented as deceivers (2007, 48). 
In cases like Araujo’s, dress is both that which facilitated her self-presentation, and that 
which instigated homicidal identity enforcement. Such enforcement capitulates to a 
metaphysics of sex discovery, where the sexed body is understood to be the essential reality 
underneath a dressed/gendered subject. As Salamon writes: "Conceiving of gender 
expression and sexual identity as fungible encourages people to look at gender expression 
as an act, and often as an aggressive act, akin to a sexual advance or even a sexual assault" 
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(2018, 30). 
Even as early as 400 B.C.E, aesthetic presentation in dress was understood as an 
indicator of biological sex. Diogenes Laertius recounts an incident between a young man 
and Diogenes the Cynic as follows: “When he was asked something by an effeminately 
dressed young man, Diogenes refused to say anything to him unless he first pulled up his 
clothes to show whether he was a woman or a man” (cf. 2012, 172). In this incident, sex 
verification also occurs as identity enforcement, and feminization is perceived as a threat 
to “male” identity that warrants interrogation. Given the prevalence of pederasty, the threat 
that the young man presents to Diogenes is not the threat of homosexuality or of sexual 
identity. When a youth complains to Diogenes of the large numbers of men pestering him 
for his affection, Diogenes advises that the young man should stop dressing in a feminine 
manner (cf. 2012, 145). The threat, then, is that of femininity itself, understood both as 
inherently shameful and as an invitation for sexual advance. A third incident between 
Diogenes and an “effeminate” young man is recounted where Diogenes says: “‘Aren’t you 
ashamed,’ he said, ‘that you should have worse intentions for yourself than nature had? For 
nature made you a man, and yet here you are, forcing yourself to become a woman’” (144). 
In 1915, American philosopher Charlotte Perkins Gilman claimed that “[t]he mere 
insistence on a totally different costume for men and women is based on this idea—that we 
should never forget sex” (Gilman 2002, 10).  
Dress is a significant way through which a binary sexual hierarchy is maintained 
when it is relies on a genital-centric conception of sex, of gender, and the “alignment” of 
the two in public presentation. As Susan Stryker observes, there is a very real difference 
between “passing” and not. She writes: “Being perceived or ‘passed’ as a gender-normative 
33 
cisgender person grants you a kind of access to the world that is often blocked by being 
perceived as trans or labeled as such” (2017, 8-9).Misaligning biological sex and self-
presentation becomes tantamount to lying, and the implication of this is that “correctly 
aligned cases” offer a “disclosure of genital status on a regular basis through gender 
presentation” (Bettcher 2007, 52-3). Bettcher writes: “This is ironic, of course, since one 
of the main functions of attire is to conceal the sexed regions of the body. Yet insofar as 
gendered attire and gender presentation more generally indicate genital status, systematic 
symbolic genital disclosures are secured through the very items designed to conceal sexed 
body” (2007, 53). The naturalization of gender identity and gender expression alike onto a 
biologically sexed body produces a “shallow” conception of the identification of others—
of identity—as little else then the expression of one’s biological sex through genitalia.  
Debates in the metaphysics of gender have not considered the role that fashion and 
dress have played in supporting the gender binary, the collapse of the sex-gender 
distinction, nor the metaphysical apparatus upholding them. The “metaphysics of gender” 
is a moniker for debates in gender essentialism more broadly, insofar as the concern for 
essences, as illustrated in the above section, has been metaphysicalized throughout 
philosophy’s history (cf. Witt 1995, 2011). My project is not one in the metaphysics of 
gender, but in the metaphysics of clothing. While there are significant overlaps, the 
metaphysics of clothing is not reducible to the metaphysics of gender, although it is 
supported by many of the same beliefs: namely, the belief in a “metaphysics of substance,” 
understood as a natural kind essentialism or as gender realism (Witt 1985, 2011). Taking a 
cue from the Aristotelean idea that essences are natural kinds, Charlotte Witt writes that 
“[t]hose who would advocate gender essentialism understood as kind essentialism mistake 
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what is social and variable for what is natural and fixed” (2011, 7-8). Certainly, clothing 
represents a serious and overlooked way in which gender essentialism, understood as 
masked sex essentialism, manifests. In other words, the belief that there are “correct” forms 
of clothing for “each” sex, evidenced by “boy” and “girl” clothing sections in stores, 
indicates an essentialism about gender presentation that doubles as an essentialism about 
sex.   
Judith Butler’s conception of performativity as a style of being that also expresses 
being has been central to the disruption of biologically-reductive gender essentialism of 
the kind that concerns Witt, and which has plagued the metaphysics of gender more 
broadly. Although Butler herself engages extensively with butch and femme subjects as 
subjects whose very embodiments of their gender dispels tropes about gender by subverting 
or denaturalizing them, she says very little about clothing itself. In Gender Trouble (1990), 
Butler references drag in order to suggest that the donning of “differently” gendered 
garments functions to destabilize gender. The subversion of gender enacted by drag is not 
found in the “swapping” of gendered norms of dress, but in destabilizing the myth of 
gendered origins, including those of dress. In other words, it is not the case that feminine 
clothing belongs to heterosexual female-sexed bodies, and masculine dress to heterosexual 
male-sexed bodies. In Gender Trouble (1990) clothing is mentioned only once, in the 
context of the legal obligation of Herculine Barbin to dress in men’s clothing (336). For 
Butler, this indicates the “juridical and regulatory pressures of the category of ‘sex’” 
manifested in the imposition of “men’s” clothing. 
In Bodies that Matter (1995), Butler discusses drag performance, including drag 
clothing, stemming principally from an analysis of the film Paris Is Burning (1991), where 
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the use of clothing in the drag balls chronicled by the film is primarily understood as a 
mechanism for illustrating and destabilizing norms of gender, including its intersections 
with race and class. Contestants are judged based on their performative embodiment of 
different categories (“Ivy League student”; “butch queen”; the “executive”): all of which 
are judged based on the believability or “likeness” of the contestants’ appearance. In other 
words, what determines the winner in each category is the respective contestants’ ability 
to embody, reiterate, and impersonate the norms that govern each category (88). For Butler, 
the performances effect “realness,” understood as the production of naturalization, or, the 
production of a seeming or appearing natural, where no “artifice” is detected: a 
“disjunction” between a contestant’s appearance and the meaning (or essence) of that 
appearance. Butler writes: “Significantly, this is a performance that works, that effects 
realness, to the extent that it cannot be read. For ‘reading’ means taking someone down, 
exposing what fails to work at the level of appearance, insulting or deriding someone” (88). 
Butler’s thematization of gender as performativity—an appearance that is its own 
essence—enacted a metaphysical shake-up. Indebted both to Nietzsche’s critique of 
metaphysics and to Merleau-Ponty’s conception of style as a way of being that also 
expresses being, the novelty of Butler’s position was in developing the critique of 
metaphysics as a critique of the metaphysics of sex and gender specifically. But subsequent 
discussions of gender as style have paid very little attention to clothing as a site of style 
which meaningfully informs gender. For instance, Ephraim das Janssen writes that while 
clothing is “frequently one very visible aspect” of gender expression, gender expression is 
“not simply about clothing” (2017, 59). And yet the fact that gender expression exceeds 
clothing should not mean that there are so few discussions of clothing as a meaningful site 
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of gender expression. In the case of Janssen, who takes up both Butler and phenomenology, 
the dismissal and elision of clothing from the conversation does more harm than good in 
perpetuating harmful tropes about femininity in particular. Throughout his text, Janssen 
writes that the “value of the feminine” cannot be proven within a framework that accepts 
its inferiority. Instead of challenging its inferiority, however, Janssen—following in the 
footsteps of Sandra Bartky—reaffirms the supposed inferiority of the feminine by not 
recuperating it for analysis.   
Scholarship in what has come to be known in anthropology as “critical femininity 
studies” or “femme studies” aims to disrupt anti-femininity essentialism (Dahl 2019; cf. 
Walker 2012). The starting point for critical femininity studies is that it does not begin with 
the assumption that femininities are “primarily an effect or imposition of dominant men 
and masculinities” (Giunta 2020, 1). Since femininity is replaced with femininities, the 
same metaphysical hangups do not hold for the burgeoning anthropological sub-discipline 
as it does for philosophy. Ulrika Dahl’s ethnographic work on femme subjects around the 
world disrupts the hegemonic narrative of femininity as a trait of cis-sexed, heterosexual 
women in particular (2010). Mishali argues that non-binary femme subjects in particular 
destabilize the connection (what I would thematize as a bias) that connects femininity with 
attraction to men (2014). The presumption that feminine subjects are both cis-gendered and 
heterosexual plagues feminist critiques of femininity (cf. Connell 1987; Bartky 1988, 
1990). While scholars of critical femininity studies take their cue and inspiration from the 
work of Judith Butler, they depart from Butler in a few significant ways. Rather than 
primarily understanding (certain) femme embodiments as a subversion of heterosexualism 
and gendered norms, critical femininity studies, as I understand it, aims to begin with queer 
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femininity as an originary phenomena, not as “Other” to heterosexualized femininity and 
to masculinity.  
I do not engage critical femininity/femme studies in any detail in the dissertation, 
nor do I begin with femininity as its own starting point. My goals are different. While I 
also adopt an anti-essentialism about clothing, I believe that the bias which pits fashion, 
ephemerality, and femininity against essence, truth, and philosophy, is one that can be 
corrected for with recourse to philosophy’s own history. In this vein, I opt to use the 
“master’s tools” to dismantle the master’s house, or maybe just the master closet (cf. Lorde 
1984). Philosophy is not hostile to fashion; canons of philosophical history have just made 
very little room for it. As I will endeavor to show throughout the dissertation, philosophers 
have had plenty to say about clothing and fashion, both implicitly and explicitly. In mining 
many of these resources and offering preliminary analyses of them, I endeavor to create a 
starting point, a capsule closet if you will, filled with the staples of fashion philosophy.  
Outline of Chapters 
The five major chapters of the dissertation can be divided into two thematic parts. Part I 
comprises Chapters II, III, and IV, and centers on the project of “recovery,” or rather, the 
project of “raiding”  philosophy’s closet for new (old) tools to wield in the development of 
a philosophy of fashion. Part I deals most explicitly and directly with the history of 
philosophy. In Chapter II I argue that the Biblical or theological relationship between 
women and clothing cements the metaphysical distinction between essences and 
appearances that I take issue with throughout the dissertation: a distinction that I trace 
through Kant and then through Levinas. In Chapter III, I trace the role of clothing in the 
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development of the materialist philosophy of Diderot, Marx, and Benjamin: the recovery 
of which is vital for the project of problematizing an understanding of clothing as 
“superfluous” to meaningful philosophical analysis. Chapter IV, on Eugen Fink, is a 
fulcrum between the two major parts of the dissertation, insofar as I read Fink’s major text 
on fashion, Mode: Ein Verführerisches Spiel (Fashion: a Seductive Game) (1969), both as 
a vital but neglected text in the history of philosophy, and as a meaningful application of 
(clothing) theory to contemporary life. Part II analyzes just some of the social and political 
implications of a metaphysical schema in which clothing is made to be “only” or “merely” 
about the world of appearances. Chapter V attends to one of the most insidious 
manifestations of the appearance/reality dyad I track throughout the project: its apparition 
in what I call the “coloniality of clothing.” Chapter VI investigates the formative role of 
clothing in the constitution of subjectivity.  
In Chapter II, “The Theology of Clothing,” I begin—where else?—at the beginning 
(or at least a beginning). There, I trace the origins and the genesis of femininity-cum-
superfluity as it is tied to clothing in order to support the larger claim of the dissertation 
that the identification of femininity with superfluity has an enduring normative force. I 
attend to Judeo-Christian theology in particular with a focus on the story of “Genesis” 
primarily because such theology undergirds the history of metaphysics so central to my 
project overall. Given that there is no distinction between sex and gender as it is conceived 
today in the Bible (and equally for Kant and Levinas, around whom my chapter is centered) 
I take the normative dimension of clothing in the Bible primarily to indicate a naturalization 
of clothing onto cishet subjects. In other words, clothing does not only differentiate men 
from women, but understands men and women as cishet subjects and further understands 
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clothing to signify these categories. For Kant and Levinas alike, clothing does not exist as 
a cultural invention but as a “natural fact” around which their accounts are informed. In 
this chapter, I will show that clothing plays a key role in both Kant and Levinas’ accounts 
of women and of femininity alike. Specifically, I will show that an attention to the role of 
clothing in each thinker will illuminate their respective reliance on a naturalized account 
of feminine inferiority. In this chapter, I concentrate primarily on accounting for the genesis 
of what I will develop in Chapter V as the naturalization of clothing.  
In Chapter III, “Fashion and Materialism,” I consider the role of clothing and of 
fashion in the development of the thinking of three significant materialist philosophers: 
Diderot, Marx, and Benjamin. I show that fashion and clothing are not incidental or 
“superfluous” considerations, but central to the history of materialism I trace here. In doing 
so, I argue that these reflections are vital to the respective philosophies of each of the three 
thinkers. Similarly as is the case in Chapter II, the work of this chapter aims to account for 
the vital role of femininity and of clothing within the history of philosophy. In stark contrast 
with Kant and Levinas, clothing is unabashedly and admittedly central to the development 
of the history of ideas presented here in these three thinkers. In other words, it enjoys a 
relatively positive status and recognized role as a site of theoretical acumen and insight. 
That so little has been made up of the role of clothing and fashion in these three thinkers 
indicates, while not a bias of their own, a theoretical or disciplinary bias against the subjects 
as relevant, vital, and “serious” enough for philosophy.  
In Chapter IV, “Eugen Fink: Phenomenologist of Fashion,” I look to Eugen Fink 
as a phenomenological philosopher of fashion. There, I offer one of the first English-
language commentaries on Eugen Fink’s untranslated Mode: Ein Verführerisches Spiel 
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(Fashion: a Seductive Game) (1969). Although itself drawn on very little in philosophy, 
those who have drawn on the text have done so primarily to place Fink in a line of 
philosophers who write about Fashion and dress (cf. Marino 2017). I read the book both as 
an important contribution to Fink’s philosophical oeuvre and as a novel contribution to the 
history of philosophy and to the history of phenomenology in particular. I will argue that 
the text develops Fink’s ontology of play in addition to offering an early indication of a 
conception of phenomenology as a critical practice, or what has more recently come to be 
considered as critical phenomenology. Attending to Fink’s phenomenology in connection 
to fashion will help to lay the groundwork for my last and final chapter, where I detail the 
possibilities of a phenomenological approach to fashion and clothing.  
In Chapter V, “The Naturalization of Clothing,” I attend to naturalization as it 
pertains to clothing. I understand naturalization to be a process whereby values and 
meanings become naturalized, or, made to seem and to appear natural understood as self-
evident: embedded or embodied not only in or on individuals, but on groups and 
populations. I understand naturalization as a necessary byproduct of a metaphysics of 
essences or a substance metaphysics. Colonialism, and its related iterations in neocolonial 
“dress policing” (including the criminalization of clothing and veiling bans) all gain ground 
through the production of homogenous groups and populations for policing. What I will 
call the coloniality of clothing is a specific mechanism of clothing’s naturalization which 
has served colonialism’s ends, and which continues to wield power and dominance as a 
tool for neocolonialism. Naturalization is a continuously developing or ongoing historical 
process which not only makes natural, but functions by continuing to make natural in its 
reliance on sedimented meanings and values. In other words, while taken to be natural or 
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self-evident—as “always having been this way”—I posit that naturalization is an ongoing 
process which is sustained by continued instances of reproduction. What becomes 
“naturalized” onto clothing are specific values, and the naturalization of those values often 
serve sexist, racist, xenophobic ends.  
In Chapter VI, “Recovering Our Clothes,” I cultivate a conception of clothing as 
that which personalizes subjects, or which meaningfully informs subjectivity by drawing 
primarily on Iris Marion Young’s essay, “On Women Recovering Our Clothes” (2005). 
Sandra Bartky argues that femininity is a “mere” style of the flesh which ultimately 
capitulates to inherently patriarchal standards of beauty. Against Bartky, Iris Marion 
Young argues that femininity and feminine subjectivity may be better explored and 
understood through “touch” rather than through the lens of the objectifying male gaze: the 
filter through which Bartky’s conception of femininity is formed. Young advocates for the 
recuperation of “pleasure” in feminine clothing: a pleasure that is not, as Bartky worries, 
nothing other than the pleasure derived from pleasing or appeasing the male gaze, whether 
literal (as objectifying in time and space) or as internalized (as the subconscious adoption 
of normative ideals of feminine beauty). With recourse to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, I 
develop Young’s discussion of touch as a feminist resource for femme and feminine 
subjects to re-cover their pleasure in their clothes in order to argue that her thematization 
of touch in the essay does not capitulate to a mere reversal of the vision/touch dyad, in 
which objectifying, masculinist vision is simply traded for a feminine sensibility of touch. 
Ultimately, my analysis situates lived experiences of clothing and femininity alike as 
meaningful and constitutive sites of subjectivity.  
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Conclusion 
My dissertation constructs a history that has always existed, although it has been relegated 
to the proverbial back end of the closet. Researching this project has felt very much like 
rediscovering an old garment, which, in its rediscovery, becomes new or renewed. What I 
set out to do and what I did are two very different things, for in my research I discovered 
that the project was not to develop a philosophy of clothes, for it already existed. My task, 
instead, became to create something new from the scraps of philosophical fabric. 
Philosophers have had plenty to say about fashion and clothing; many of us just haven’t 
listened. I have already suggested that this inattention has been a willful one, conditioned 
both by metaphysical bias and a long-standing history of a supposedly natural or essential 
feminine inferiority, both of which are inextricably bound up with clothing. In paying 
serious attention to clothing, the dissertation disrupts both biases. 
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“The philosophy of clothes is the philosophy of human nature.” 
— Gerardus Van Der Leeuw 
II. THE THEOLOGY OF CLOTHING
Introduction 
Biblical metaphors about clothing are not only metaphors: they indicate an entire 
metaphysics of clothing which has been supported by theology. To be “clothed by grace,” 
for instance, signals that divinity may protect the spirit in at least an analogous way to the 
manner that clothes cover the body. Theological understandings of the world, including the 
natures of those who live in it, still endure. When gospel is understood as, well, gospel, 
then the task of historicization required by problematization stagnates. In other words, the 
hold of the “a priori” is especially strong when it comes to theology. For this reason, the 
dissertation formally begins by challenging some of the core metaphysical biases of 
“Genesis.” Throughout the chapter, I will refer principally to theology instead of 
metaphysics in order to signal a particular metaphysics that is bound up in beginnings. I 
will trace the origins and the genesis of femininity-cum-superfluity as it is tied to clothing 
in order to support one of the larger claims of the dissertation that the identification of 
femininity with superfluity has an enduring normative force. The superfluous—meaning 
inessential or external to—takes shape in Kant and Levinas as the uncredited or discredited 
ground, or condition of possibility, for each of their respective accounts. I will show that 
the feminine (and her clothing) are ultimately subordinated and devalued in favor of “real” 
philosophy. It is not only that particular values and characteristics (unreasonableness and 
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shame, among others) become naturalized onto clothing, women, and femininity alike, but 
that the constitutive role of all three becomes decentralized: tossed away like unsalvageable 
garments. In showing the vital, constitutive role they play, I aim both to disrupt their 
naturalization and re-center or re-focus them as generative of foundational insights for both 
Kant and Levinas alike.  
I attend to Judeo-Christian theology in particular with a focus on the story of 
“Genesis” primarily because such theology undergirds the history of metaphysics so central 
to my project overall. The Bible is especially rife with discussions of clothing, and such 
mentions primarily function to identify and to differentiate between the categories of man 
and woman. In Deuteronomy for instance, it is written that “woman shall not wear that 
which pertaineth unto a man,” and “neither shall a man put on a woman’s garment” 
(Deuteronomy 22:5). Written as a commandment, the statement betrays a powerful belief 
in the function of clothing to indicate sex and gender alike. The dictum functions as a 
regulative normative ideal: so much so, in fact, that the transgression of clothing’s norms 
(a woman dressing in a man’s garment, for instance) is considered an “abomination” that 
will be “detested” by God (cf. New King James Bible 22:5, Standard Bible 22:5; New 
International Version Deuteronomy 22:5). Given that there is no distinction between sex 
and gender as it is conceived today in the Bible (and equally for Kant and Levinas, around 
whom my chapter is centered) I take the normative dimension of clothing in the Bible 
primarily to indicate a naturalization of clothing onto cis-gendered, heterosexual (cishet) 
subjects. In other words, clothing does not only differentiate men from women, but 
understands men and women as cishet subjects and further understands clothing to signify 
these categories. 
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For Kant and Levinas alike, clothing does not exist as a cultural invention but as a 
“natural fact” around which their accounts are informed. In this chapter, I will show that 
clothing plays a key role in both Kant and Levinas’ accounts of women and of femininity 
alike. Specifically, I will show that an attention to the role of clothing in each thinker will 
illuminate their respective reliance on a naturalized account of feminine inferiority. In this 
chapter, I concentrate primarily on accounting for the genesis of what I will develop in 
Chapter V as the naturalization of clothing. To begin (Section I), I will briefly situate Kant 
within a broader framework of an inherited metaphysics subordinating appearances to 
essences. I argue that Kant’s reading of Genesis in the “Conjectures on the Beginning of 
Human History” (1786) naturalizes women and clothing as superfluous: to humankind and 
to the ascent of reason alike. However, their function as the condition of possibility for 
Kant’s own system will show that they are anything but superfluous, but essential. In 
Section II, I will turn to Levinas as another prime example of the endurance of such a 
metaphysics in the history of philosophy. There, I will show that Levinas thematizes shame 
and femininity as co-constitutive of one another: both of which are indelibly tied to 
discourses of dress and of nudity which further reify a normative understanding of 
femininity as that which is regulated by modesty and shame. I suggest that modesty and 
shame are themselves regulated by norms of dress and clothing, and vice versa. In the final 
section (Section III), I turn to Irigaray’s critique of Levinas and suggest specifically that 
her call to “dress differently” ought to be interpreted in the context of the inherited 
theological history outlined in the first two sections.  
My analysis will ultimately suggest that both thinkers naturalize women and 
clothing as superfluous: for Kant, superfluous to humankind and to the ultimate ascent of 
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reason; and for Levinas, superfluous to ethics and to ethical consideration more broadly. I 
contend that an understanding of the naturalization of femininity within the history of 
philosophy can aid future feminist projects in accounting for the naturalization of: 1) 
feminine bodies as biologically female bodies, 2) female bodies as bodies that ought to be 
feminine bodies, and 3) feminine bodies as shameful bodies. Attention paid to the 
construction of femininity through the lens of the theology of clothing preliminarily 
challenges all three as “natural” facts, and further, proves that all three are anything but 
superfluous.  
Kant’s Conjectures 
Kant’s essay was written in the period between the first two critiques. In what follows, I 
will first briefly discuss the first two critiques in order to contextualize the “Conjectures” 
within Kant’s corpus and his thinking more broadly. Kant’s simultaneous concern for the 
possibilities of (human) reason and for a corresponding metaphysics in the first critique is 
extended to his extensive discussion and interpretation of “Genesis” in the “Conjectures.” 
In the essay, reason itself is conceived of in terms of its “genesis,” and in fact, Kant 
primarily reads “Genesis” as an account of reason’s ascension or becoming. Just as 
humankind becomes itself through the Fall, so too does reason simultaneously come into 
its own. Adam indeed acts as a template for the conception of moral agency that Kant will 
go on to develop in much more detail in the second critique. More significantly however, 
as I will argue below, the “genesis” and ascension of reason is only made possible through 
Eve’s covering-up of herself. I argue that the act naturalizes both shame and clothing onto 
a feminine body conceived as un-reasonable. It is against this foil of unreason that reason 
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(through Adam) is able to reach its own heights. 
In the first critique, Kant’s concern with metaphysics manifests as the concern for 
the possibilities of a priori knowledge, which Kant identifies with reason (1781/1999). The 
project of the first critique therefore considers the possibilities that human reason has or is 
capable of attaining a priori knowledge. Metaphysics, then, is primarily about reason for 
Kant: including the nature, scope, and limits of its domain. As “the inventory of all we 
possess through pure reason,” metaphysics for Kant is more indicative of a system of 
human knowledge. Kant’s thesis on transcendental idealism (the transcendental aesthetic) 
maintains that human beings only ever experience mere appearances, and not things as they 
are in themselves (1781/1999, 104). According to one dominant view of Kant’s 
transcendental aesthetic (beginning with Christian Garve and J.G Feder’s review published 
in 1782, known as the Göttingen Review), Kant essentially maintains the traditional “two-
worlds” metaphysics which distinguishes between appearances and “objective” reality (cf. 
Garve 1782; see Sassen 2000; see also Strawson 1966, Aquila 1983, Guyer 1987, Van 
Cleve 1999, and Jankowiak 2017). This two-worlds or two-objects interpretation of Kant 
maintains the reality of things in themselves, despite the fact that they cannot be grasped 
by reason. The two-objects or two-worlds view eventually lost favor to what has come to 
be known as the two-aspects interpretation of the transcendental aesthetic: distinguishing 
not between two different, discrete kinds of worlds or realities, but instead between two 
sides or aspects of one and the same world.8 Interpretations of this view vary widely as to 
whether or not it actually commits Kant to a metaphysics whereby the world remains only 
partially available to us. According to the two-aspects theory, appearances are at least a 
8 For more on this interpretation, see Bird 1962, Bird 2006; Prauss 1974; Langton 1998; Allison 2004; and 
Allais 2015. 
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part of their objects and not merely mental representations of them. To put the difference 
simply: the latter theory takes Kant’s claim that human beings only ever experience 
appearances to mean that there is no other reality in which things “really” inhere, while 
the former does commit Kant to the view that there is in fact another, secondary reality.  
 The first critique is also a vital early work of Kant’s burgeoning moral philosophy: 
especially so for my purpose here because it is there that he begins to develop his account 
of freedom as a necessary condition for and precursor of moral evaluation, including moral 
consciousness. As I will show in my reading of the “Conjectures” below, the development 
of reason is bound up in the “freedom” from sexual temptation that Adam feels once Eve 
is clothed. Moral rightness or wrongness may only be ascribed to someone who was free 
to do otherwise: that is, someone able to control their desires and actions. Kant’s 
conception of the free moral agent who is able to direct and control their actions finds its 
model in the man controlling his sexual “impulses,” thematized as sexual desires which are 
literally tempered by clothing.  
  Despite the live issue of how many worlds there really are for Kant in the first 
critique, the second critique maintains that explanations for actions and events—
explanations which are themselves reliant on a conception of freedom—are unable to be 
derived from the world of appearances alone. This means that freedom is not actually 
“given” in experience, but arrived at through reason. In the second critique, Kant argues 
that the fledgling, free moral agent is subjected to—is responsible to—the categorical 
imperative. He also argues that the adherence to the categorical imperative does not 
actually inhibit freedom, meaning that ethical responsibility (duty) is compatible with 
freedom (1788, 5:29, 5:30, 5:39, 5:46, 5:48). The inhibition of acting on sexual desire, 
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tempered as it is through clothing, thereby indicates a metaphysical step in the reach toward 
reason. In the second critique, Kant writes that he is “gratified” by comparisons made 
between the second and first critique: that the comments “rightly occasion the expectation 
of being able some day to attain insight into the unity of the whole rational faculty” (2015, 
74, 5:91). It is in this vein that I read and understand the “Conjectures” as a contribution to 
the development of Kant’s critical project.
Between the first two Critiques Kant wrote what he called a “conjectural history” 
of the development of human freedom through a reading of “Genesis.” “Conjectures on the 
Beginning of Human History” (1786) is an account of man’s ascent above animal society 
through a conjectural or speculative reading of “Genesis” that functionally carves up a 
division between the animal and the moral.9 Despite Kant calling the essay a “work of 
9 After the publication of all three critiques, Christian garve went on to write “On Fashion” (1792) which 
was heavily influenced by his work on Kant. Garve’s free market Enlightenment ideals informed his view 
that fashion was a key element in the formation of a liberal democracy. Advancing an early iteration of 
technological utopianism—echoed today in discourses surrounding climate change most particularly—
Garve’s 1792 piece “On Fashion” suggests that as consumer goods, changes in fashion design are indicative 
of advancements towards an ultimately perfectable human society. He defines imitation as a primary 
motivation for the spread of fashion, identifying the desire for uniformity as part and parcel of human nature. 
Fashion, then, is to be understood as a movement towards uniformity through imitation. The language of 
teleological perfectibility, of societal utopianism, preempts correlated assumptions about evolution and 
evolutionary theory developed by Darwin decades later. Garve’s notion of a Spencerian form of social 
evolution indicates, more than anything, his own interpretation of Kant’s teleology: that is, at least for my 
purpose here, Kant’s emphasis on ultimate perfectibility.  This is significant because Garve seems to modify 
Kant’s notion of “inner” purposiveness by extending it beyond human consciousness and to a societal level. 
This renders fashion as a vehicle for a kind of evolutionary perfectibility. This understanding of fashion as 
ultimately teleological in nature works to render clothing itself as subordinate to its telos. This is not the same 
subordination that occurs when truth is located “beyond” the world of appearances, but bears an important 
structural similarity insofar as materiality becomes, yet again, a means to a higher-ordered end.  
Garve identifies two types of laws: immutable moral laws and laws of fashion which are governable 
by change.  As will become clearer later on, the distinction between fashion and morality can be traced back 
to Kant’s carving up of a distinction between reason and morality on the one hand, and unreason and the 
feminine on th eother. In accord with this distinction, Garve writes: “we can explain fashion as the dominant 
opinion of the beautiful and proper at any time in small matters, matters which cannot be regulated with 
unanimity by the application of the rules of either taste or utility” (67). The essence of fashion is marked 
precisely by its mutability: a mutability which has a ‘national’ character, i.e. he believes that the essence of 
fashion is different in different ‘nations’. He writes: “The mutability in everything concerning fashion arises 
from the drive for employment and the activity of the spirit, from the taste of the beautiful and the judgment 
of it, and finally from national industry. Because these factors are present among any people to a greater or 
lesser degree, this mutability will be greater or lesser in each nation” (68). Garve identifies the division of 
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fiction,” scholars have rightly taken seriously the developmental account of human 
freedom that Kant offers here in this text. While scholars like Chakrabarty (2016) and 
Baumeister (2019) concentrate primarily on the human-animal distinction, my aim is to 
understand the function that clothing has in producing a gendered metaphysics of shame 
which precludes women from Kantian freedom. Following Moira Gatens (1991) and 
Cornelia Klinger (1997), reason and unreason function as one of many gendered Kantian 
binaries, taking its place among, most notably, the (gendered) Kantian distinction between 
the beautiful and the sublime (cf. Mann 2006). These pivotal feminist interpretations of 
Kant have shown that the binaries and dichotomies employed by Kant are neither sex-
neutral nor gender-neutral. My analysis will show how shame becomes naturalized onto 
the feminine body: a feminine body constituted, in juxtaposition to Adam, as a site of 
unreason, or as the condition of possibility for Adam’s reason and freedom alike. In his 
own little-known text on fashion and dress, Eugen Fink (1969) wrote that Kant saw in 
Eve’s fig-leaf “the irritating effect of shame” (18). Perhaps it is because, as Silvan Tomkins 
wrote, shame is a key feature of intersubjective and thus of ethical life that “Genesis” 
includes an account of shame (1995).  
For Kant, the introduction of the fig-leaf specifically catalyzes the movement from 
instinct to the first step of reason and is ultimately what inaugurates human freedom. He 
writes that the arousal of desire is itself a property of reason (224). Accordingly, the fig-
leaf is “the product of a much stronger assertion of reason” (224). Elicited by the serpent’s 
tempting, desire in this case corresponds to the desire for the forbidden fruit. Since desire 
indexes both will and want for Kant, it indicates that the faculty of reason is its underlying 
labor and the proliferation of the bourgeois classes as that which marks the acceleration of this “essence” of 
mutability, though he does not pinpoint or criticize capitalism as such. 
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property or condition. It is Eve’s dilemma of desire specifically that interests Kant. While 
giving in to bodily temptations usually marks what Kant calls “animal” or “non-human” 
instincts, the pause that Eve gives to her initial choice to pick the fruit indicates to Kant a 
newfound possibility to choose against instinct, unlike the animal. Kant interprets the 
eating of the forbidden fruit not as the mere giving in to (animal) temptation, but as that 
which for the first time indicates the possibility of choice, despite Eve’s choice to indulge. 
It is precisely this newfound ability to choose one’s own way of life which marks the 
human—now fully human—from the animal.  
 The discovery of choice is what Kant calls the first step of reason to becoming fully 
realized. The tasting of the apple signifies the discovery of man’s ability to “choose his 
own way of life without being tied to any single one like the other animals” (224). Indeed, 
it is man’s ability, and not woman’s. The tasting of the apple is simultaneously a tasting of 
the first stage of freedom, juxtaposed to what Kant calls the state of servitude, understood 
as servitude or “animal”-like adherence to instinct (224). Eve’s choice, then, can be 
understood as the choice between reason (man) and un-reason (animal). It is the dilemma 
itself, and not the outcome specifically, which functions to indicate to Kant the radically 
human possibility of choice. However, it is Eve’s actual choice to eat the apple that places 
her squarely on the side of choosing un-reason. Although she is excluded from reason 
herself, Eve takes on the role of grounding reason’s possibility. 
 Eve’s un-choosing of reason is what results in the donning of the fig-leaf as first 
clothing. Since her choice marks both the advent of reason and the severance of the human 
from the animal, the fig-leaf becomes “the product of a great effort of reason itself,” as 
Eugen Fink calls it, and the product of a wholly human reason (1969, 22). In other words, 
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clothing catalyzes reason and simultaneously marks the human as human, or more 
specifically, “reason” marks man as reasonable and woman as unreasonable. We cannot 
then say that the fig-leaf merely “covers” the human body, since it is what actually marks 
or makes the human by ultimately differentiating human beings from animal kind. This 
collapses (challenges) the essence/appearance dualism. For Kant, there is no human before 
the fig-leaf: the nakedness of Adam and Eve before the Fall indicates human-animals, and 
not the human as such.  
The second step of reason involves its ability as a faculty to prolong sexual 
satiation, or acting on sexual desires (224). This happens (or rather, does not happen) 
through the development of the imagination, itself mediated by the function of clothing to 
conceal. The fig-leaf thereby becomes the first incentive for man’s development as a moral 
being, borne from his “sense of decency, his inclination to inspire respect in others by good 
manners (i.e. by concealing all that might invite contempt) as the proper foundation of all 
true sociability” (225). This is why Kant calls the donning of the fig-leaf an act “more 
important than the whole endless series of subsequent cultural developments” (225). It is 
the fig-leaf which ultimately makes man: not only by separating him from the animal, but 
by putting him squarely above them, and women (barely) above them. Rather than sexual 
desire and satiation being understood as periodic or episodic (Kant’s description of the 
animal’s sexual nature)—as happening during “mating seasons,” for instance—it now has 
a durational, temporal dimension. For Kant, the animal is that creature for whom sexual 
desire and stimuli occur transiently and periodically, while man is that creature who can 
choose to prolong satiety: sexual desire can be kept in wait, “chosen” not to be acted upon. 
The imagination is best equipped to function the farther away the object of sexual 
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desire is from the senses. While imagination in the third Critique “plays very much the role 
of the woman as possessor of a beautiful understanding,” and “is gendered feminine” 
(Mann 2006, 45), here in the Conjectures the imagination plays a constitutive role in its 
temptation of reason away from “animal nature.” The withdrawal of the object of desire 
from the senses renders sexual inclinations and impulses “more intense and lasting” (224). 
For Kant, this withdrawal—from the senses to the imagination—is an exhibition of having 
rational control over the impulses. This control is itself thematized as the function of reason 
to control oneself from acting on one’s sexual desires. This sense of control is praised by 
Kant as a significant development of reason, now able to plan and prepare for the future by 
tempering (man’s) sexual appetite. This “remarkable” step of reason which is now able to 
express reference to time by planning for future events is itself conditioned upon the 
condition of a distinctly heterosexual feminine modesty to temper male sexual desire. This 
insight lends credence to the idea that male temperance—further, that men “not” assaulting 
or raping women—ought to be lauded as a kind of virtue in itself (cf. Aponte 2020).  
And when they do, and even when they go so far as to kill the women whom they 
fantasize about—and here I have in mind the perpetrator of the March 2021 shootings of 
(predominantly) Asian women in Atlanta—their actions are treated by some as explainable 
on account of their sexual addiction. On his own admission to detectives, twenty-one-year- 
old Robert Aaron Long committed the murders in order to rid himself of “sexual 
temptation” (cf. Graham 2021). Based on Kant’s account, if “reason” is associated with 
prohibition, then Long’s decision to rid himself of the very temptation required by reason 
is itself a refusal of the dictum to be reasonable. Having been taught precisely that he should 
abstain from temptation, and that to give in is not only to act unreasonably but to disappoint 
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God, Long thought it better to eliminate the source of temptation than wrestle with his own 
views on women: to reason with himself. The promotion of the idea that men are less able 
to control their sexual urges than women are also promotes basic civility and respect for 
bodily autonomy as some kind of miraculous feat. Women, thereby charged with setting 
the sexual boundaries, become responsible for the promotion and provocation of sexual 
violence committed against them. Indeed, women’s clothing—“what was she 
wearing?”—is frequently used to justify sexual violence (cf. Awasthi 2017; Burnett 2018). 
 J. David Velleman has suggested that sex becomes shameful with the introduction 
of privacy that corresponds with clothing. The reference to genitalia as “private parts” 
(parties honteuses, or shameful parts) most clearly seems to indicate the association of 
sexual organs with privacy (2001, 31). Velleman writes: 
 
The realization that they [Adam and Eve] were naked must have been the 
realization that they were unclothed, which would have required them to envision 
the possibility of clothing. Yet the mere idea of clothing would have no effect on 
Adam and Eve unless they also saw why clothing was necessary. And when they 
saw the necessity of clothing, they were seeing—what, exactly? There was no 
preexisting culture to disapprove of nakedness or to enforce norms of dress. What 
Genesis suggests is that the necessity of clothing was not a cultural invention but a 
natural fact, evident to the first people whose eyes were sufficiently open. (31) 
 
The serpent’s message to Eve—that she does not have to obey—indicates more than a 
shame brought about by her own disobedience, but introduces the very notion of sex itself 
as shameful. In the divine injunction to “be fruitful and multiply,” sex between man and 
wife is not seen as shameful. It is only when the injunction is rejected, and thus made 
private through the donning of the fig-leaf, that it becomes shameful. Since it is “after sin 
that lust began,” desire understood as lust is only made possible when the sexual body 
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becomes a private body (31). When Jesus beseeches his followers in Sermon on the Mount 
not to worry about clothing or what to wear, it is because its very concern points to sexual 
disobedience (cf. Matt VI). Lambden interprets Adam and Eve’s covering-up of themselves 
after having disobeyed God to point to “the foolishness of humans thinking that they can 
cover their nakedness” (1992, 75). In other words, (human) clothing always points to the 
shameful folly of having fallen from divinity in the first place: the shame of being human. 
It is ultimately in the subordination of the animal to the human that reason finally 
becomes “completed” for Kant. Man now realizes that “he is the true end of nature, and 
that nothing which lives on earth can compete with him in this respect” (225). This 
“enduring Kantian fable,” as Chakrabarty puts it, strictly demarcates between our moral 
(human) and animal (biological) lives, which assumes that the animal dimension “would 
always be taken care of by the natural order of things,” or that animal life can more or less 
be understood as corresponding to those beings who can take care of themselves, while we 
(humans) “struggl[e], consciously, in search of a collective moral life” (2016, 378). One of 
the most striking comments that Kant makes on the human-animal distinction in the 
“Conjectures” is as follows:  
When he first said to the sheep ‘the fleece which you wear was given to you by 
nature not for your own use, but for mine’ and took it from the sheep to wear it 
himself [III. 21], he became aware of a prerogative which, by his nature, he enjoyed 
over all the animals; and he now no longer regarded them as fellow creatures, but 
as means and instruments to be used at will for the attainment of whatever ends he 
pleased. (225) 
Here we can clearly see that animality and clothing are just as co-implicated as the human 
is with the animal. As suggested earlier, it is both the wearing of clothing and the ascension 
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of man over animal that marks reason’s development. Here in this passage we can see 
clearly how the two are materially related: clothing is that which comes from animals, and 
is that which man feels entitled to take.  
 “Conjectures” is not the only place where Kant writes of the relationship between 
clothing and animality. In a section entitled “On the Character of Humanity in General” in 
the Friedländer anthropology lecture (1775) Kant describes clothing as that which 
“represses” bodily fluids (2012, 213). In trying to imagine what “kind” of animal the 
human would be—what Kant calls “the naked state”—he determines that the human would 
be a “crude” and “very ugly” animal (ibid). There, he makes a distinction between a 
“savage state” (less-developed human) and a “naked state” (animal). The former is 
characterized by the human retaining his beard, while in the latter, the beard disappears. It 
is in the latter that “the fluids which are now repressed by the clothes, and cause the beard, 
might evaporate more, and [the human being] would then naturally also be otherwise 
altogether crude” (ibid.) The citation indicates that Kant conceives of hair as a kind of 
clothing in itself, which is produced in order to cover up what clothing does not otherwise 
adequately protect. Thus, the “naked state” (or the animal state) is that which has been 
unmediated or evolutionarily affected by clothing. This recalls Kant’s analysis of human 
beings before the fall in the “Conjectures” (or better yet, as prehuman, as Fink puts it) as 
both animal-like and as un-clothed. The distinction between savage and naked, too, makes 
sense of the pre-fall Adam and Eve as more animal-like than “savage” like: more like 
animals than like “lesser” developed humans. 
 Kant’s account of the development of reason in the “Conjectures’ is an epigenetic 
one. Kant conceived of epigenesis as “the system of generic preformation, since the 
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productive power of the generating beings, and therefore the form of the species, was still 
preformed virtualiter in the intrinsic purposive predispositions imparted in the stock” 
(1790/1987, 309). Intrinsic purposivity is contrasted with a conception of evolution 
understood as non-virtual: that is to say, an account which involves actual material 
preformation. In evolution, “all relevant material pre-exists, and only its aggregation is 
shuffled, whereas in a product, altogether new things emerge, presumably by immanent 
processes” (Zammito 2003, 91). This epigenetic account is consistent with Kant’s belief 
that reason has insight “only into what it itself produces according to its own design,” or 
into the realm of appearances in accord with its principles (1999, 109). In other words, his 
account of reason is itself epigenetic. It is thus that the world becomes dependent on man 
in the most significant way. This core element of Kant’s idealism follows smoothly from 
his “conjectural” account of the beginning of human history. Since to be of the world is 
precisely to designate man’s “fall” into reason through his initial “temptation,” the world 
is quite literally dependent on him since it was his (epigenetic) ascent into reason that 
inaugurated his worldly condition to begin with. In addition, it indicates that woman’s 
“strong inborn feeling for all that is beautiful, elegant and decorated” can also be accounted 
for epigenetically as intrinsically purposive (1960, 81).  
Through his developmental account of reason, Kant’s reading of “Genesis” 
ultimately posits a conception of man as epigenetically progressive, and woman as the 
condition for the possibility of such progression. Since his epigenetic account relies on a 
biologized form of purposiveness, woman is both socially and biologically excluded from 
reason. In other words, it is not the case that Eve could have chosen differently. This means 
that the very “discovery of choice” Kant locates in the moment of decision as to whether 
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or not to heed temptation and to eat the forbidden fruit is itself an impossibility based on 
his own account. His conjectures, then, begin to sound less than conjectural—that is to say, 
like the work of fiction he claimed he was writing—and more like a significant 
development of an idealism predicated on a pernicious sexed and gendered bias.  
My analysis has shown that Kant’s reading of “Genesis” naturalizes women, the 
feminine, and clothing as necessary precursors: both to mankind and to the ultimate ascent 
of reason. Kant achieves this by creating a system of signification wherein all three are 
intimately linked, and where the presence of one functionally makes present the others. 
Conceived by Kant as “mere” conditions of possibility for the achievement of the ultimate 
philosophical endeavor (the emergence of reason), they are ultimately excluded from the 
domain of the properly philosophical: becoming, in their own way, superfluous for Kant, 
insofar as they are unnecessary for and unrelated to reason itself. 
By analyzing the genesis of femininity with Kant’s theology of clothing, rooted in 
sexism, I have laid the groundwork for challenging the ways that both clothing and 
femininity become essentialized and reproduced as instruments of shame and violence. I 
have also shown that femininity in Kant functions heteronormatively. The presumption of 
heteronormativity underlies many conceptions of the feminine through the history of 
philosophy, and continues to obscure the history of femme critique within queer studies, 
and critical femininity studies within anthropology (cf. Skeggs 2001; Dahl 2019). The 
future feminist task, then, is not as simple as disentangling “woman’” from the 
“feminine”—a project that Sandra Bartky declares as impossible—but to challenge the 
constitution of femininity itself as a homogenous phenomena. Reconstructing and 
disputing accounts like those of Kant, in which femininity is conceived of as “natural,” is 
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one step in this direction. 
Levinas, Shame, and the Feminine 
For Levinas, Kantian idealism is unable to respond to ethics and so unable to arrive at 
ethics as first philosophy, which it is for Levinas (cf. Levinas 1969, 1998). As Paul Davies 
aptly puts the difference between the two thinkers: “There is no way of getting from the 
Kantian reflection on the subjectivity of space, and time, to a sense of the subject ‘outside’ 
ontology,” that is, to ethics as first philosophy for Kant, which it is not (1998, 130). It is 
this specific concern for grounding ethics as first philosophy for Levinas that motivates his 
detailed reflections on ethical relations and shame, and which accounts for the prevalence 
of the related topics of clothing and femininity. In a framework in which ethical relations 
are primary, “Genesis” represents a fundamentally ethical text for Levinas simply by virtue 
of being a story about beginnings (cf. Cohen 1986, 30). The ethical imperative is therefore 
not a derivative one, which is to say, arrived at through a chain of ascendency as it is for 
Kant. Instead, the ethical relation exists at the outset, present in each and every encounter. 
While my analysis of Kant in the preceding section concentrated primarily on the 
centrality of clothing and its role in the naturalization of women and femininity as 
constitutively inferior, my reading of Levinas will concentrate more squarely on the role 
of shame in the development and reinforcement of the feminine subject as a passive, 
superficial (secondary or derivative) subject. In this way, her very being is constituted by 
Levinas as superfluous, with little exception. Even though Eugen Fink later goes on to 
write that what Kant saw in the fig-leaf was “the irritating effect of shame,” shame itself 
does not overtly factor into Kant’s “Conjectures” (cf. Fink 1969). However, it becomes 
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absolutely central for Levinas. Levinas does not, however, thematize shame as happening 
the same way for differently situated persons (cf. Guenther 2011). In what follows, I will 
show that the unique shame of the feminine subject prevents her from undergoing the 
process of justification that produces ethical subjects and which constitutes ethical 
subjectivity for Levinas. Similarly as was the case for Kant, Levinas’ conception of 
femininity is also bound up with shame and clothing. I will begin with a more generalized 
account of shame in Levinas before moving on to a discussion of “feminine shame” in 
particular.  
For Kant and Levinas alike, shame is intimately bound up with freedom. Whereas 
for Kant, shame is produced as reason ascends—as both freedom and reason become fully 
realized—shame in Levinas’ work functions as a signal or cue that one must justify their 
freedom. In other words, shame is actually what indicates that our freedom has not been 
justified, since it is in the experience of shame for Levinas that we recognize our failure to 
bear responsibility for the other, and as a result, realize our utmost responsibility to become 
responsible to others (1969, 83, 84, 86). The work of freedom’s justification is done by the 
investment of freedom into ethical responsibility. This notion of “invested freedom” is, as 
Lisa Guenther puts it, “divested of its arbitrary spontaneity” by situating meaning “not in 
subjective affirmation,” as Levinas reads Kant, but “in critical response to an interlocutor 
who is perpetually putting me in question” (Guenther 2011, 32). This means that freedom 
is invested as the possibility of giving (or bearing responsibility) to the other (1969, 84, 
88).  
Drawing on Eve Sedgwick, Guenther suggests that “we feel shame because others 
matter to us in ways that are constitutive of who we are” (2011, 25). While for Sedgwick, 
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shame is opposed to what she calls “interest” (understood as connection to others) Guenther 
argues that shame is instead an intensification of the intersubjective connection: “the point 
where the subject emerges as a radical being-for-Others” (25). The conception of shame 
that emerges from the intersubjective relationship is thereby a shame that comes from the 
other, which is why it is understood as the reversal of intentionality, which is necessarily 
outward-directed. For Levinas, shame is “something that is on you, coming from the 
outside” (Critchley 2015, 23). The condition of shame is elicited from the primary ethical 
relationship for which I am responsible which then forces me to justify (and invest, or re-
invest, perpetually) my own freedom into the ethical relationship.  
 One of Levinas’ most detailed and striking accounts of shame is found in his 
description of the phenomenon of nausea in On Escape (1982).  He writes: 
 
It [nausea] is not only shameful because it threatens to offend social conventions. 
The social aspect of shame is fainter in nausea, and all the shameful manifestations 
of our body, then it is in any morally wrong act. The shameful manifestations of 
our bodies compromise us in a manner totally different than does the lie or 
dishonesty. The fault consists not in the lack of propriety but almost in the very fact 
of having a body, of being there. (67-8) 
 
In this passage, shame is bound up with the riveting of one’s body to one’s self, or better 
yet with the lack of distance between shame (indexical to the body) and the self (or 
subjectivity). This is why nausea is a “fact of consciousness, which the I knows as one of 
its states” (68). In other words, nausea is an embodied experience (a “fact” of 
consciousness), and not merely indicative of the bodily aspect of a mind/body dualism. 
Shame as described the passage above has two distinct components: 1) the flouting of 
social conventions, and 2) the indexing of bodily existence. Both are generative sites of 
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shame, where generative indicates a becoming or a happening of an event of shame: the 
genesis of shame. As Levinas writes, the shame of nausea indicates the second component 
more so than it does the first.  
For Levinas, the shame of having a body is less than the shame of any “morally 
wrong act.” At least analogously to Kant, Levinas carves up a distinction between the 
bodily and the moral, where the bodily is clearly characterized as being of lesser 
significance. In another parallel to Kant, bodily shame functions as a catalyst to the 
understanding of the experience of shame in general. In other words, it is because I have 
felt bodily shame that I can experience a “higher” level shame: the shame of breaking the 
moral law. Again, however, as I will show in more detail later on, it is the function of the 
feminine (conceived in Levinas as the passive “beloved”) to indicate to her male lover the 
possibility of an ethical ontology or an ontology of ethics. 
Oddly enough, one of the ways that Levinas differentiates himself from Kant is by 
attending to bodily existence.  Levinas’ attention to what is present, his emphasis on the 
phenomenal world, is still somewhat Kantian in nature: his move from Being or ontology 
to the “there is” or to the “il y a” is Kantian insofar as it aims to take stock of what presents 
itself in experience. As Levinas writes here, shame is strongest when it indicates a “morally 
wrong act.” However, it is not reserved as a phenomenon of the moral order (such as shame 
for having acted badly) or only a moral phenomenon (cf. 1982, 64). In extending shame to 
the bodily and to the social (indeed, to the intersubjective), shame may become a personal, 
social, and moral failure alike. 
Levinas’ account of “shameful nakedness” in On Escape further describes shame 
as indexed to “the very fact of having a body,” as cited above (cf. 1982, 67-8). There, 
63 
Levinas writes that “shame arises each time we are unable to make others forget [faire 
oublier] our basic nudity” (64). Shame arises in this context because it is “related to 
everything we would like to hide and that we cannot bury or cover up” (64). Shame is then 
the manifestation of—and even the acknowledgment of—bare, (literal) stripped down 
existence, where bare is understood not as that which is unable to be hidden, but as the 
“sheer visibility [patence] of our being, of its ultimate intimacy” (64). In other words, to 
be rendered bare indicates a kind of failure of hiding the very fact that one has a body: not 
only or just from others, but from oneself, only to find that one cannot flee from either.  
Here I am reminded of the seemingly perennial suggestion that public speaking 
nerves may be quelled by imagining the attendees as naked. Based on the analysis given, 
the function of this tactic would be to quell anxious or nervous energy with laughter 
garnered from the sight of the naked attendees. Such nakedness, however, indicates a social 
and moral failure that is laughable enough to warrant an investment in oneself as superior 
(as clothed). Such a sense of superiority, and of ensuing confidence, is literally buoyed by 
the clothed/unclothed dyad in which the unclothed are laughable by virtue of simply having 
bodies. Levinas describes this condition (the shame of being or even seeming naked) as the 
“unalterably binding presence of the I to itself [du moi à soi-même],” where one’s sense of 
oneself, or consciousness of one’s self, becomes inextricably bound up to one’s bodily self 
(64). In other words, one is not free in one’s consciousness to imagine oneself elsewhere 
or to distance oneself from one’s bodily reality. Heidegger writes in the Zollikon Seminars 
that one may “imagine” oneself at a train station despite not physically being there, and 
Sartre writes in Being and Nothingness that the prisoner in his cell is ultimately “free” (in 
his own consciousness) to react to his situation in a myriad of ways (1987, 86; 1956, 622). 
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Neither of these accounts account for the soi-même, where consciousness is not able to be 
separated from lived, physical reality. 
 This ultimate “visibility of our being” is oddly enough not actually correlated to the 
body without clothes for Levinas. Instead, such “visibility” of being is what is revealed 
through clothing. Levinas writes: “Poverty is not a vice, but it is shameful because, like the 
beggar’s rags, it shows up the nakedness of an existence incapable of hiding itself. This 
preoccupation with dressing to hide ourselves concerns every manifestation of our lives, 
our acts, and our thoughts” (64). The beggar’s rags “show” the poverty that cannot be 
hidden: ragged clothing reveals to ourselves and to others that “we cannot hide what we 
would like to hide” (64). As he writes very succinctly: “Being naked is not a question of 
wearing clothes” (65). This is resonant with Silvan Tomkins description of shame as a kind 
of “feeling naked” without being naked (cf. Tomkins 1995, 133). In other words, clothing 
is precisely what facilitates “shameful nakedness,” since even the allusion to their absence 
may instigate the “binding” of the I to itself. 
 Shame both indexes the human condition (makes the human, as we saw with Kant 
above), and inaugurates the literally ungraceful descent into humanity (so much for being 
clothed by grace). The Fall, marked by the original event of feeling shame, is equally 
marked by the donning of the fig-leaf as a response to the experience of shame (cf. 
Critchley 2011). In Levinasian terms, this experience of shame can be understood as the 
experience of the soi-même, which Levinas defines as a being that is “expelled into itself 
outside of being,” in “exile or refuse in itself” (1998, 105). This “self-same” self is 
contrasted with the “territorial expansion of self-consciousness” which moves outwards. It 
is, in other words, the reversal of intentionality (cf. Critchley 2015, 23). The decry “shame 
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on you!” illustrates this idea: shame exerts itself as a force coming from without, on to 
someone (cf. Crtichley, ibid.).  
The experience of shame indicates a self who is already guilty, and always 
responsible: a self that has been, as Lisa Guenther puts it, “chased into myself and out of 
being” (2009, 178). This sense of self as a self that is expelled from itself (soi-même) 
invokes the originary expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden which marked 
their becoming-human. Expelled from the garden, Adam and Eve literally became who 
they are: riveted to their bodies, their shame, and their humanity alike. Paradoxically, the 
“expulsion” is conceived in Levinas as an inward movement: as the riveting of the soi-
même described above. To be expelled from the self, then—just like Adam and Eve—is to 
be fatefully marked as human. Interestingly, both fates (that of Adam and Eve, and that of 
the soi-même) are marked by shame: shame at becoming human due to Eve’s folly in the 
former, and shame at the fact of not being able to rid myself of my body in the latter. As it 
is thematized in Levinas, I understand modesty, then, as a mechanism to keep shame at 
bay. In terms of clothing, modest dress “covers over” the naked body which may incite the 
experience of shame. 
Bonnie Mann’s analysis of shame is significant for understanding the ways in 
which shame becomes constitutive of “woman” and of femininity alike (2018a, 2018b). 
Her view of shame as an internalized and inward-directed phenomenon indexing 
vulnerability and finitude complements my own reading of the “genesis” of shame in the 
Fall, where shame literally indicates the becoming-finite of humankind, as supported by 
Kant. Mann’s account is also compatible with the Levinasian account, for whom the 
directionality of shame is the same (shame is the “reversal” of an outward or spatially-
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oriented consciousness). In the accounts of all three, shame is a (self) orientation towards 
limitation and thereby of finitude. In the accounts of shame in “Genesis” as well as in those 
that Mann critiques (Steinbock and Zahavi), shame is a transition towards something else: 
a lesser-than status in “Genesis” (man falls from Grace, into his humanity) and towards 
“moral” improvement in the latter (or “moral amelioration”). In the ameliorative account, 
shame is likened to a developmental stepping stone, where it becomes integral to the 
transition to “higher realms of human existence and moral standing” (Mann 2018b, 60). 
For women and for feminine subjects, however, shame denotes a “permanent and 
unremitting moral failure.” Like Eve, then, women are precluded from ascension or 
transcendence.10  
 In Difficult Freedom (1963), Levinas describes a tension between “spontaneous 
life” and “the life of spirit” that parallels Mann’s diagnosis of the masculine or patriarchal 
assumptions in ameliorative accounts of shame, and the foreclosed, feminine, or feminized 
nature of shame when understood as foreclosing the future. In the text, “spontaneous life” 
designates material goods (corn and flax are his examples) not interfered with by man, and 
the latter indicates their manufacture into commodities (32). It is this (literal) uprooting of 
life in the forms of corn and flax, work done by man, that is women’s task to respond to: 
10 Mann critiques the ameliorative account of shame offered by both Steinbock (2014) and Zahavi (2014) as 
being unreflective of the normatively laden dimension of “life” of which shame functions as a modality. As 
that which (re)orients my self to my life and my own precarities and vulnerabilities, the ameliorative nature 
of shame in prominent accounts like those of Steinbock and Zahavi suggests that the receding to or falling 
back into one’s vulnerable life is a temporary state of being rather than, as it is for many, a more stable and 
constituting state. For many, Mann presses, life is itself laden with a kind of permanent shame that cannot 
merely be shorn or taken off like a coat: not because living life (as a woman, as a feminine subject, etc.) is 
inherently shameful, but because shame is understood as a natural condition for certain subjects. Mann’s 
feminist phenomenological intervention challenges the underlying assumption shared by Steinbock and 
Zahavi that shame is a ubiquitous moral emotion. But shame is not always or only a step towards moral 
progress or virtue. Mann shows instead how shame functions concretely as that which can both perpetuate 
power-laden tropes and stereotypes (the trope of the “blushing virgin,” for instance) and foreclose futures 
rather than opening them in morally ameliorative ways. Moral amelioration does not justify shame nor does 
it account for its gendered constitution. 
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not only to “ground the corn and spin the flax” which man has gathered, but to return man 
to himself by dis-alienating him from the elements of nature which he has proven to have 
conquered through the acts of hunting and gathering. By making the corn into bread and 
the flax into clothing, woman functions to return man back to himself as non-alienated 
(33). For men, then, clothing is that which returns them to themselves in an event of self-
coincidence unlike that of the soi-même described above, while women are considered as 
the literal means to the end of such affirmation. Clothing, then, is not a fundamental site of 
shame for men as it is for women. Indeed, clothing often becomes a site of shame for men, 
or at least a site of attempting shaming, when it is feminized (cf. Hill 2007).  
 The two components of shame outlined above (social-moral and bodily) are both 
fulfilled in Levinas’ conception of femininity. It is only in its feminine form that the face 
“laughs under the cloak of its own expression . . . without leading to any specific meaning” 
(1969, 264). The cloaked feminine figure who laughs under the garment of her own 
expression invokes a characterization of the feminine as deceitful: that trickster who, were 
it not for her temptation in the garden, would not have catalyzed man’s fall. Indeed, to draw 
on the account of Kant discussed earlier, there was a choice in the matter, although it is 
still Eve’s fault in choosing poorly. I thereby understand Levinas as an inheritor of the 
theological conception of shame operative throughout the chapter: a conception of shame 
borne out in the temptation of Adam, and a shame that is both inherently sexual and one 
which is intimately tied to the shame of the feminine in her particularity.  
 What also appears in this passage is the dual delineation of the feminine figure and 
her garments alike as non-signifying. That is, both the (biological) female and the (socially-
constructed) feminine are co-original for Levinas, and in fact, the two are not separable 
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(1990, 34). The inseparability of women and femininity means that “feminine” shame can 
be understood as a kind of shame experienced by women and on account of feminine 
presentation alike. Even though Levinas claims that “the whole body […] can express as 
the face,” the characterization of the face as inverted and disfigured in femininity begs a 
consideration of the relevance of such non-signifyingness for Levinas’ conception of the 
feminine (1969, 262). Levinas writes that the face is exterior only in its morality: meaning 
that it constitutes an ethical response simply by virtue of its indicating an “other” to whom 
I am responsible. This is precisely why the dead face becomes a “mortuary mask” and no 
longer appears as a face, as our ethical relations and responsibilities to the dead may differ 
from those to the living. Irigaray’s later call to “take off” the masks, as I will argue in the 
next section, ought to be read as a demand to rethink ethics beyond the harmful tropes of 
femininity and feminine clothing alike reinforced by both Kant and Levinas.  
Levinas’ discussion of “erotic nudity” in Totality and Infinity furthers implicates 
the feminine in familiar historical tropes of passivity and submission. Briefly, erotic nudity 
is conceived in Levinas as the (literal) “bare” encounter between a male lover and a female 
beloved. Levinas calls erotic nudity “lascivious” for invoking and revealing that sexual 
desire of the body which yet “signifies falsely” by renouncing expression and speech: by 
sinking into “the equivocation of silence,” beyond “the decency of words” into the 
“absence of all seriousness” (1969, 263). Importantly, erotic nudity can never be overcome 
or surmounted (transcended) so as to attain grace, for erotic nudity is always, on my reading 
of Levinas, anchored in the event of original sin understood as the feminine condition from 
which the feminine is not considered to be able to escape. Levinas himself writes that “the 
mode in which erotic nudity is produced (is presented and is) delineates the original 
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phenomena of immodesty and profanation” (1969, 257). Original sin is also part of the 
“original phenomena,” since, to draw on Velleman from earlier, the event literally 
produced (and continues to re-produce) not only a conception of sex itself as shameful (as 
private), but of a feminine figure who is quite literally responsible for covering up that 
shame.  
The lack of reciprocity between male and female lovers is vital for Levinas’ 
conception of the ethical relation, which requires alterity (or difference) in order to 
function. This is because, for Levinas: “ethics concerns the infinite and absolute Other” 
(Anderson 2019, 173). Drawing on Iris Marion Young, Ellie Anderson describes the 
relation between the (male and female) lovers as one of “asymmetrical reciprocity,” where 
male is understood as “Same” and the feminine as “Other” (Anderson 2019; cf. Young 
2007). As Anderson argues, the desire of the (male) lover for the other is best understood 
as a “metaphysical desire,” oriented towards the infinite (the ethical), and such desire 
eclipses (or goes beyond) the (female) lover with whom he is amorously engaged. Indeed, 
such an “asymmetric” ethic is precisely disclosed through this example of the lovers’ 
encounter, and through the erotic figure of the feminine in particular. As Anderson writes: 
“because Levinas takes the relation between masculine ‘Same’ and feminine ‘Other’ to be 
exemplary of ethical relations, problems that arise with his theory of eros are problems for 
his view more generally” (2019, 173). Underscored in Anderson’s critique of Levinas is 
the idea that Levinas’ conceptions of eros and ethics alike are predicated on an 
“indefensible” equation of femininity with otherness. Not only is the feminine confined to 
the historical tropes of passivity and submission for Levinas, but as I have suggested, she 
is riveted to her shame and precluded from ethics.  
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In Kant’s account, Eve—her folly, her shame, and above all, her clothing—
functions as nothing more than the means to the end of his own philosophical system. 
Similarly in Levinas, the feminine beloved becomes the condition of possibility for 
Levinas’ own system, his ethical ontology. In Kant, I showed how the “othering” of the 
feminine also functioned as a necessary step or movement of male or masculine ascension 
or transcendence. Here in Levinas—whether she is spinning flax or in an asymmetric erotic 
encounter—her function is to elevate her counterpart: either by affirming him in his 
manhood or by serving as the means to the end of the ultimate realization of ethics as that 
which strives towards the infinite. 
Dressing Differently 
The conceptions of the feminine and of shameful femininity I have been describing 
throughout do not reference singular “events” of shame with clear temporal book-ends, but 
shame as a condition of particular lived, gendered, and dressed experiences. I have 
suggested that feminine dress in particular is meaningfully informed by the inheritance of 
a theologically-laden, gendered, and sexualized shame. In what follows, I will consider the 
gendered and sexualized dimensions of shame more explicitly than I have done so far in 
order to lay the foundation of Irigaray’s critique of Levinas as one motivated by the role of 
sexualized, gendered shame in the production of a morally suspect or inferior feminine 
subject. The beginning of this section is therefore dedicated to a brief discussion of 
gendered shame and femininity. I invoke Sandra Bartky and Iris Marion Young in 
particular because their competing—indeed, their seemingly incompatible—conceptions 
of feminine subjectivity drive home the point that femininity must reckon with its inherited 
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history and corresponding theology of clothing. The second part of this final major section 
of the chapter considers Irigaray’s call to “dress differently” as an explicit response to the 
seeming impasse of femininity as riveted to shame. In “The Fecundity of the Caress,” 
Irigaray writes that lovers may “inhabit their world together and dress it differently” (1993, 
207). 
Gendered shame is not in itself a homogenous phenomenon (cf. Skeggs 1997; 
Felski 2000). For Sandra Bartky for instance, not only is shame constitutive of femininity, 
but femininity does not (and simply cannot) exist without shame (1990). For Bartky, this 
means that there is no way “through” femininity, and that the only way to disrupt the 
particular ways that gendered shame gains traction as a mechanism which dismisses, 
harasses, objectifies, and harms, is by ridding “woman” of the “feminine” altogether 
(1990). Drawing on Ann Hollander (1978), Iris Marion Young develops Bartky’s analysis 
by suggesting that normative femininity continues to gain purchase in ways that reproduce 
gendered shame because of the ability of pictorial representations to “naturalize” feminine 
ideals by “freezing” them into images, such as those in art, advertising, and fashion 
editorials (2005, 64). As a result, women “seek to fashion ourselves in the mode of the 
dominant pictorial aesthetic” (Young 2005, 64; cf. Hollander 1978). For Bartky, “self-
fashioning” is none other than a process of the internalization of normative patriarchal 
standards and ideals of beauty: what she refers to as the “fashion-beauty complex” (1990). 
However, since femininity on Bartky’s view is nothing other than this process of 
internalization, there is no authentic or non-derivative manner by which one can inhabit, 
be, or become feminine. There is, then, no meaningful distinction for Bartky between 
femininity and normative femininity; femininity is always normative. 
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 By contrast, Young offers an alternative to Bartky’s position, and I will attend to 
her specific methodology in much more detail in Chapter VI. Briefly however, Young’s 
analysis of clothing in “Women Recovering our Clothes” suggests that a serious attention 
paid to clothing as one aspect of feminine existence that challenges the staunch post-
structuralist or discursive view of femininity like that of Bartky (2005). For Bartky, 
feminine clothing is simply (and only) a part of the fashion-beauty complex. While she 
agrees with Bartky that she may “seek to find the approval of the transcending male gaze” 
in clothing, Young argues that the reduction of clothing to this function would mean 
admitting that “there is no subjectivity that is not his, that there is no specifically female 
pleasure I take in clothes” (2005, 67). Reluctant to give up claims to a subjectivity 
meaningfully inflected by gender and by gendered experiences, Young suggests that the 
reduction of clothing to its role in reproducing women’s oppression under patriarchal 
capitalism means giving a reductive and homogenized account of social relations within 
patriarchy and capitalism alike (67).  
 The reduction of femininity and feminine attire in particular to an instrument in the 
reproduction of oppression (women’s oppression in particular) also dismisses the critical 
potential of clothing as the site of analysis for such oppression. The reduction forecloses 
analysis of the ways that femininity is itself a telling mode of visibility and of 
representation. Shame, for instance, is not bestowed democratically, and is itself implicated 
in the relative visibility or invisibility of particular bodies. Clothing informs a body’s 
legibility as either visible or invisible, and clothing is a formative part of this complex 
system that cannot be reduced to its mere participation in the reproduction of women’s 
oppression. As I will argue in Chapter VI, it is this view of femininity which in fact 
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produces and reproduces harm and oppression. 
In terms of visibility, women’s clothing may be noticed in ways that men’s are not: 
soliciting comments, accusations, dog-whistles, etc. Mary Edwards argues that women’s 
clothed bodies seem (or appear) more visible because their clothes are “taken to make 
visible something politically significant about them, in a way that men’s are not” (2018, 
572). “Seeming” more visible has to do with the differential ways in which shame is 
experienced. As Luna Dolezal puts it, men may often:  
. . . get to experience shame as a switch from (in)visibility to visibility . . . The 
situation is different for oppressed persons, who may only rarely experience the 
comfort of (in)visibility, and instead fluctuate between feeling painfully visible and 
feeling ‘invisible,’ that is, ‘seen, but then seen through,’ in the company of others.’” 
(Dolezal 2015, 88 in Edwards 2018, 571) 
Sexualized shame in particular represents the discomfort (and often times, the danger) of 
forced visibility or of a default visibility. This kind of default visibility is exemplified by 
cat-calling understood as visible and audible sexualization. Edwards’ analysis of the 
revival of the pantsuit in the 2016 U.S. Election cycle diagnoses the avoidance of 
sexualized shame as part of what accounts for the garment’s continuing and enduring 
“feminist” success. Sexualized shame here indicates a metric of objectifying and 
sexualizing visibility as the default. The pantsuit may thereby be understood as a way of 
shifting the default mode of public apprehension from one of sexualization to one of 
(sexual) invisibility, where the objective is to facilitate de-sexualization for the sake of 
“being taken seriously.” If the juxtaposition is between sexualization and seriousness—and 
sexualization is itself often equated with feminine attire in totem—then feminine attire 
becomes equivocated not only with an absence of seriousness, but with a shameful absence. 
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 The idea that feminine subjects are “more visible” than others is echoed in Levinas. 
While both man and woman bear the burden of original sin for Levinas, it is only woman 
who bears (and wears) its weight: Levinas asks the beloved to “efface an original wound 
of which she would be the bearer” (Irigaray 1993, 201). This original wound is the 
“suffering of an open body that cannot be clothed with herself, within herself, unless the 
lover is united with her in the joy” (1993, 201). “Joy” here refers to the joy of 
transcendence, attained only in and through the production of the child. To reiterate from 
the previous section, such transcendence is for Levinas the pinnacle of an ethics which 
concerns the infinite, borne out in the literal reproduction—or in the infinite continuation 
of—familial lineage. For Kant, Eve is the clear bearer (and cause) of the event of original 
sin. On Irigaray’s reading of Levinas, however, Eve is not heralded or championed as 
having made a great “sacrifice.” Instead, she is charged with having made a fateful and 
shameful decision. For Irigaray, this interpretation of Eve, however, is not a natural fact 
but a hermeneutical difference between her reading and that of Levinas. On her reading, 
the hermeneutical shift from shame to sacrifice would necessarily mean that the burden of 
shame is not actually on woman to (continue to) bear. It would mean that “the threshold of 
the garden . . . remains open” (201). For Irigaray, Levinas’ gaze is the same gaze through 
which Adam saw Eve: a gaze which is “still innocent of the limits set by reason” (201). It 
is a male gaze, informed by the unnatural divisions and hierarchies of Judeo-Christian 
theology, which burdens woman with shame. It is a gaze which fails to recognize the “face 
to face encounter of two naked lovers in a nudity that is more ancient than and foreign to 
sacrilege,” an encounter that can be perceived otherwise than one of profanation (201). It 
is a male gaze informed by the unnatural divisions and hierarchies of Judeo-Christian 
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theology: divisions which also inform Kant’s conception of reason’s ascension as a 
“natural fact” supported by feminine folly.   
 A hermeneutics of feminine suspicion founds the male gaze while also informing 
the meaning(s) of nudity and of erotic encounters for Levinas. Irigaray critiques the 
Levinasian conception of profanation (the “immodest apparition” of “erotic nudity”) by 
suggesting that there need not be an ongoing complicity between nudity, profanation, and 
the feminine. She calls instead for a nudity that is “more ancient than and foreign to 
sacrilege,” a nudity not inflected by this theology of clothing, where “love does not yet 
know, or no longer knows, nudity as profane.” Irigaray envisions, then, a nudity which is 
not shameful, and which does not rivet the feminine as its carrier. Recall from Section I the 
suggestion that Kant’s account makes women and feminine subjects responsible for the 
temperance of male sexual desire. Irigaray would have us return to the time of pre-
profanation: an erstwhile dream given the very real and distinctive ways in which gendered 
shame is continuously lived (201). Irigaray writes that “Modesty is not found on one side 
only. Responsibility for it should not belong to only one of the lovers. To make the beloved 
woman responsible for the secret of desire is to situate her also, and primarily in the place 
of the beloved man—in his own modesty and virginity, for which he won’t take ethical 
responsibility” (205). Here, Irigaray invokes a conception of women as the “gatekeepers” 
of desire. Earlier, I showed how this idea also operates in Kant to make women responsible 
for the cultivation of reason in man. In this way, modesty functions to juxtapose woman to 
“reasonableness.” For Levinas, modesty functions as a prohibition against shame: a shame 
in being nude, of having a body at all. But since it is only women who are responsible for 
such modesty, we again see a conception of modesty that functions to serve men’s 
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cultivation as moral subjects. The injunction against shame is what preserves the difference 
(alterity) between the lovers, and it is this injunction that allows the male lover to act 
sexually: the act itself aimed at the production of the child. It is not that sex is inherently 
shameful for Levinas, but because woman keeps shame at bay in her modesty that the sex 
act can become at once an ethical act.  
Irigaray is equally concerned about the harms of the Levinasian conception of the 
feminine for men. In making woman responsible for the prohibition of shame through 
modesty, men wholly deny or repress the “shameful” act of having a body. Disagreeing 
with the idea that naked bodies are inherently shameful, Irigaray suggests that “dressing 
differently” may return to man “a possible site of his identity” (207). I do not take Irigaray 
to necessarily mean adopting different forms of dress, but to be suggesting the adoption of 
a new hermeneutic, and consequently, a new modality of sexual ethics. In calling for a 
“creation of love that does not abandon respect for the ethical,” Irigaray suggests that the 
ethical is to be found within the sexual union itself, where the equality of the pair is 
precisely what makes for an ethical encounter. Irigaray’s ethics of equality does not 
necessitate the obliteration of difference or of alterity. Instead, the relation may still 
maintain heterogeneity while still commanding reciprocity. True reciprocity is denied in a 
Levinasian ethic of male or masculine activity and female or feminine passivity and 
modesty. “Porosity” is the name Irigaray gives to her new conception of sexual-ethical 
reciprocity. Porosity indicates a movement from self to other which maintains 
heterogeneity and mutual activity (or mutual activity) or even alternating activity and 
passivity, rather than a wholly asymmetric relation where such qualities (activity or 
passivity) are fixed or naturalized onto gendered subjects. 
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I read Irigaray’s call to “dress differently,” then, as a demand for ethical reciprocity 
that can only happen in the absence of sexualized, gendered shame. The ethical-sexual 
relation ought to preserve the quality of the encounter as heterogenous. The “profound 
intimacy” generated by such an encounter acts as a “protective veil” (191). A veil is not a 
cloak: a veil allows for a seeing-out and onto a world in which one moves and participates. 
Similarly, such an intimacy “turns itself into an aura” (or a veil) which both separates and 
protects. Rather than romanticizing the union as one of which obliterates difference, 
Irigaray argues that—much like a veil demarcates difference without removing the self 
from view (or hiding the self)—an intimacy of equality would preserve difference and yet 
allow for a “seeing-in.” True intimacy then—from the Latin meaning inmost—allows for 
a “seeing” which does not shame or violate. This is not the “intimacy” that Levinas 
describes. As Irigaray writes:  
Spelled out in images and photographs, a face loses the mobility of its expressions, 
the perpetual unfolding and becoming of the living being. Gazing at the beloved, 
the lover reduces her to less than nothing if this gaze is seduced by an image, if her 
nudity, not perceived as endlessly pulsating, becomes the site of a disguise rather 
than of astonishment at something that moves, unceasingly and inwardly (1993, 
192)  
Fixed as an image, the beloved is neither a free agent or an equal sexual partner who may 
reciprocally engage with her partner. Here, I recall Young’s claim that the fixation (or 
“freezing”) of feminine ideals into images functions to naturalize harmful tropes about 
femininity and feminine subjects. Instead, Irigaray imagines a world where the lovers 
“meet as a world that each reassembles and both resemble. Inhabiting it and dressing it 
differently [les amants s’abordent comme monde que chacun rassemble et auquel il 
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ressemble. L’habitant et le revêtant différemment]” (207; 1984, 191). Here, revêtir 
indicates a dressing or a clothing which also indicates a facing, or an opening onto the 
possibility of an ethics of reciprocity. Such ethics calls for a gaze which no longer witnesses 
“profanation” or “shameful nudity,” but sees an equal other who is not “fixed” or “frozen” 
in her modesty.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown that both Kant and Levinas reproduce a theological 
conception of shame borne out in the temptation of Eve: a shame that is both inherently 
sexual in nature and one which is intimately tied to the shame of women and of femininity 
alike. My analysis of Kant shows that his reading of “Genesis” naturalizes women, the 
feminine, and clothing as superfluous both to mankind and to the ultimate ascent of reason: 
principally by creating a system of signification wherein all three are intimately linked, and 
where the presence of one functionally makes present the others. My reading of Levinas 
shows the endurance of a theological conception of femininity which regulates women, the 
feminine, and dress as ultimately inferior to their male or masculine counterparts. I have 
considered Irigaray’s response to Levinas in “The Fecundity of the Caress” as indicating 
the productive philosophical work, as well as the work to be done, in critiquing a 
metaphysics of shame which continues to gain purchase from a particular theology of 
clothing.  
Clothing is not devoid of metaphysics. My analysis throughout has suggested that 
it plays a vital role in separating out the superfluous from the reasonable and the ethical 
alike. The naturalization that I have thematized throughout (the naturalization of clothing 
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onto the feminine, of femininity onto women, of unreason onto feminine women, etc.) can 
itself be understood as a kind of theological process. In other words, it may be difficult to 
think women, clothing, and femininity otherwise when what is considered “natural” (i.e., 
that which has been naturalized) has the feel of an a priori: in this case, under the guise of 
a creation story. The theological entanglements of these concepts imbue them with a 
feeling or a sense of non-history, or as somehow being outside of place and of time. In 
accounting for the history of the production of shameful femininity and shameful dress 
alike, however, I am not suggesting that such significations ought to remain, or that we are 
indelibly tied to the origin stories which impact, inform, and shape our conceptions of who 
we are as clothed, gendered subjects. Indeed, the force of Irigaray’s critique of Levinas 
suggests that such re-significations are both possible and necessary: that they can be 
reclothed. To say that a philosophy of clothes is also a philosophy of human nature—to 
draw on the chapter’s epigraph by Dutch philosopher Gerardus Van Der Leeuw—is not to 
say that garments indicate something inherent about human nature. Instead, it is to say that 
the shifting significations of clothing also indicate corresponding shifts in conceptions 
about who we are, which means reckoning with the stories about where we come from. 
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III. FASHION AND (HISTORICAL) MATERIALISM
Introduction 
 Similarly as was the case in the preceding chapter on Kant and Levinas, the work of this 
chapter aims to account for the vital role of clothing within the history of philosophy. In 
stark contrast with Kant and Levinas, however, clothing is unabashedly and admittedly 
central to the development of the history of materialism presented here. In other words, it 
enjoys a relatively positive status and recognized role as a site of philosophical insight. 
This chapter considers the role of clothing and fashion in the development of the thought 
of three significant materialist philosophers: Diderot, Marx, and Benjamin. I show that 
fashion and clothing are not incidental or “superfluous” considerations, but central to the 
history of materialism I trace here. In doing so, I argue that these reflections are vital to the 
respective philosophies of each of the three thinkers. That so little has been made of the 
role of clothing and fashion in these three thinkers indicates—while perhaps not a bias of 
their own—a theoretical or disciplinary bias against the subject as relevant, vital, and 
“serious” enough for philosophy. In considering the “material” of clothing, materialism 
challenges the metaphysical dualism between essences and appearances. While new 
problems emerge as a result (namely, those of change and causality) my focus here is on 
recuperating materialism’s insights into the relationship between fashion and philosophy 
in order to demonstrate the impact and importance of fashion on philosophy—of fashion 
as philosophy—when taken seriously, and not as “mere appearance.”  
What I offer in this chapter is both a historical and interpretive account of the role 
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of dress and clothing in three significant philosophers of materialism.11 I follow Charles 
Wolfe in understanding the history of materialism to be relatively scattered and 
diachronous, save for the undergirding belief held by materialist philosophers that either 
everything is real, or that everything is at least the product of material processes (2015, 3). 
My aim is not to reconcile divergent materialist philosophies and philosophers, but to argue 
11 While I am motivated by the effort of feminist materialist philosophy to analyze oppression in material 
terms, no scholarship has seriously considered or analyzed fashion or dress. Feminist materialism has 
revitalized the turn (back) to concrete material conditions away from the “linguistic turn” (and social 
constructionism more broadly) which dominated much of the latter 20th century (cf. Landry and MacLean, 
1993). As Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman describe it, the linguistic turn—motivated by very real feminist 
concerns of reductive essentialism—resulted in a concerted movement away from materiality, understood as 
a “tainted” or hopeless realm for feminist thought and scholarship (2008, 1). Even in her book on the subject 
of femininity (The Feminine Subject) Susan Hekman does not address the construction of feminine 
subjectivity in relationship to fashion or clothing (2014). 
While feminist theory has no doubt been enriched by structuralist and deconstructionist insights, the 
postmodern account of the “real” as constituted primarily by structure and language—by discourse—has 
meant a foreclosing of the very “matter” of materiality. The tendency to subsume or to subordinate the 
material to the discursive has also meant that discourses tend to be “about” something rather than “of” 
something (Alaimo and Hekman 2008, 3). This does not mean that we merely ought to revert the binary, in 
what would surely be an endless tug-o-war between the material and the discursive, but should—to invoke 
Donna Haraway’s formulation of the project of material feminism—interrogate the “material-discursive.” 
Attending to the “material-discursive” means, as Alaimo and Hekman put it in Material Feminisms, 
practicing feminist philosophy as a method of paying attention to materiality, and not as a discipline of the 
“unconstrained play” of abstract theoretical exercises (2008, 6). The “material turn” is “a wave of feminist 
theory that is taking matter seriously” (6).  
In developing critical conceptions of materiality as non-neutral—that is, in understanding the role 
that material conditions play in contributing to specific forms of oppression—feminist historical materialist 
philosophy aims to understand concrete histories of oppression (cf. Kuhn and Wolpe 1978; Vogel 1983, 
1995; Delphy and Leonard 1980; Hennessy and Ingraham 1997; Gimenez 1998, 2000). For Martha Gimenez, 
a broad or general understanding of materiality is insufficient, for an ambiguous concept of materiality 
renders it as both “real” (“gender and race are as real as class”) and as central, meaning that “ideologies are 
just as central or have as much ‘material weight’ as class” (2000, 20). The problem with this broad (or 
abstract) understanding of materialism for Gimenez is that it rests upon a “functional notion of causality 
according to which all institutions or elements of the social system mutually interact and affect each other, 
and none is ‘more’ causally efficacious than any others—that is, none can set parameters for the conditions 
of possibility and development of the others” (2000, 21). While a broad understanding of materialism may 
still invoke material conditions as relevant, a more focused definition for a feminist materialist framework 
would refer instead to the material conditions of the oppression of women (2000, 20). For Gimenez, feminist 
materialism must be capable of theorizing about social change. ⁠ Gimenez is critical of Landry and McLean’s 
account of feminist materialism in particular, guilty on Gimenez’ view of not taking materialism seriously 
by concentrating squarely on the linguistic, or on a conception of materialism as a kind of critical reading 
practice (as deconstructive). While all forms of materialism emphasize the agentive capacity of matter—
indeed, understood matter as a force of change and causality—different iterations emphasize different forms 
of “matter” as their locus of analysis. For example, while there is a tension in materialist feminism between 
the material and the linguistic, new materialist feminism (represented by Karen Barad, Donna Haraway, and 
Jane Bennett, among others) focus on a sharper attention to the “matter” of scientific inquiry in order to 
challenge (often anthropocentric) binaries, such as those between mind and matter. 
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that analyses of fashion and clothing have been central to the development of (historical) 
materialist thought. Retracing (or redressing) the role of dress in the history of materialism 
in particular is especially important, since it works to challenge the crude association of 
fashion with material-ism as the incessant desire for various objects of consumption, and 
to illuminate it instead as a vital theoretical linchpin of materialist accounts of alienation 
and of history in particular: central concepts which preoccupy the three figures I focus on 
throughout. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. In Section I, I develop Diderot’s 
latent theory of alienation from his own biographical account of his scarlet dressing-gown 
in his 1769 essay, “Regrets sur ma vieille robe de chambre.” In Section II I argue that 
Marx’s development of historical materialism is meaningfully indebted to dress and its 
relationships to materialism and alienation as thematized by Diderot. Having argued for 
the place—indeed, the necessity—of dress in this history of historical materialism in 
Diderot and Marx, I am then equipped to explain the central role of fashion in Benjamin’s 
reconception of historical materialism in Section III. What I intend to show throughout the 
chapter is not an unmistakable lineage between these three thinkers, but the simultaneous 
centrality and erasure of fashion from materialist philosophy broadly construed. 
Ultimately, the chapter is an effort to understand fashion and dress not only as concrete 
objects of material analysis, but as theoretical tools which promote and inspire conceptual 
analysis. As I will show in my analysis of Diderot, Marx, and Benjamin, garments are not 
mere objects upon which their respective ideas are cashed out or tested (they are not merely 
“examples”), but incentivize and motivate the theoretical work being done.   
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Diderot, the Dressing Gown, and Embodied Materialism 
While alienation is theoretically central for Marx’s early conception of historical 
materialism, its place in the French materialism of the 17th and 18th centuries is less widely 
discussed in the literature. Marx’s account and critique of alienation is itself predicated on 
his critique of capitalism from which his own account of materialism develops (Marx 
1844). While there is no explicit critique of capitalism in Diderot (eighteenth century 
France was not capitalist, but dominated by mercantilism and statism) there is a growing 
frustration evidenced in Diderot’s writings at the growing gap between the poor and the 
wealthy, and the ensuing development of a conception of alienation that develops 
throughout his work which parallels or even preempts Marx’s later account. Both Diderot 
and Marx offer accounts of alienation that develop from their reflections on existing and 
burgeoning relationships with/to material objects, and to objects of fashion in particular. I 
understand Diderot as a proto-dialectical materialist whose conception of alienation 
ultimately stems from his observations of the contradictions inherent within fashion: 
specifically, the contradiction between an epoch or era defined by opulence and lavishness, 
and the individual lived experiences of poverty and struggle he witnesses.  
 While historians of materialism generally find their most fruitful resources for 
thematizing Diderot’s materialism in works such as Le Rêve d’Alambert (1830), Le Neveu 
de Rameau (1805), or even Jacques le Fataliste (1796), my analysis stems principally from 
Diderot’s early essay, “Regrets sur ma vieille robe de chambre” (1767).12 Briefly, I will 
discuss the more established account of alienation found in Le Neveau de Rameau before 
arguing that an equally rich account of alienation is also to be found in “Les regrets sur ma 
 
12 See Phoebe von Held (2007) for a sophisticated account of the concept of alienation in Diderot’s work. 
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vieille robe de chambre.” While there already exists a scholarly recognition of Diderot’s 
“embodied materialism,” there has yet to be any discussion of the role that dress plays in 
such embodiment, and in such materialism (cf. Wolfe 2016). 
Although it was published in 1805, Diderot wrote the majority of Le Neveu de 
Rameau between 1761-1762 and made substantial revisions between 1773-1774. “Les 
Regrets” (1769) is situated between these two periods of writing. The 1805 novel is 
constructed as a dialogue between two figures: the philosopher (Moi) and the Nephew 
(Lui). As a performer, Lui comes to signify —through his dramatization—a myriad of 
caricaturized figures enigmatic of a “mimeticised society,” to use Phoebe von Held’s term 
to describe a society which is fundamentally alienated from itself (2007). Held’s 
conception, embodied by Lui, recalls an understanding of mimesis as a fundamental 
alienation, or of the reproduction of images as fundamentally alienated from their original 
as discussed in Chapter I. Lui embodies and exemplifies this conception of mimesis by 
publicly arguing against the merits of originality and truth with his interlocutor. An auto-
alienation also takes place: Lui transitions, almost imperceptibly, from speaking of himself 
as an “I,” and then as an “autre,” or from soliloquy to story-telling (von Held 2007, 278). 
His “self-dividing” or auto-alienating tendencies are themselves derived from his wish to 
in fact be somebody else entirely. It is this desire which fundamentally constitutes Lui’s 
relation to reality as one which brushes up against the demands of social assimilation. In 
this novel then, Diderot is able to “readdre[ss] the issue of roleplay as a strategy of material 
survival and social assimilation in the context of an alienated social universe” (von Held 
2007, 275). Alienation is not (only) an abstract theoretical concept, but is lived and 
embodied by the character Lui in Diderot’s novel. 
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Diderot’s description of his dressing gown—in his 1769 essay which I will turn my 
attention to now—amounts to an early account of alienation as it is experienced through 
the very embodiment (the actual wearing) of novel, material commodities. In the essay, 
Diderot both mourns the deterioration of his old dressing grown and expresses shock and 
disdain at his new one. The new robe replaces Diderot’s well-worn, beloved evening robe 
and causes him a flurry of existential unease. The new garment symbolizes the “savages of 
luxury,” and Diderot curses the one who “invented the art of giving a price to common 
cloth by tinting it scarlet.”13 I take Diderot to be referring here to the history of calico (a 
common fabric, cheap and versatile due to its unfinished nature) becoming calamande (a 
slightly more glossed and fine version). Initially developed as an alternative to earlier forms 
of calimanco and calico, the history of calamande is itself inseparable from the British 
colonization of India (cf. DePlessis 2009). The calamande variety boasted a glossed fabric 
and was produced predominantly in Flanders and Brabant. Given this history, the 
“inventor” Diderot chastises in the above citation is none other than industrialization itself, 
motored by the production of commodities requiring exploitation and colonization in order 
to materialize as, well, as material garments. The very color of the robe not only comes to 
symbolize power, wealth, and opulence, but these significations are felt by Diderot as the 
wearer, who is made to feel uneasy (1769, 14).  
Diderot’s yearning for his old robe signals more than a nostalgic desire for a 
particular object, but is itself indicative of an embodied sense of alienation from his 
garment. The replacement of the old garment with the new one ignites an affective shift in 
Diderot’s comportment: a reaction to the concrete economic and political changes which 
13 In the original: “Maudit soit celui qui inventa l’arte de donner du prix à l’étoffe commun en la teignant en 
écarlate!”, translation mine, 14. 
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facilitated the differences between the garments, in look, texture, and feel alike. Since 
Diderot understood and practiced materialism as a “working philosophy—” a “tool in the 
scientific investigation of the material universe”—I consider his descriptions of the scarlet 
robe as a resource or a “tool” in the investigation of the production of the garment as a 
commodity (Hill 1968, 90).   
 Diderot considered himself to be a disciple of the Cynic Diogenes. In linking 
himself to the Cynic heritage and describing himself as an heir of Diogenes, Diderot also 
points to a conception of fashion and dress as vital for social-political critique.14 Often 
barefoot and dirty, Diogenes scandalized the public through his refusal to self-discipline, 
carried out through norms of dress and hygiene. In his refusal—which itself was a 
simultaneous refusal to feel shame—Diogenes was able to reflect back onto the public the 
very norms and systems of values that were structuring their existence. Diderot writes: “O 
Diogenes! How you would laugh if you saw your disciple beneath Aristipius’ luxurious 
mantle! O Aristipius, this luxurious mantle was paid for by many low acts” (1). Between 
Aristipius (the notorious Hedonist) and Diogenes (the infamous Cynic) there could not 
exist a greater contrast. Here, Diderot mocks his own kinship with Aristipius that the fine 
new evening gown seemingly symbolizes. Unlike the teaching of Aristipius who, 
famously, was the first to charge students for philosophical education at the Academy, 
Diogenes’ pedagogy took place in the classroom of the world, so to speak: in the public 
realm. It is central to Cynic philosophy more broadly that ideas are both produced and 
enacted in and through action alone, and not merely in theory. That is, Diogenes’ cynicism 
performs political critique through embodied action.  
 
14 For a fuller account of Diderot’s relationship to the cynical tradition, see Jean Starobinski 1984, “Diogène 
dans le Neveu de Rameau,” Stanford French Review 8: 147-65. 
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It is this foundational element of Cynic philosophy (or perhaps, of Cynic politics) 
that Foucault, in his final lecture series (1983-1984) finds so promising about a return to 
the Cynics for a conception of truth. Foucault locates in Diogenes a rejection of a 
metaphysical (two-worlds) conception of truth in favor of what he describes as an aesthetic 
conception of truth: truth that itself manifests as parrhēsia or as truth-telling. Foucault 
clearly identifies the Cynics with parrhēsia (free and true speech) and as parrhēsiasts: 
those who “brin[g] into play the true discourse of what the Greeks called ēthos” (2011, 19). 
The parrhesiast, the truth-teller, does not tell the truth of the metaphysical what is: the 
“truth of being and the nature of things.” Instead, Foucault writes: “The parrhesiast does 
not reveal what is to his interlocutor; he discloses or helps him to recognize what he is” 
(19). In other words, it is not content that is disclosed and exchanged, but the act of being 
accountable to oneself and the transformations that doing so effects. Being is thereby 
conceived as a kind of self-relation, or better, as a self-saying that is also fundamentally 
aesthetic. Parrhēsia is “telling the truth without hiding any part of it, without hiding it 
behind anything” (9-10). Foucault sees the commitment to truth-telling as a simultaneous 
commitment to the risk of undermining relationships (11). Again, Diogenes is a prime 
exemplar in this respect. As Foucault writes: “In a way, the parrhēsiast always risks 
undermining that relationship which is the condition of possibility of his discourse” (11). 
Diogenes exemplifies to Foucault what it means to have an “aesthetics of 
existence,” and dress is not incidental to this aesthetics for either Diogenes or Foucault. An 
aesthetics of existence includes “bearing witness to the truth by and in one’s body, dress, 
mode of comportment, way of acting, reacting, and conducting oneself” (173). In 
Cynicism, we become acquainted with a way of seeing that is bound up with a way of 
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being: to say that there is “truth” to being is just to say that there is a truth to seeing, and 
that seeing can reveal something about what conditions its own possibilities, and 
ultimately, its own contingencies. The aesthetic dimension of Cynicism may best be 
summed up in the dictum to “practice what you preach,” and clothing is an integral part of 
this practice. Nicholas Pappas describes Cynic fashion as the “display of withdrawal” 
(2016, 211). The “well-draped gentlemanly” cloaks of the Platonic dialogues finds its 
counter in the Cynics, whose “rags” evoke the description of poverty by Levinas cited in 
the previous chapter. Recall that Levinas described poverty as shameful because “like the 
beggar’s rags, it shows up the nakedness of an existence incapable of hiding itself. This 
preoccupation with dressing to hide ourselves concerns every manifestation of our lives, 
our acts, and our thoughts” (64). Cynic fashion is not shameful, or rather, Cynics were not 
ashamed of their rags like Levinas’ beggar. Rather than inciting shame, Cynic dress 
functioned as a political statement: as parrhēsia. 
Diogenes is the ultimate resistance to a Platonic idealism which ultimately foregoes 
the materiality of the body for the forms (cf. Plato 2001). Plato’s famous description of the 
human being as a featherless biped is rejected by Diogenes, who allegedly tore the feathers 
from a rooster and brought it into Plato’s academy, proclaiming: “Here is Plato’s human” 
(cf. Diogenes Laertius vol. VI, 40). Diogenes’ human is clothed, and the fact of that 
clothing is significant for the way Diogenes lives his philosophy. Diderot’s clear alliance 
with Diogenes indicates that his clothing, too, is to be taken seriously as an element of his 
thinking. 
In another passage in the essay, Diderot describes a peasant woman and highlights 
the contrast between the image of the woman on one hand, and an ensemble on the other. 
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Consider the passage below:  
 
I can bear the sight of a peasant woman without disgust. That piece of crude cloth 
that covers her head; that sparse hair fallen on her cheeks; these worn rags that only 
half cover her; that poor petticoat that only covers half of her legs; these naked, 
muddy feet cannot hurt me. It is the image of a state I respect. It is the ensemble of 
the disgraces of a necessary and unhappy condition which I pity. But my heart rises; 
and, despite the redolent air that follows her, I distance myself, I turn my gaze from 
this courtesan whose English-style hair and torn cuffs, the white stockings and the 
worn shoe show me the misery of the day associated with the opulence of the age.15 
 
It is not the woman’s garments which are either pitiful or disgraceful for Diderot. The 
garments themselves do not mark an inferior status or elicit shame, but signal the failings 
of a system which “necessarily” produces poverty and keeps the poor in their place. 
“Necessary” then refers to the fact of limited social mobilization, and not to an ultimately 
necessary state wherein some are poor and others are not. It is not the woman who is the 
site or source of Diderot’s criticism, but the system which has allowed for such poverty in 
the first place.  
 I do not read “ensemble” to be referring to the garments themselves (or only to the 
garments), but to the social, historical conditions which produce them and which give them 
their meaning. To say that the woman’s “necessary and unhappy condition” is something 
of an ensemble indicates the seemingly determinate place she holds within the economic 
system: that it is held together (ensemble) by both “misery” and “opulence.” Whereas the 
 
15 The original passage is as follows: “Je puis supporter sans dégoût la vue d’une paysanne. Ce morceau de 
toile grossière qui couvre sa tête; cette chevelure qui tombe éparse sur ses joues; ces haillons troués qui la 
vêtissent à demi; ce mauvais cotillon qui ne descend qu’à la moitié de ses jambes; ces pieds nus et couverts 
de fange ne peuvent me blesser. C’est l’image d’un état que je respecte. C’est l’ensemble des disgrâces d’une 
condition nécessaire et malheureuse que je plains. Mais mon coeur se soulève; et, malgré l’atmosphère 
parfumée qui la suit, j’éloigne mes pas, je détourne mes regards de cette courtisane dont la coiffure à points 
d’Angleterre et les manchettes déchirées, les bas blancs et la chaussure usée me montrent la misère du jour 
associée à l’opulence de la veille.” 
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function of an image is primarily representative, “ensemble” goes beyond the image: it is, 
perhaps, a “working” image, to draw on my earlier invocation of Diderot’s conception of 
materialism as a “working” or “embodied” philosophy. Well before Barthes’ analysis of 
fashion as a system of signs, Diderot conceives of clothing as a part of an ensemble, that 
is, as part of a constellation of signs. Diderot understands clothing as more than a collection 
of garments and accessories (another definition of ensemble), but as signs that bear insight 
into “the age.”  
Just as it was only through the transgression of norms of dress, cleanliness, and 
public comportment that Diogenes scandalized the Athenian public, perceived differences 
in dress function for Diderot as a catalyst for critique: specifically, a critique of the 
contradiction between an epoch defined by opulence and lavishness, and the individual 
lived experiences of poverty and struggle.16 These contradictory elements are those of the 
opulence displayed by the quality of the dress and their eventual wear. This suggests a 
fundamental contradiction between the demand for newness (and hence, for production 
itself) and the eventuality of destruction or wear through consumption which in turn 
stimulates more production. It is precisely this formulation which Marx draws on in his 
own conception of the dialectic of production and consumption, detailed in the following 
section. After describing the scene of the peasant woman, Diderot goes on to proclaim that 
this fate would have been his lot had it not been for the “imperious” scarlet robe (16). Here, 
16 Eighteenth century France was not capitalistic; it was an age where mercantilism and statism dominated 
(cf. Schaeper 1980). Textile production was one of the most dominant industries at the time, owed in large 
part to the invention of the flying shuttle by John Kay, patented in 1733 (cf. 1871). Kay’s invention 
revolutionized textile production by mechanizing weaving and decreasing the number of weavers required 
per person from four to one, all while dramatically increasing injuries sustained to workers (cf. 1993; 1901). 
Kay moved from England to France in an attempt to rent his looms there. While Diderot does not speak 
directly of Kay’s invention, an image of it appears in Diderot and d’Alambert’s Encyclopédie. Many weavers, 
fearful of losing their jobs, destroyed the machines. Kay himself barely escaped when angry weavers stormed 
his house in 1753 (1993, 148-9). 
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I take Diderot to mean that the new robe, understood as one without tears or other signs of 
wear, prevented him from displaying the very contradictory elements shown to be at work 
in considering the torn cuffs and worn shoe of the peasant woman against the opulence and 
wealth Diderot witnessed.  
Diderot’s analysis of the peasant woman and his dynamic conception of “ensemble” 
in particular is aligned with his materialist philosophy more generally. Diderot puts forward 
a conception of materialism in which substance itself changes both through time and 
through history.17 This conception of substance as dynamic allows Diderot to think about 
the relationship between matter and history while avoiding the pitfall of causality between 
thought and matter. Briefly, if everything is understood as matter, then thinking would also 
need to be understood as something like matter acting on matter.18 But if matter is instead 
understood as having an inertial force of its own—a force which causes itself to happen 
and to change—then it must also be the case that this process is very much unlike the 
process of “thinking” as human persons conceive of the term: that is, as a mental process 
ultimately related to but disconnected from the body.19  
Diderot’s conception of matter as active was itself a response to D’Alambert’s 
criticisms of Cartesian-Malebranchian notions of matter as inert and mechanistic (Wolfe 
2016, 11). In other words, Diderot’s conception of matter is a response to the “split” 
17 This suggestion is consistent with Leibniz’ own rejection of intersubstantial causality (cf. 1720). 
18 This assessment of the materialist as a causalist produced a caricatured archetype of the early modern 
materialist (cf. D’Alambert 1757; Wolfe 2015). 
19 The materialists that d’Alambert is critiquing here are those who ascribe thinking to bodily matter without 
also being able to give a satisfactory account of how the two separate substances interact with one another, 
let alone an account of how one substance could causally effect and change a substance completely other 
than itself. These “bad” materialists, as the Cambridge Platonist Henry More calls them (1668), defend a 
staunch form of mechanism which reduces everything to matter. However, even “good” materialists on this 
view also defend a form of mechanism, without, however, the ultimate reduction to matter (cf. More 1668; 
Wolfe 2016, 2). A classic form of “bad” materialism, can readily be found in the work of Carl Vogt (cf. 
1847). 
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between mind (active) and matter (inert). The substance dualism of mind and matter in 
Descartes is called into question when the nature of the “I” is thought of as the designation 
of function, and not as a substance in itself.20 Diderot’s conception of matter supposes a 
dis-identity of substance with and within itself, meaning that substance is both always one, 
and yet is always changing: it is both continuous and discontinuous with itself. Indeed, 
Engels acknowledges that Diderot’s materialism is dialectical in this way, writing that 
Diderot produced “masterpieces of dialectic” (1908, 77). 
Diderot’s conception of the self develops from his conception of matter, rendering 
his materialism an “embodied materialism.” In other words, the self is not pitted against 
the body, as in mind versus matter. Instead, both Diderot’s conceptions of the self and of 
matter are conceived as continuous and as discontinuous. For Diderot, a conception of 
matter as active does not mean a conception of matter as causal, but one which 
“incorporates progressively more properties, from motion to thought, chemical dynamism, 
sensitivity and life” (Wolfe 2015, 3).21 Not only is it the case that the body is not “separate” 
from the world (Diderot rejects the mind/matter distinction of Descartes), but “mind” and 
“body” (or matter) are correlates rather than separate substances. “Embodied materialism” 
is another way of saying “materialist theory of the self” or of subjectivity. Both are of the 
world in a phenomenological register. This means that the “mind” is not that of the 
solipsist: it is not separate from the world, unable to grasp it: it is informed by it. Concretely 
20 This early, ‘organismic’ theory of personhood prefigures Whitehead (cf. Alexander 1953) as well as 
contemporary feminist materialisms (cf. Grosz 2004; Barad 2007; Bennett 2010; Braidotti 2013). 
21 This active quality of Diderot’s materialism begins to account for the inter-relational or ethical dimension 
to his materialist philosophy, itself indebted to Spinoza. I do not here make any claims that suggest that 
Spinoza was himself a materialist, as some do (cf. Moreau 2000; Korichi 2000) but emphasize the inheritance 
of a rather social conception of self which lends itself to Diderot’s materialist theory of self. Regardless of 
his status as a materialist, Spinoza was indeed dialectical (cf. Illyenkov 1977). That is, there is a relational 
ontology present in both Spinoza and Diderot (cf. Spinoza Ethics II; Morfino 2006; Wolfe 2016). 
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and for my purpose here, this means that Diderot’s observations are not that of an onlooker 
who is “puzzled” by his robe as an object wholly foreign and strange. Neither does he 
consider it an object of mere curiosity or passive interest. Instead, his reactions indicate the 
seriousness with which its changing matter indicates something salient about its own 
signification.  
 “Les regrets” was not a side project to Diderot’s more serious materialist 
philosophy, although it has been treated as such. That is, although the majority of 
scholarship has focused on Diderot’s naturalist materialism (including his views on 
epigenetic development, on evolution, etc.) I have read “Les regrets” as a vital work of 
materialist philosophy (cf. Yolton 1983; Thomson 2001; Wolfe 2014, 2015, 2016). Even 
Engels, whose experience with and in textile mills informs his work with Marx, praises 
“Le Neveu de Rameau” and other texts by Diderot without mentioning “Les regrets.” “Les 
regrets” shows materialism as an embodied working-through of the shifting and changing 
significations of matter, down to the very clothes we wear. In other words, materialism is 
not only a philosophical or theoretical enterprise about the nature of matter, but comprises 
the embodied experiences (of, with, and as matter) which alert us to the ways in which 
social forces influence and inflect those experiences.   
 
Marx, Fashion, and Dialectics 
While Diderot considered himself to be a discipline of Diogenes, Marx was indebted to 
Diderot. Marx’s fondness for Diderot is well-known: indeed, he names him publicly as his 
favorite writer in a questionnaire published in Confessions (1865). Although the two 
thinkers are both understood to be central and defining figures in the history of materialism, 
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the philosophical influence of Diderot’s materialism on Marx’s own conception of 
materialism has been poorly traced, despite the recognized influence and impact of French 
materialism on German materialism more broadly (cf. Hegel 1991, I; Marx & Engels 1845, 
VI 3).22 Marx wrote that Diderot added “wit, flesh, blood, and eloquence” to materialist 
philosophy: an addition that is not to be taken lightly (1845). Marx also takes from Diderot 
a particular sensibility towards and about materialism. Diderot’s materialism is, as Isabelle 
Stengers puts it, one that centralizes wonder as an affective stance towards matter: to give 
matter the “power to challenge” well-defined categories (Stengers 2007, 10). It is this 
affective sensibility toward matter and attunement to the embodied nature of matter that 
Marx inherits from Diderot. Ultimately, I will argue in this section that fashion exists not 
as a mere anecdotal example or as metaphor in Marx, but is itself central to his formulation 
of the dialectic of production and consumption. 
The young Marx was forthcoming in his praise of Hegel for conceptualizing 
alienation as one of the most instrumental and structuring forces of production (Marx 1975; 
cf. Sayers 2011). Both Hegel and Marx are indebted to the title-character of Diderot’s 
Rameau’s Nephew for showing them how alienation functions within the self (cf. Easton 
1961; von Held 2007). For Hegel, Spirit develops precisely through the concrete and actual 
movement of alienation (1807). This means that wealth or state-power, for instance, should 
not to be understood as external conditions that are merely encountered, but as conditions 
which are themselves concretely revealed through the self, much like the insights that were 
prompted by Diderot’s reflections on the sight of the peasant woman. For Hegel, alienation 
is not itself an external force but is that which both comes to be and functions through a 
22 One such explanation might lie in the characterization (and perhaps stereotype) of early modern 
materialism(s) as both causal and explanatory in nature, as briefly discussed in the preceding section. 
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subject as subjective alienation (Hegel 1991, 4A, 187A, 258A; cf. Jaeggi 2014, 8). Marx 
follows Hegel’s account of alienation as alienation from a social or common world, but on 
this point, Hegel follows Diderot (Easton 1961, 195). Marx, however, was critical of Hegel 
for deriving concrete, material things from thought, rather than thought from material 
experience (Marx 1844; Sayers 2011). Hence, for Marx’s reading of Hegel, “the essence 
of nature was outside nature, the essence of man outside man, and the essence of thought 
outside the thinking act” (1961, 196).  
Marx’s appeal to Feuerbach against Hegel indicates Marx’s own Diderotian 
materialist sympathies, for in Feuerbach Marx finds an ally in the prioritization of direct 
experience or of “sensuous consciousness” over and against abstract (or absolute) ideas 
(1845). It seems then that where Hegel fails for Marx, Feuerbach succeeds. But there is 
also an important way in which Feuerbach fails and Hegel succeeds: for despite 
Feuerbach’s emphasis on direct experience, Marx condemns him for his neglect of the role 
of history in the formation of subjectivity (1867). Young Hegelians such as Feuerbach are 
guilty on Marx’s critique of a contemplative materialism: a materialism which ultimately 
fails to take social and economic relations into considerations (1845). And so Diderot 
succeeds where the Young Hegelians failed. Marx’s materialist conception of history 
supposes a theory of human history that ascends from earth to heaven, rather than from 
heaven to earth. This means that “morality, religion, metaphysics, and all the rest of 
ideology as well as the forms of consciousness corresponding to these” develop from 
material production (1867, 42).23  
Marx believes that material conditions, and not abstract ideas, are the generative 
23 Marx’s rejection of the idealism characteristic of the Young Hegelians (including Feuerbach) in part 
catalyze his own clear formulation of a materialist conception of history in the German Ideology (1867). 
96 
agents of history. The view commits him to a non-deterministic conception of the unfolding 
of history prioritizing the processes and forces of production (1998). This basic tenet of 
Marxist materialism is in line with Diderot’s materialism insofar as both materialisms: 1) 
reject causality as explanatory, and 2) invoke a conception of matter as an active, dynamic, 
historical force.24 In contrast to a Feurbachian naturalism maintaining a rather static 
conception of nature (as unchanging), as well as a Hegelian system viewing nature as the 
“alienated existence of the absolute idea,” Marx and Engels conceived of a materialist 
philosophy that is attentive to history (1998; cf. Bellamy Foster 2000, 111). In The German 
Ideology, Marx and Engels criticize Feurbach in particular for collapsing the metaphysical 
distinction between being and essence which, on their view, dissolves religious alienation 
into material existence, thereby making him ill-equipped to understand real, material 
alienation (1998, 572; cf. Bellamy 2000, 111-2). As Marx writes in his Theses on 
Feurbach: “The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and 
upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and 
changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator 
must himself be educated” (2002, 572-3). 
Some of Marx’s most mature insights into the nature of alienation are—similarly 
to Diderot—arrived at through the examination of fashion and dress, including textile 
production. In the Grundrisse (1857-8) Marx lays out the dialectic of production and 
consumption with specific reference to clothing: “A product, a garment,” he writes, 
“becomes a real product, a real garment only in being worn, becoming worn out, being 
24 This is an oversimplified comparison, as the accounts of “causation” that are rejected in each thinkers are 
indeed different, as Diderot’s focus (in works other than the one my analysis focused on) is on biological 
causality (or evolution), and Marx’s on historical causality, emphasizing the superstructure-base distinction, 
of which he rejects a uni-directionality of causation (cf. Marx 1859). 
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consumed.” Through wear, clothing “disintegrates and negates itself, stimulating more 
production” (91). In other words, consumption motivates production. Prophesying the 
nature of fast fashion inchoate in early stage industrialization, Marx writes how the very 
reliance on quickly deteriorating materials is necessarily built into fashion’s production. 
For Marx, the commodity is itself a transient form which needs constant renewal and 
regeneration. The commodity can thereby be understood as the “cellular unit” of 
capitalism, as Esther Leslie puts it, requiring life and regeneration in order to keep 
capitalism functional. Fashion, as Leslie puts it, becomes its host (2017). As Tansy Hoskins 
writes: “Fashion is more than just clothes; it is a commodity cycle of newness that makes 
clothes go out-of-date and keeps retailers in business” (2014, 55). When Marx writes of 
the “murderous, meaningless caprices of fashion,” as he does in Capital, this is a 
description he takes quite literally (1976, 609). The textile industry was a significant 
catalyst of the Industrial Revolution, and effectively inaugurated the “factory system of 
exploitation” (Leslie 2018). Since both “work and income are reliant on fashion’s fancies,” 
the fashion industry participates in the hiring and firing of workers at whim, depending on 
the demands placed by “fashion” itself. Since “no-one can say beforehand what will be in 
demand” in the future, the capricious nature of fashion—manifest in the especially 
capricious nature of “trends”—creates remarkable precarity and uncertainty (608).  
 Ironically, the advent of technologies like trains and telegraphs, which increased 
the speed and efficiency of early stage industrial garment production, also functioned to 
increase the precarity of the industry itself. Even though these technologies increased the 
efficiency of production, they had an adverse effect on any normalization or stabilization 
of the production of desire itself. Desires could then change more quickly since materials 
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could be transported faster and faster yet in order to accommodate them. Messages could 
be sent and received at increasing speeds. By calling fashion capricious, I believe that Marx 
intended this understanding of the industry as one marked by the rapidly evolving temporal 
structure of desire which is itself conditioned by the dialectic of production and 
consumption. Fashion “seasons” have promoted the “sudden placing of large orders that 
have to be executed in the shortest possible time” (Marx 1976, 608). Commodity fetishism 
especially promotes the continued production/consumption dyad of fashion especially. 
Briefly, Marx conceives of commodity fetishism as the fetishization of commodities 
perpetuated under consumer capitalism in particular (cf. 1976). As Marx puts it, fetishism 
“attaches” itself to commodities, such that the fetishized desire for the object, including the 
desire for what the fashion object in particular may signify about its wearer, becomes 
inseparable from it. Tansy Hoskins describes commodity fetishism as the “imbuing of 
objects with powers beyond their composition,” harkening to a much earlier conception of 
the a fetish (feitiço in Portuguese) as an amulet or charm believed to give its owner special 
powers (Hoskins 2014, 63; cf. Jhally 1990, 53-4).  
It is also because of the particularly social nature of fashion objects as commodities 
that make them so rife for commodity fetishism. As Marx writes in Capital, the enigmatic 
character of the (fashion) commodity—its allure—is presented to the consumer not just as 
a thing, but as a “social relation” comprising the invisible labor of the commodity’s 
production, as well as the labor of the buyer as manifest in their purchasing power (1976, 
130). The fundamentally social component of fashion makes it unlike many other 
commodities in this regard. Unlike many other commodities of cultural capital, the fashion 
garment is able to signal virtues and values to others, including strangers. As Jane Addams 
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writes in 1902, class is differentially manifest in the ways that fashion allows for “interior 
home life” to be lived as an exterior, public life (2002, 19-20). In other words, unlike other 
forms of cultural capital which may signify only in private—facilitated by the inviting of 
others into one’s home—fashion becomes a vehicle to, as it were, take one’s home along 
through the streets. In rendering value and social status alike as a never-ending effort 
requiring serial purchasing, and in locating values (in “attaching” them) to clothing items 
in particular, the fashion industry fuels commodity fetishism and the engines of the 
production/consumption dyad. It is for this reason that “autumn cloth”—clothing that 
becomes so threadbare it needs immediate replacing—is hardly ever reached, on account 
of a fashion system which demands that these garments are replaced before reaching such 
a point (Marx 1857-8; cf. Hoskins 2014, 55).  
Marx’s distinction between abstract work and concrete work in Capital (1867) is 
again cashed out in the lexicon of fashion: he says that the weaving of a linen coat is 
“concrete work” while the tailoring of the coat is “abstract work” (1990, 130; cf. Lehmann 
2000, 68-9). It is to his horror that ten yards of fabric go into the production of this singular 
garment (Marx 1990, 56-69). Since Marx conceives of labor as embodied in the 
commodities that labor produces, it does not seem incidental that Marx again chooses dress 
to develop his conceptions of labor and of the commodity (133). He compares the use-
value of the fabric and the coat, respectively, in order to illustrate the nature of labor as 
contained within commodities, writing that “use-values cannot confront each other as 
commodities unless the useful labour contained in them is qualitatively different in each 
case. In a society of commodity producers, this qualitative difference between the useful 
forms of labour which are carried on independently and privately by individual producers 
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develops into a complex system, a social division of labor” (133). The use-values of the 
coat and of the fabric represent this qualitative difference, and as such represent different 
forms of labor (tailoring and weaving respectively). This is why it does not make a 
difference for Marx in terms of use-value “whether the coat is worn by the tailor or by his 
customer” (133). What is “embodied” by the wearer is still the labor put into its production 
(in terms of both the weaving of the fabric and the coat’s tailoring), and what Marx points 
to here is the inability to “take off” or otherwise alter that signification in consumption. 
The example itself illustrates the fundamentally dialectical nature of production and 
consumption, itself pointing to the inability to detach processes of production from 
commodity consumption.   
Both the linen and the finished coat are the “physical bodies of commodities” and 
are made of the same fundamental elements according to Marx: the material elements 
(provided by nature), and labor (provided by “man”). Here, Marx cites English economist 
William Petty, who writes that “labour is the father of material wealth” while “the earth is 
its mother” (134). The “physical body” of both is then dual: the labor that goes into the 
production of each commodity is masculinized while the material component of each 
commodity is feminized. The distinction is mirrored by the account given by Levinas in 
Difficult Freedom, detailed in Chapter II. In my analysis of Levinas, I suggested that 
manufacture becomes masculinized wherein the raw materials needed for manufacture 
become feminized. The distinction functioned to highlight that the manufacture of clothing 
from its raw materials becomes an avenue to dis-alienate man by returning him (through 
his clothing) to “nature.” In Marx, the consumption of the commodity results in a similar 
feeling (if only a feeling) of non-alienation between self and world, facilitated not only by 
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the purchasing of commodities, but in wearing them. 
Benjamin, (Fashion) History, and (Evolutionary) Progress 
Benjamin was inspired by a “biological theory of fashion” that seriously considers 
nonadaptive or seemingly purposeless features (AP 73: B5, 3). In his reliance on non-
teleological accounts of evolution, including vestimentary evolution, Benjamin finds the 
necessary support for his own critique of historical materialism—itself a kind of evolution 
or evolutionary theory—as wrongly conditioned by a principle of progress which 
functionally aligns the movement or progression of history with teleology (cf. Benjamin 
1940). In The Arcades Project, Benjamin develops a conception of clothing as an exemplar 
Tigersprung (leap) into the past. Throughout this section, I show that fashion is 
instrumental to the Arcades’ critical project: to reconceive historical materialism against 
the “principle of progress.”  
For Benjamin, it is not the case that evolutionary “mutations” (fashion or otherwise) 
indicate a deviation from a grand plan or from ultimate perfectibility. Instead, their study 
can illuminate the historical and contextual reasons for their existence: namely, their 
meaning. Benjamin’s renewed approach to the study of history is one which considers the 
mutated, the cast-off, and the dismissed as integral to non-teleological developmental 
processes. In terms of fashion, it is not the case at all then that it is “senseless and 
nonsensical,” but that it in fact has “played the role of wise nature” (ibid.). I read Benjamin 
as making a significant intervention in progressivist tendencies in both historical 
materialism and evolutionary theory alike: namely, in theories of the development of 
(human) history. Benjamin develops an alternative account of history as non-linear and 
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non-teleological. In challenging the development of fashion and history alike as 
teleological, Benjamin’s critique is also apt to disrupt the naturalization of clothing at issue 
throughout the dissertation. For my purpose specifically, challenging the notion that 
fashion or clothing has a telos is helpful for also challenging the naturalization of garments 
to particular bodies and norms.  
 For Benjamin, the progressivist model of universal history relies on a teleological 
conception of materialism as involving matter which evolves towards a more perfectible 
realization of itself. In other words, matter changes on this account because it is always on 
its way to becoming its own highest form or most perfect version of itself. Progressivist 
models of materialism are informed by “uncritical assumptions of actuality” instead of 
holding a “critical position of questioning” (Buck-Morss 1989, 80). “Uncritical 
assumptions of actuality” refers to the belief that matter develops in accordance to its own 
evolutionary ends. In other words, the bad assumption actually holds that the unfolding of 
matter is preformed or predetermined in some way. This account is resonant with that of 
“intrinsic purposivity” or epigenesis in Kant, which I conceived in Chapter II as a 
naturalized, even “biologized form of purposiveness.” Benjamin rejects this account of 
purposiveness, and in doing so, he establishes the analysis of fashion—much like Diderot 
and Marx—as a serious and meaningful site of philosophical engagement. Were fashion 
only oriented toward the future—toward its own evolution—then there would be little point 
analyzing it as a locus of insight into the past and the present. Indeed, this “shallow” reading 
of the temporality of fashion is rejected by Benjamin.  
 Benjamin’s insight into the evolution of fashion as non-purposive supports his own 
aim of reconceiving historical materialism away from similar accounts of purposivity. In 
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offering an account of evolution as non-teleological in nature, but as fundamentally 
oriented and influenced by the past, Benjamin reconceives of the development of human 
history as that which is always inflected by its own past. In contrast to the developmental 
account of Kant, for instance, Benjamin’s view of human history resists the naturalization 
of clothing and femininity, which, as I showed with Kant, become naturalized precisely 
through such developmental accounts: by circumscribing their place in the course of human 
development. In resisting the notion that fashion has an “intrinsic purposiveness,” 
Benjamin does not concede that fashion has no purpose. On the contrary, it illuminates 
history while simultaneously resisting being naturalized onto it, or subordinated to it. 
Fashion’s ephemerality, its ever-changing state of nature, is precisely what makes it so 
valuable; its “superfluousness” is an asset, not a liability. In other words, it is precisely 
because it has no “intrinsic” meaning that it is able to be utilized as a source of constant 
insight.  
Benjamin’s critique of progressivism is not in itself a rejection of progress. As Amy 
Allen puts it, Benjamin does not reject progress altogether, but aims instead to “break it 
apart and reconceive it dialectically” (cf. 2016, 5). Benjamin aimed to reconceive of 
historical materialism so as to involve the breaking down of the “epic” element of history: 
that is, a linear, narrative structure evocative of progressivist teleology which assumes a 
conception of time as homogenous, empty, and therefore as fillable.  As Allen suggests in 
her reading of Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History,” it is because “the idea of historical 
progress depends on the idea of humanity” that Benjamin takes such great issue with 
‘progress’” (174). The specific idea regarding humanity that Benjamin takes issue with is 
an evolutionarily progressive conception of humanity. In Kant, for instance, the sense of 
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purposiveness in his developmental account of human reason functions to naturalize shame 
onto clothing and the feminine alike. Their “purpose” then becomes to (literally) catalyze 
the ascent of reason in man. For Benjamin, the present is not merely a transition between 
moments (from past to future), in which progress would be conceived as the fulfillment of 
these temporal transitions (1940, thesis 16). Instead, “progress” is conceived as a 
reorientation towards the past in redemptive moments of insight and revolution. In other 
words, instead of accepting naturalized accounts—perpetuating myths that they are indeed 
natural—Benjamin offers a mode of resistance and retelling alike. 
To understand the way that fashion acts as a central element of Benjamin’s 
reconception of historical materialism, it is important to understand how Benjamin’s 
concern about progressivism was not limited to historical materialism. He saw similar 
trends in certain strains of evolutionary theory, with which he was deeply engaged. In 
challenging the progressivism in certain strains of evolutionary theory, Benjamin is 
equipped to challenge the progressivist model of human development more broadly. He 
does this primarily by adopting many of the positions held by Georg Simmel in challenging 
the normative account of progress in certain evolutionary theorists (cf. Benjamin 1999, 
73).25 The Arcades Project is thus not only Benjamin’s attempt to support his argument 
that an uncritical notion of progress is imbedded within the concept of universal history 
(itself reliant on a particular conception of time that remains his focus here in this work), 
25 For instance, even though evolution amounts to a normative account of progress for Herbert Spencer (in 
line with what Lamarck conceptualizes as the drive of a “vital internal force”) it is an account of progress 
which Benjamin, following Simmel, understands as not having a necessarily teleological structure (cf. 
Simmel 1997). Although there is debate about this point, Lamarck’s commitment to materialism meant that 
all evolutionary changes/phenomena are derivative on underlying physical principles, not on teleological 
ones. Science historian Charles Coulston Gillispie argues that it is on this ground that Lamarck ought not to 
be confused with holding a vitalist view (cf. Gillispie 1960, 272). This point—that not all universalist 
trajectories are progressive in a normatively perfectible sense—is vital to understanding why Benjamin 
attends to fashion in such detail within his critique of progressivism in the Arcades Project. 
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but a particularly pernicious form of evolutionary theory. 
Benjamin makes a strikingly similar claim as Herbert Spencer, writing that “fashion 
functions as camouflage for quite specific interests of the ruling class,” going on to quote 
Brecht who writes that “rulers have a great aversion to violent changes” (AP 71-2, B4a,1).26 
For Benjamin, as for Spencer, there also exists a relationship between politics and dress. 
But for Benjamin, the relationship is also implicated with his (re)conception of time. An 
obsession with “progress”—a worry Benjamin shares with Spencer—may result in the 
fallacy of mistaking novelty for improvement: or, with mistaking “progress” itself as 
always a necessary good. From Spencer, Benjamin is inspired to think of clothing not only 
as incidentally coinciding with certain political leanings, but as the very access point from 
which “progress” may be critiqued.  
Even though Benjamin does insist that nature progresses historically, history does 
not itself proceed “naturally,” which is to say, in a developmental or progressive manner. 
Time is instead conceived of as dialectical, prompted by occasions of historical witnessing 
which jolt one into the past as a means of assessing the present, i.e., engaging in critique. 
Benjamin’s reconception of historical materialism is guided by a principle of actualization 
(instead of a principle of progress) (69). The principle of actualization involves the removal 
26 Herbert Spencer was one of the first and most prominent European social scientists to seriously engage 
fashion. Spencer was also a renowned “Social Darwinist” holding both Lamarckian and Social Darwinist 
views. The influence of Lamarck on Spencer is more noticeable in Spencer’s early works, before and soon 
after Darwin published his Origin of Species (cf. Spencer 1859). “On Manners and Fashion,” for instance, is 
an early text by Spencer dominated by Lamarckianism (1854). In it, he espouses the Lamarckian position 
that evolution qua natural selection proceeds in accordance with environmental and behavioral changes and 
differences. Herbert Spencer affirms just such a Lamarckian belief by drawing out an analogy between 
political revolutionary aims (roughly commensurate with environmental factors) and revolutions in behavior 
(analogous to evolutionary variation). Spencer suggests that there is an essential relationship between 
political conservatism and conservative dress, and similarly, a relationship between revolutionary politics a 
tendency towards sartorial differentiation or sartorial difference (1854/1917). Spencer writes: Must we not 
rather conclude that some necessary relationship obtains between them? Are there not such things as 
constitutional conservatism, and a constitutional tendency to change? Is there not a class which clings to the 
old in all things; and another class so in love with progress as often to mistake novelty for improvement? (2) 
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of an event or individual from universal categories in which notions of progress or 
teleology are embedded (cf. Lindroos 1998, 92). A new temporal order is thereby at the 
core of the principle, which is carried out (or actualized) through events of witnessing the 
“dialectical image” (11). This revelation of temporal experience is prompted by 
Benjamin’s own experiences walking the streets of Paris: taking in the sights, the scenes, 
and the fashion. Indeed, it is Benjamin as a flaneur that comes to such a realization about 
the capacity for witnessing to be a catalyst for insights about history. An image or sight of 
something, someone, or something, becomes dialectical when it is able to “freeze” the 
“Now” and traverse time. This occurrence is the Tigersprung: the dialectical leap back into 
time (cf. Benjamin 1940). Benjamin writes:  
 
…image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to the past 
is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of what-has-been to the now is 
dialectical: is not progression but image, suddenly emergent (N2a, 3, 462). 
 
Benjamin rejects the notion that images may only function as indicators of the past (as 
“archaic images”) (N3, 1, 463).  Even as shadows on Plato’s wall, the function of images 
as second-order representations not to be trusted means that they are incapable of signaling 
anything but the past: the originals from which they derive. Conceived instead by Benjamin 
as dialectical, the image functions to disrupt linear temporality by syncing past with 
present, disrupting an understanding of the “present” as the developmental progression of 
the past. The present is, instead, a “point of explosion” (N3, 1, 463). Benjamin’s distinction 
between “archaic” images and “dialectical” images comes out of his critique of 
Heideggerian phenomenology in particular. Briefly, Benjamin understands the 
phenomenological search for “essences” one which renders the “truth” of images as 
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transhistorical in nature and so unable to account for their historical specificity. The 
rupturous moment of “explosion” that the dialectical image produces is conceived by 
Benjamin as the “death of the intentio,” or of intentionality, since the occasion is not one 
of consciousness intending a particular object, but of an object “bursting” with historical 
truth and insight (N3, 1, 462-3). Contrary to what Benjamin sees in phenomenology as the 
search for transhistorical structures of consciousness, dialectical images inaugurate a 
“resolute refusal of the concept of ‘timeless truth’” (N3, 1, 463). In terms of fashion, 
clothing objects may function as dialectical images, understood not as “mere” appearances 
(the mimetic paradigm), as representations of an inherent or “purposive” truth, nor as 
objects on the receiving end of consciousness. Instead, clothing may appear to us as having 
its own story, its own meaning(s), and own truth. 
The phenomena which serve as dialectical images are themselves multiple: fashion, 
film, architecture, etc., can all be shown to “uncover the specific present that is webbed in 
the structures of the chosen material, and which becomes created anew during the course 
of our interpretation” (Lindroos 1998, 13; cf. Benjamin 1990, 10, 11, 69). Appearances and 
public presentation thereby become absolutely central for Benjamin, especially for the 
principle of actualization to, well, actualize. The insight renders encounters with fashion 
and with clothed others as vital moments of insight: specifically, as moments which 
reorient one to the past in such a way so as to interrupt and to disrupt a steady or unthinking 
march towards progress. Similar to Diogenes, these encounters rupture everyday life so as 
to catalyze critical thinking and prompt social and political critique in particular. An 
example of this disruptive power was illustrated above in Diderot’s descriptions of the 
peasant woman. An heir of Diogenes himself, the “shock” value of dress so important for 
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Diogenes’ embodied philosophy functions in Benjamin not only as social disruption 
prompting social analysis, but as a temporal disruption challenging the “natural” order of 
things: specifically, the onward movement of time towards perfectibility. In de-naturalizing 
time as progressive in this way, Benjamin’s insight into the disruptive power of fashion to 
act as a Tigersprung into the past functionally denaturalizes an understanding of it as 
superficial, or as mere human cover. In occupying a central role in re-figuring the human, 
clothing plays an active role in Benjamin’s development of historical materialism. It is 
itself a materiality which matters: an active force or agent of history. In sum, actualization 
(dialectics) replaces “progress” as the basis for Benjamin’s reconception of historical 
materialism. 
In The Arcades Project, Benjamin writes that “the eternal is in any case more the 
ruffle on a dress than some idea” (1999, 69). I interpret the enigmatic phrase to mean that 
time is not bound up with future-oriented thinking: the confusion of new or novel ideas as 
improvement, to draw once more on Benjamin’s indebtedness to Spencer. Time is better 
understood dialectically than it is as always uni-directionally moving forward, pressing on 
into the future. The “ruffle on a dress” refers to the garment as a dialectical image, and 
thereby as able to facilitate the movement (Tigersprung) through time that it catalyzes. 
Andrew Benjamin analyzes the “ruffle on a dress” phrase in the terms set by Benjamin’s 
earlier work, “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility,” where 
the eternal becomes concomitant with the reproducible (cf. 1940). Briefly, mass-produced 
works are removed from history, specifically, from having an origin or an original. In other 
words, the significance of space, time, specific location, social-political context, etc., is lost 
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for mass-reproduced works which do not have a point or place of (meaningful) origin.27 
Since finitude implicates both a spatial and temporal origin, they are, in this way, 
ephemeral.  
 Andrew Benjamin’s interpretation of the ruffle as a commodity befitting this 
description of technological reproducibility, however, neglects to take seriously the fact 
that the ruffle functions as a dialectical image for (Walter) Benjamin. There is no guessing 
as to whether or not Benjamin thought that it functioned as such: it is written right next to 
the ruffle remark (69). Briefly, Andrew Benjamin’s analysis is incompatible with fashion’s 
function in Walter Benjamin as a Tigersprung. If clothing were comparable to mass-
produced artworks, then it would not also be able to act as a Tigersprung, which demands 
 
27 Benjamin conceived of the origin [Ursprung] as a “thoroughly historical category” that “nonetheless has 
nothing to do with beginnings” (quoted in Buck-Morss 8). Origin does not designate that process of becoming 
which occurs as an aftermath of an initial event, but that which itself “emerges out of the process of becoming 
and disappearing” (8). Many Enlightenment thinkers espoused versions of theories of social evolution more 
broadly in some form of another, including Hegel. For Hegel, the Sprung is that nodal line of measure 
relations in which certain nodal changes in quantity result in qualitative changes: a qualitative “leap” from 
one matter to another. This is exemplified by both the boiling-point and freezing-point of water, where a 
change in quantity results in a transformation of quality (Lehmann 2000, 241, fn. 77). It is interesting, if not 
curious and coincidental, that Engels referenced the Sprung in relation to Hegel’s interpretation of objective 
and natural laws in a letter he sent to Marx from a textile mill in Manchester in July 1858. This concept of 
the Sprung (leap), which itself has a long history in materialist thought, is indebted more to Engels than to 
Marx. This qualitative leap is what is invoked by the famous phrase in the Communist Manifesto that “all 
that is solid melts into air” (cf. Lehmann 2000). Since the Sprung fundamentally consists (qua qualitative 
change) in that which distinguishes itself from its previous state, it is always directed toward the past (2000, 
241). Hegel’s relationship to evolution and evolutionary theory is a complicated one, but I note it here briefly 
in order to establish the connection between evolutionary and historical thinking so relevant for Benjamin 
later on. Some of Hegel’s most important comments are to be found in his intervention in the debate in 
geologic history between the Vulcanists and the Neptunists (cf. Kolb 2008). While both posit that catastrophic 
geologic change was central to the development of the Earth, the former located the main agency in volcanic 
eruptions and the latter in flooding. Hegel, suggesting that both were certainly at play, nonetheless rejects the 
historical chronology of geological stratification as having philosophical import. What is philosophically 
salient for Hegel is the “intrinsic connection or necessary relation of these formations,” in which “time plays 
no part” (2004 339a; cf. Kolb 2008, 101). This point is succinctly summarized by David Kolb, who says that 
this means that for Hegel, “nature has no history, even if it has a history” (Kolb 102). In the Science of Logic 
(1812) Hegel argues against an evolutionary principle or law of continuity which would hold that generation 
happens mechanistically, or in a continued order. It is precisely from this rejection of continuity that the 
concept of the Sprung develops in Hegel’s thinking. This maps onto Georg Simmel’s notion of individuation 
developed later on as a negative principle and not a positive one. Individuation is not borne ex nihilo, but 
from the inhibition or blockage of the principle of heredity. So too is the Sprung to be understood as that 
creation of difference borne from competing tendencies (where difference is understood as qualitative 
change). 
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temporal flexibility and openness, since the former can “leap” into the past while the latter 
has no “history” in a meaningful sense for Benjamin. Indeed, Benjamin’s conception of 
clothing as exemplar dialectical images becomes even clearer when considering his claim 
that clothing “is as much at home with what is dead as it is with living flesh” (1999, 69). 
This points to the transhistorical nature of fashion achieved by the Tigersprung. As Ulrich 
Lehmann argues, the transhistorical element of fashion (the eternal) exists as a 
contradiction or opposition to the ephemeral: but the opposition is “rendered obsolete by 
the leap,” by the Tigersprung that “needs the past to continue the contemporary” (2000, 
xviii). The Tigersprung and image alike are thereby both dialectical in nature for Benjamin 
(ibid.).  
Fashion is the tiger’s leap (Tigersprung) into the past. This means that it does not 
exist solely within one singular temporal or aesthetic configuration. This in turn functions 
to generate a conception of historical development and historical time as fundamentally 
dialectical, opposed to teleological (Benjamin 1999; Lehmann 2000, xvii). This begins to 
challenge the progressive dimension of historicist time of which Benjamin remains critical. 
Now-Time or Jetztzeit is Benjamin’s concept for a temporality which operates against a 
conception of time as linear, empty, and homogenous (cf. Benjamin 1930).28 Tiger has 
etymological origins in the Avestan word tighrhi, meaning “arrow.” Benjamin’s 
Tigersprung might in this case be thought of as that leap which travels quickly and swiftly, 
much like an arrow, into the past. This invokes a notion of Sprung as one of nodal 
relationality and qualitative change, charged here with the added dimension of swiftness 
28 An illuminative illustration of Now-Time can be found in Benjamin’s essay on “Surrealism” (1929) where 
he shores up an image of an alarm clock which rings each minute for sixty seconds. This incessant ring 
functions as a strike against homogenous time by blasting itself out of the historical continuum understood 
as the linear progression of history and of historical time (Weigel 1996). 
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(understood as movement in time and space) indicative by the “arrow” like quality of the 
leap. Benjamin’s reconfiguration of historical materialism towards a principle of 
actualization functions similarly to accounts of evolutionary theory which seek to 
understand evolutionary change as a dynamic process of the actualization or non-
actualization of differing tendencies, rather than as part and parcel of teleology or else some 
causal conception of ultimate perfectibility. It is in this sense that fashion is so 
meaningfully correlated with human evolution. Fashion, then, is a fundamental part of 
evolutionary history, and a central material by which materialist philosophy has henceforth 
developed, as well as the key to its reconception. On this analysis, it is not “retro” fashion 
that Benjamin is interested in, but fashion itself as retroactive (as Tigersprung). Fashion 
does not merely belong to the past, but illuminates it.  
Fashion is not limited to being a catalyst of the Tigersprung for Benjamin, even 
though this seems to be its central role. When Benjamin writes of the “forward-thinking” 
quality of fashion, or its ability to anticipate the future (opposed to its animation of the 
past) he associates this ability with a mysterious “the feminine collective” (1999, 64, B1a, 
1). Seeming to invoke the myth of the eternal feminine, Benjamin’s association of the 
predictive nature of fashion with femininity does not limit the premonitions to future trends 
alone but to “new legal codes, wars, and revolutions,” provided anyone can decipher the 
secret, mysterious codes—the “secret signals of things to come”—inchoate in fashion 
(ibid.). Benjamin’s claim does at least two things. First, it invokes a well-worn conception 
of femininity as mysterious and epistemically unknowable: or at least, as that which 
requires difficult work to fully discern and understand. Second, in excluding femininity 
from the retroactive movement of the Tigersprung—in illuminating the past—it becomes 
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reified as shallow or superficial, where superficiality would designate a concern only with 
present and future trends and possibilities, and would not have the “depth” of meaning 
associated with the past. 
 Benjamin recognized that many qualities and characteristics associated with 
women at the time (living sedentary lives, family lives, etc.) only “appeared destined” 
because of the clothing that actively constricted their movement (1999 74, citation from 
Charles Blanc). In the challenge of a teleological account of evolution which necessitates 
a genesis (or “Ursprung) of human development, neither femininity nor clothing are 
destined in their significations. Non-deterministic accounts of evolution are compatible 
with Benjamin’s concern to re-orient historical materialism away from a guiding principle 
of progress.  
 Insofar as historical materialism concerns itself with the reproduction of life 
throughout time and history, evolutionary theory is not tangential, but essential to 
analyzing the changing dynamics of these relationships. The notion of sexual selection in 
particular is extremely helpful in this regard. Charles Darwin’s conception of sexual 
selection has generally been understood to privilege maleness and to attribute maleness to 
activity, while femaleness has been relegated to a passivity (Grosz 1999). This essentialist 
critique is merited. However, the principles and entailed gendered norms of “fitness” and 
“survival” which govern the process of natural selection are irreducible to his conception 
of sexual selection (Grosz 2011). On Elizabeth Grosz’s view, sexual selection operates in 
accordance to a principle of excess in relation to survival, whereby the “energetic excess” 
of sexual selection accounts for the production of both “biological and cultural 
extravagance” in various species. This “uncontainable production of intensification” exists 
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“not for the sake of the skills of survival but simply because of its force of bodily 
intensification, its capacity to arouse pleasure or ‘desire,’ its capacity to generate sensation” 
(2011, 118). The feminist reading of Darwinian evolution offered by Grosz suggests a non-
reductive account of sexual difference as a site of productive excess, intensities, and 
possibilities. In other words, it is precisely by attuning ourselves to sexual selection, and to 
variations in kinds of adornment specifically, that a non-progressivist view of evolution 
qua selection begins to emerge. As Grosz writes: sexual selection actually involves the 
“nonadaptive, non-reductive, [and] nonstrategic investment of (most) forms of life in 
sexual difference” (2011, 119). One of the most stellar examples of this account of sexual 
selection can be found in the work of George Darwin, nephew to Charles: or, as I like to 
call him affectionately: the other Darwin.  
George Darwin analyzed the parallels between biological development and 
vestimentary development, or vestimentary evolution (1872). His argument is firstly an 
analogical one: the garment corresponds to the organism in much the same way as the 
system of dress corresponds to a species. Like his more well-known uncle, G. Darwin 
locates survival as the mechanism for vestimentary evolution. This does not mean that 
survival should be understood as the need to adapt to one’s climate, as one might expect. 
Rather, he suggests that dress evolves for the sake of its own own survival. While George 
Darwin considers fashion to be an external force that meaningfully influences vestimentary 
evolution, it is not central to it. Fashion is external to processes of “natural selection” which 
would account for slight differences and variations in dress throughout time. On Darwin’s 
view, fashion is analogously related to processes of sexual selection, including both a love 
of novelty and penchant for exaggeration. Within this evolutionary process, fashion itself 
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selects for exaggerated forms. When this happens, they are “retained and crystallized” as 
part of dress, in spite of any former use functions. The second form of evolutionary dress 
involves garments which previously held particular use values but which no longer 
function as such in the present. High heels are an excellent example of this. While there 
are multiple evolutionary histories of the popular shoe, its initial design was informed by 
the need for equestrian riders to remain secure in their stirrups (cf. Semmelhack 2015). The 
former has its analogue in the peacock’s tail and can be explained through sexual selection, 
while Darwin likens the latter to the wing of the apteryx, and can be explained through the 
effects of disuse. 
 Benjamin intended his Arcades Project to be a materialist philosophy of history 
constructed with the “utmost concreteness” (1999; Buck-Morss 1989, 3). In the Theses, 
Benjamin remarks that the historicist presents an eternal image of the past, while the task 
of the historical materialist is to describe a unique moment within that past (cf. 1940, 254). 
This is precisely the work of the Arcades Project. It is for this reason that sartorial fashion 
becomes one of the single most important metaphors in the Arcades Project; as some argue, 
it is the most important (cf. Lehmann 2000). As Lehmann suggests, fashion existed for 
Benjamin as the metaphor best equipped to evoke the sense of time he was attempting to 
articulate in this work (2000, 202). While Lehmann stresses fashion’s significance, he also 
neglects to take seriously its central role beyond its capacity as a “metaphor,” albeit a 
powerful one. The suggestion that fashion operates as a metaphor functionally relegates 
the material of fashion to ‘bad’ mimetic objects. For Benjamin however, mimesis has a 
phylogenetic component, meaning that mimetic objects are far from their Platonic or 
Aristotelian heirs as being “mere” representational objects. For Benjamin, mimetic objects 
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have both a representational function and a reproductive capacity (cf. Benjamin 1933). This 
means that mimetic objects functionally double as evolutionary phenomena. Benjamin’s 
aim to reconceive historical time in anti-teleological and progressivist terms also entails a 
rejection of history in similar terms. This renders historical objects as “evolutionary” 
objects only when evolution is also conceptualized in similar anti-teleological and 
progressivist terms.  
Benjamin was set to give a lecture course at the Collège de France on the Arcades 
Project, but the lectures never materialized. When Georges Bataille asked Benjamin what 
the specific topic would be on, Benjamin replied, with brevity: “Fashion.”29 While we can 
only imagine what those lectures would have included, I have shown here that his 
commentary on fashion is not incidental to his thinking, but developed from a much longer, 
richer history. It is by keeping the legacy I have detailed here in mind that we may continue 
to develop philosophical thinking on fashion as an important continuation and extension of 
materialist philosophy.  
Conclusion  
It is not a coincidence that three of the most important materialist philosophers were 
interested in fashion and in clothing. As I have shown throughout, their commentaries are 
not incidental, but vital to their respective works. In line with the rejection of progressivism 
witnessed in Benjamin in particular, the history I have outlined between these three 
thinkers does not follow a straightforward or pre-formed evolutionary trajectory: there is 
not an unmistakable influence or a heredity of sorts that I have traced here. But that is also 
29 This anecodate is recounted by Hans Meyer, who witnessed the exchange. 
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not the point. The point is that fashion endures as both ephemeral and as eternal, and that 
the dialectic is a productive one for materialist philosophies which would seek to 
understand the complex role it continues to play. For all three of the major figures whose 
accounts I have developed here, fashion exists both as a set of material objects and as a 
dynamic, dialectical force or process informing the materialist philosophy of each. 
Clothing plays a pivotal role in the disruption of human history as “naturally” unfolding 
over time in a pre-determined direction: an idea most fully realized by Benjamin. 
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IV. EUGEN FINK: THE PHENOMENOLOGIST OF FASHION
Introduction 
This chapter offers one of the first English-language commentaries of Eugen Fink’s 
untranslated Mode: Ein Verführerisches Spiel (Fashion: a Seductive Game) (1969), a text 
that I read both as a vital but neglected text in the history of philosophy, and as a 
meaningful application of clothing to philosophy (and vice versa). Fink was especially 
concerned with the dominance of metaphysical views of human nature that subordinate 
and hierarchize. In Play as Symbol of the World, for instance, he writes that metaphysics 
“decided in advance that the beautiful is subordinate to the true and is a sensuous image 
for pure non-sensuous thought,” and that such subordination has “had great 
consequences not only for the conception of human beings, but also for the 
representation of the whole of beings” (2016, 99). As I suggested in Chapter I, the 
subordination is so longstanding that it “appears” as natural, or as an unquestioned a 
priori seemingly outside of the whims and wills of time and of history. Play, what Fink 
conceives of as a “fundamental phenomenon of existence,” becomes one of many 
phenomena that get the short end of the metaphysical stick, along with fashion. In other 
words, both fashion and play become juxtaposed to “reason,” “truth,” and “essence” as 
being both superficial and trivial. Fink rejects the Platonic dualism between original 
and representation (appearance) supported by the mimetic paradigm, writing that “an 
imitation, a mimesis, of philosophy” exists “only as long as it allows philosophy to 
determine its character” (2016, 99). In other words, it is not metaphysics that should 
determine philosophy, but philosophy that should determine metaphysics. So long as 
philosophy discards or casts aside the world of appearances as the inferior, false, or 
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deceitful world, its insights will continue to be undermined as being incredible in the 
etymological sense, as not credible. It is not philosophy that should determine the 
“character” of its subjects, but its subjects that should determine the character of 
philosophy.  
 In this chapter, I will argue that Fink’s insights into fashion develop his ontology 
of play: an ontology which is itself motivated by the refusal of the essence/appearance 
dualism. Fink’s conception of ontology is not as the search for the ultimate “there is”—of 
essences—but is the analysis of what uniquely characterizes human beings: of how and in 
what ways they exist, interact, and appear. In Section I, I will contextualize Mode in 
relation to Fink’s ontology. In Section II, I highlight the influence of both Kant and 
Nietzsche for Fink in order to further contextualize some of Fink’s major insights. Briefly, 
Fink critiques Kant’s conception of clothing as that which primarily expresses (or conceals) 
shame (1969, 55). From Nietzsche—specifically Nietzsche’s rejection of a two-worlds 
system, or of the appearance-reality dualism—Fink inherits a fervent affirmation of the 
world of appearances. In Section III, I focus squarely on Mode, having contextualized 
Fink’s ontology and relevant philosophical inheritances in the previous two sections. In the 
final major section, Section IV, I develop the phenomenological component of Fink’s 
analysis: his conception of dress not only as part of the lived body (Leib) but as “a second 
Leib” itself (1969, 69). As such, clothing does not cover the body—reinforcing yet another 





Historical Context and the Reception of Mode 
Commissioned by the German Fashion house Spengler, Mode is a small but extraordinary 
text. Fink’s discussions of fashion are not “mere” applications of his thinking (an applied 
philosophy) but represent a vital and original kind of philosophical thinking. In other 
words, fashion is not just an object of inquiry among any other object for Fink to apply his 
philosophical ideas, overlaying it like an oversized coat. Instead, it is a phenomenon which 
generates and inspires his insights. For Fink, philosophy ought to have a fundamentally 
anthropological orientation. Fashion provides just such an orientation. Similarly as in Kant, 
the Fall represents the making-finite of humankind: repetitive insofar as the human is 
precisely marked by the “fall” into finitude. Whereas for Kant, the Fall propels or kickstarts 
reason’s ascension, for Fink, the fall into finitude indicates that the newly-minted humans 
ought to orient their search for wisdom in line with their conditions, meaning that 
philosophy ought not be oriented towards the metaphysical or theological, but to the 
anthropological, the imminent, and the concrete. The intermingling of theology with 
ontology is, on Fink’s view, especially “disastrous” (1969, 39). Fink thereby conceives of 
philosophy as “a finite possibility of the finite human being,” and argues that we ought to 
embrace it rather than fear or repress it (39). In a Nietzschean vein, Fink argues that the 
“human spirit” ought to “take up finitude as its fate” (39). With such an affirmation, Fink 
writes that the “words of the serpent, eritis sicut deus, should have no further seductive 
power” for the human who takes up their own finitude. In primarily engaging finitude 
through the infinite, religion thereby represents an “alien interpretation” of human 
experience, which is to say, inhuman understood as non-finite (or infinite). Philosophy, by 
contrast, ought to be a “self-interpretation” of the “sojourn” of human existence in the finite 
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world (39). Fink’s understanding of ontology is riveted to this dual concern for the 
anthropological and for finitude. It is this distinct sense of humanity bound up in finitude 
that grounds Fink’s ontological philosophy, but is especially evident in the decidedly 
anthropological turn of his later work. It is against this backdrop that we must read Mode.  
 The most sustained engagement with Fink’s text is by Stefano Marino in “Ideas 
Pertaining to a Phenomenological Aesthetics of Fashion and Play: The Contribution of 
Eugen Fink” (2017). Marino considers Fink’s text to be an under-regarded contribution in 
the ever-developing nexus of work on clothing and Fashion within the human sciences (and 
slowly, within philosophy). The aim of their article is to analyze the place of the text within 
both a “phenomenological aesthetics” and an “anthropology of Fashion” (334). Mode is a 
late text for Fink, and follows the “ontological turn” of his work in the 1940’s and 1950’s. 
The 1950’s and 1960’s led Fink more explicitly in the direction of phenomenological 
anthropology, but the ontological and cosmological dimensions of his phenomenological 
work (of the 40’s and 50’s) still persists in the 60’s work.  His insights into the nature of 
play (developed earlier) play a prominent role in Mode. In the 40’s and 50’s, Fink 
developed a speculative phenomenology of play as a counter to a dominant conception of 
play as “mere idle amusement, to be valid only as a restful pause” (quoted in Marino 2017, 
343). In contrast to this view, Fink writes in Oase des Glücks that play: 
 
 ...is always an occurrence that is luminously suffused with sense [sinnhaft], an 
enactment that is experienced. […] Play belongs essentially to the ontological 
constitution of human existence; it is an existentiell, fundamental phenomenon. […] 
If one defines play, as is usually done, only in opposition to work, actuality, 
seriousness, and genuineness, one merely places it, falsely, next to other 
phenomena of life. Play is a fundamental phenomenon of existence, just as 
primordial and independent as death, love, work and ruling, but it is not directed, 
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as with the other fundamental phenomena, by a collective striving for the final 
purpose. It stands over and against them. (2016, 16) 
The devaluation of play— understood as antithetical to the serious—is paralleled in 
Fashion and dress (cf. Marino 2017, 346-7). The devaluation of dress represents the 
“ambiguous” relationship that the human being has to their body and world. Such a notion 
of ambiguity was also vital to Fink’s earlier development of play’s ontology, such as when 
he writes that the relationship between metaphysical philosophy and play is one of 
“stimulating ambiguity” (2016, 97). The ambiguity precisely concerns the dynamic 
interplay between opposites, which is lost in hierarchization and subordination which 
necessitates a privileging of one element over another. For instance, of Plato’s thought he 
writes that it is both “serious in its jests and jesting in its seriousness, familiar with and 
enjoying the allure of the mask” (2016, 97). Plato “takes the beautiful to be the veiling of 
what is really true,” or rather, the beautiful is related to the true in the same way that the 
visible is related to the invisible (98). This is important for Fink in situating play as much 
more than a “merely” preliminary way of “understanding the relation of the human beings 
to the gods,” by which Fink means the relation between the material and the immaterial or 
the beautiful body to the form of the beautiful. Instead, play is a mode of existing and of 
relating, similar to “the mode in which the gods handle human beings … delivered over to 
them like playthings to the child” (101). Play is, to quote from above, a “fundamental 
phenomenon of existence.”  
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Of Plato’s very late text, the Laws, Fink writes: 
 
The gods play—they do not work onerously like mortals; they do not struggle for 
sustenance; they do not forcefully wrest from the earth stones to build houses, clay 
for jugs; they do not clear the wilderness; they do not sow in order to reap, nor 
gather the harvest into barns; they do not stand their ground against one another in 
a battle for life and death; they are immortal, they cannot starve, and are not killed. 
And if they procreate and love, then this does not have among them the sense of a 
striving after “immortality” as it does for mortal human beings who can only live 
on in children and grandchildren, but as individuals themselves pass away. (2016, 
101) 
 
Fink is critical here of the appraisal of immortality in Platonic metaphysics and in the 
metaphysical tradition more broadly. Such striving towards the infinite couches human 
experience in terms of its ability to attain such a status, thereby constituting an “alien 
interpretation” of that existence: an interpretation which is foreign to the experience of 
being human as it is lived. What is especially relevant for my purpose is the idea, elicited 
by the citation, that humans actually fear play. In not being oriented toward a goal or telos, 
play represents a fundamentally human phenomenon (although not exclusively human) 
which is also a phenomenon of finitude. As paradoxical as it may initially sound, play 
really indicates death, but in indicating death, it may also reorient us to life: not as a 
stepping stone toward another realm, but life as a finite and precious gift to be enjoyed, 
even to be played with. In terms of clothing, the charge that its concern is “unserious” is 
really an accusation (stemming from fear) that it concerns finitude: the undergirding belief 
being that “real” philosophy must concern the infinite in some capacity.   
 Since “the god is without need, he is able to play continually” (101). For the human 
being, however, “playing is the activity that happens in leisure relieved of all need” (101). 
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Since the human being is bogged down by the necessities of material life, they may “only 
occasionally” be able to participate in “true” or “pure” thinking, which requires a certain 
abstraction from the realm of immediate need and concern. Pure thinking thereby requires 
a mind “free from need” (101). This foundational interpretation for the history of 
metaphysics understands the “thinking of thinking,” or “absolute knowing” (à la Hegel) as 
the highest determination of divinity and/or thought itself. “Play” and “thinking” thus 
become juxtaposed as two poles of this “ambiguous” interpretative moment of 
metaphysics.  
Even though both play and thinking indicate a degree of leisure, thinking becomes 
“the highest determination” of divinity (101-2). The quest for absolute knowing, or the 
quest to “think about thinking,” all express this ambiguous moment of metaphysics which 
privileges thought to play. Play is thus rendered as the “non-serious” and non-laborious 
other of thinking itself. Even though the activity of thinking is distinguished from those of 
manual or physical labor for Plato, its proximity to the “good” and to the gods alike makes 
it a form of work or labor, but of a different sort: the virtuous kind. To preempt my reading 
of Mode, it is for this reason that Fink remains so attentive to labor in his analysis of 
fashion. On his view, the “prejudice” of philosophy against both play and fashion have to 
do with its juxtaposition against the serious labor of thinking (of intellectual labor). This 
background is crucial for understanding the analogously “ambiguous” role of fashion and 
dress in mediating the relation between self and structure. In Mode, Fink writes that “the 
dark seriousness of philosophy is … a prejudice of public opinion” (15). On this view, 
because philosophy is thinking is labor, “Fashionable” [Modische] is thus “hurled as an 
invective” to indicate the non-thinking, non-laborious realm of “mere” appearances, 
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distinguished, also, from the realm of need. 
However, it is also clear that Mode indicates a development in Fink’s own thinking, 
and not just an application of his ontology. In Play as Symbol of the World (2016), while 
there are no concrete analyses of fashion and dress, his few mentions of the phenomena 
reinforce the very notion of “superficiality” his later work seeks to uproot (and that, in 
general, his notion of play itself seeks to upend in the philosophical imaginary). For 
example, in “Play and Celebration” he writes that clothing is one of the “superficial things” 
that life necessitates “for the sake of the body” (2016, 223).30 And yet Fink already begins 
to point to the significance of dress which he will elaborate in much more detail later on in 
Mode by suggesting that such “superficial things” change a sense of bodily possibilities.  
In the “play-world” of Olympic sports, the athletes plunge themselves into a 
situation where “the human being casts off his everyday armor like a bothersome 
garment—and ventures to find out what the body can be” (2016, 224). The “armor” of the 
human being is meant to invoke the ways that social and cultural mores, like clothing, both 
delimit and prescribe bodily possibilities in an extremely physical manner. For instance, 
just as a dress might inhibit one’s posture and movement (for instance, one might feel 
inhibited from spreading out on a train, or scaling a rock wall) social customs also dictate 
appropriate and inappropriate movements, gestures, and comportments. Fink does not, 
however, understand the display of the “naked” body as a “pre-technological” body 
understood as more natural.31 In other words, he does not idealize nor romanticize the body. 
30 The full quote is as follows: “For the sake of the body we need the necessities of life and even for the most 
part superficial things: nourishment, clothing, a house and village, tools, machines, weapons, all the myriad 
things of an artifact-culture, an immense technological apparatus.” 
31 Fink writes: “In the comportment of sports that is complementary with technology, . . . The task is to purely 
give prominence to the human body, to elevate it in its own performances, to cultivate delight in the body. 
The competitors who step up with their trained bodies and perform at a high level compete ‘naked’ to a 
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Instead, he understands the naked body (or what he thematizes as the athlete’s body) as 
unrestricted by that which would otherwise function to restrict and confine: namely, social 
customs and clothing alike. In Olympic sport, what appears is the body itself. All “essential 
moments” of human existence are inextricably linked to this sensuous, creative, uninhibited 
body where “the theme of play” can be celebrated. “Essential moments” for Fink are 
composed of those instances where the body becomes its own center of activity, and not 
merely “the place from which activities proceed” (224).  
 The insight that Fink gleans from Olympic gymnastics is integral to his 
anthropological-ontological conception of the body and the constitution of play within the 
body. Both “real” and “imaginary” features of play alike are “bound up with the body and 
exhilarated by it,” which is to say that “incarnation pervades all structures of our existence” 
(223). It is this insight that leads to Fink’s conception of the intellect as sensuality or 
materiality (223). He rather explicitly condemns an idealistic conception of the body which 
denounces the body as “ a source of disturbance for the intellect […] as a confusion of 
reason, […] that saw in it a principle of evil, the seat of lusts and wicked desires; that 
defamed it and yet have just not been able to ever ‘overcome’ it” (223). Instead, the playful 
body becomes the very seat of Fink’s ontology, where attention to the dressed body does 





certain degree. They are not set inside an efficient apparatus. They perform a presentation of the human body 
in the possibilities that belong to it alone. The race, the toss, the blow, form exemplary basic models of a 
bodily action that is not technicized” (223-4). 
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Fink on Kant and Nietzsche 
So far, I have shown that Fink’s emphasis on the centrality of embodiment for ontology is 
tied to a broader metaphysical rejection of play. In privileging thinking over playing, 
metaphysics dis-embodies itself and the “serious” business of philosophy becomes 
juxtaposed against the frivolous, the superficial, and the playful. The importance that Fink 
places on the embodied dimension of human existence extends to the importance of fashion 
and clothing in his work. Fink writes that “fashion is a phenomenon that is essentially 
connected […] to the human being’s embodied nature, to our existence’s being-incarnated 
(ein Phänomen, das mit der Leiblichkeit des Menschen, mit der Inkarniertheit unserer 
Existenz […]. Zusammenhängt) (77). Instead of reading Kant’s “Conjectures” as a “work 
of fiction,” Fink’s reading of Kant predates contemporary scholarship which also seeks to 
reckon with the implications of taking Kant’s essay “seriously” (cf. Chakrabarty 2016; 
Baumeister 2019). In Kant’s “Conjectures,” Fink locates the “process of man’s 
incarnation” [Menschwerdung], his literal coming-int-bodily-being, which is to say, into a 
finitude marked by clothing (18). Similarly as to Plato, Fink writes that Kant addresses a 
“serious problem” in a “playful nature” (17). Fink writes that “it would be outlandish to 
see here only a transcription of a sacred document” (1969, 22). Within this small book of 
1786 written between the first two critiques, Kant in fact “designs a whole anthropology… 
which shows the central structures of being human” (22). Dress is this central structure. 
Since the philosophical anthropology of Kant preoccupies a significant part of Mode, I 
attend to his analysis and critique here briefly in this section. 
In the fig-leaf, Fink suggests that Kant sees “the immanent erotic power of veiling” 
which is simultaneously “the irritating effect of shame.” This insight is developed by Fink 
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later on in his text. Not only was the fig-leaf the first dress, Fink claims, but “the first erotic 
light around the beloved body of the sexual partner and symbol of a bond, a covenant, a 
mutual dedication and affection” (22). This is explained (away) in Kant as the movement 
of reason towards the future, expressed as the ability to plan and prepare for said future. 
Thus, this remarkable “step” of reason to express reference to time is itself bound up in the 
“covenant” of marriage and its relationship to modesty. Fink’s reading of Kant is 
significant for making of clothing a distinctly human phenomena, bound up in the 
becoming-finite of the human being which is proper to the objects of study for philosophy 
as a discipline. For Kant, the “clothed” dimension of humanity functions to subordinate the 
feminine and to clear the path for the ascent of a masculinized reason. By contrast, this 
understanding of human persons as clothed beings makes clothing central to the study of 
Fink’s anthropologically-oriented philosophy. Since clothing was especially vital in the 
process of human beings’ becoming-finite (on Kant’s own account) it is made to be 
especially relevant in Fink’s finitude-centric approach to philosophical ontology.  
 Departing from Kant, Fink disagrees with the idea that clothing primarily expresses 
(or conceals) shame or else otherwise acts as a moral indicator like it does for Kant (55). 
Fink describes the aesthetic realm of fashion as neither moral nor immoral: “beyond good 
and evil” (71). Fashion presents a particular difficulty when it comes to valuation. This is 
because, for Fink, morals are fundamentally historical phenomena which more or less fall 
along an axis of either being useful or useless (111). And yet he warns against applying 
traditional aesthetic categories to the evaluation of fashion (by which he means criteria 
which would evaluate the garment “as a work of art”). Key for my purpose here is the 
related idea that metaphysical dualisms hierarchize, and therefore actively subordinate. In 
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doing so, they create moral and aesthetic categories alike. For instance, in determining the 
notion of essences as “truth,” not only are appearances rendered a kind of playful untruth, 
but both become distinctly (im)moral categorizations. To be concerned with play and with 
fashion, then, is not only frivolous or superficial, but decidedly immoral.  
Human kind has “fashioned” their own place in the cosmological system through 
the self-fashioning permitted by clothing. As a dressed being who “has the opportunity to 
design himself ‘superhumanly’ as well as ‘sub-humanly’” mankind “does not stand 
‘objectively’ in the hierarchy of all beings.” Unlike Kant, whose descriptions of clothing 
are used to situate the human squarely between divinity and animality, Fink argues that 
clothing permits a self-fashioning which does nothing other than indicate that very 
humanity. In other words, it is the very humanness of clothing that is grounds for its 
reclamation as a site of philosophical inquiry.  
Fink’s positive reclamation of finitude is certainly inspired by Nietzsche.32 
Nietzsche’s rejection of a two-worlds system, or of the appearance-reality dyad, results in 
a fervent affirmation of the world of appearances, and with it, a profound reconsideration 
of the meaning(s) of clothing, especially in its relation to the body. In denying a robustly 
metaphysical conception of truth, the quest for truth becomes a wholly human enterprise 
grounded in lived experience. Instead of a dyad between appearances and reality, reality 
32 It is not only Nietzsche’s philosophy of the body or of incarnation that inspires Fink, but Nietzsche’s 
commentary on clothing specifically. In the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche writes that “philosophy would 
have been absolutely impossible for most of the time on earth without an ascetic mask and a suit of clothes” 
(2006, 84). I interpret this claim to mean that a pernicious metaphysical dualism between this world and 
another (a “two worlds” system or theory) has sustained the history of philosophy as a particular history of 
metaphysics. I argue elsewhere that the “ascetic mask” is Nietzsche’s symbol for a devaluation of the bodily 
and the earthly. Ascetic morality not only maintains the metaphysical dualism between this realm and the 
beyond, but marks and subordinates the world of appearances as a false world. The suit of clothes thereby 
comes to represent one of philosophy’s scapegoats. In taking clothing to signify mere covering (or a covering 
over) of a deeper, truer self, the same ascetic morality that governs religion on Nietzsche’s view also governs 
philosophers’ dispositions towards the body, including their own. 
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itself is now to be understood as the world of appearances. When Nietzsche invokes masks 
and masking, as he frequently does, he often does so in irony (in a “playful” way), to 
indicate that there is no truer or deeper “essence” of subjectivity underneath the mask. In 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche writes that “the person of today couldn’t wear a better 
mask… than that of your own face” (1978, 93). This is not to say that as a mask, the face 
indicates something like psychological interiority. Instead, the language of masking is what 
permits Nietzsche to develop an ontology of self-fashioning.33   
In no longer being relegated to the realm of metaphysical unintelligibility, morality 
becomes both aesthetic and sensible for Nietzsche, opposed to abstract, theological, 
unintelligible, or metaphysical. As Salomé puts it, in Nietzsche: “ethics unobtrusively 
merges with aesthetics” (2001, 121). Concretely, this means that appearances become 
morally indicative, or indicate something about morality rather than only “superficially” 
indicating or indexing the immoral. In Chapter II, I argued that the appearance of the 
feminine in particular indicates moral responsibility for both Kant and Levinas. For both, 
the “modest” feminine figure in particular is what permits moral growth for both thinkers. 
This morality of appearances, however, renders only some appearances as morally relevant 
ones. By contrast, Nietzsche’s ontology of self-fashioning democratizes the world of 
appearances—the domain of aesthetics—as the site and locus of the moral.  
In a letter to Salomé on the “teaching of style,” Nietzsche writes that “a style should 
live” (1882). This claim emphasizes that style is not to be understood as superficial cover, 
33 This concept of self-fashioning is perhaps best captured by Daniel Anderson, who writes of Dionysos that 
“Dionysos was god of masks. But as god of masks his essence is to be masked; there can be no Dionysos 
unmasked” (1993, 8). A conception of masking as essence is juxtaposed to a conception of masking as “mere” 
cover or as “deceptive” cover. The latter emphasizes or reinforces the metaphysical dualism between 
appearances and reality whereas the former affirms the world of appearances as reality. Masking for 
Nietzsche thereby emphasizes the playful, costumed world as the “true” world. 
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but as that which affirms life (and the condition of finitude specifically). On Nietzsche’s 
view, dress does not lack “depth.” Instead, it is wholly reconfigured by the rejection of the 
distinction between surface and depth. Lack of depth, then, cannot be the reason by which 
to continue to exclude dress from philosophy. As Ron Scapp and Brian Seitz write, with 
Nietzsche: the “time-honored opposition between reality and appearance—a product of a 
confused fantasy—is readily exposed by fashion” (2010, 3).  
The Depth of Surface: Fink on Fashion 
Just as in Play as Symbol of the World, Mode is motivated by the same philosophical 
disposition. It is a disposition which is both suspicious and critical of a discipline which 
continues to gain purchase from articulating the boundaries of what is to be considered 
“serious” philosophy, and what “serious” topics merit its considered attention. The 
juxtaposition between the serious and the unserious indexes a more fundamental 
juxtaposition between the moral and the immoral. Fink’s approach to the writing of Mode 
is similar to that of his analysis of Kant’s “Conjectures”: it is precisely in taking “seriously” 
what has been outcast or dismissed as “mere play” (or, as a “work of fiction” in the case of 
the “Conjectures”) that Mode’s insights are reached. In the two previous sections, I 
established that the “corporeality of existence” quite literally grounds Fink’s ontology. 
Grounded in finitude and incarnation, Fink comes to fashion and clothing alike as rich, 
complex phenomena that shed light on the human condition.  
In the broadest sense, Fink considers fashion to be the “style of an epoch” that 
encompasses the “total spirit that shapes and determines all manifestations of life” (31). 
Fashion “expresses itself in the great and small things of social life, beforehand imprinting 
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every individual and his own personal attitude of life” (31). Events of everyday life are 
thus to some degree “determined by the zeitgeist and contemporary taste in most people—
at least in the manner of their performance.” As determined by the zeitgeist, Finks also 
understands fashion as a system of power that marks and stratifies social classes by 
assigning status and rank to its symbols and signs. Fashion also regulates gender relations. 
Fink writes that much of fashion is predicated not only on a two-gender system, but on a 
system of heterosexuality in which designs are “determined by the attractiveness of the two 
genders for one another” (51).  
 Fink’s insight is a prescient one for understanding the ways that fashion not only 
produce and reproduce products based on naturalized notions of masculine and feminine 
existence, but for understanding that the production of clothing along a two-gendered axis 
is itself conditioned by the production of gender as dual. Much in the same way that the 
shameful feminine functioned to bolster and constitute the Euro-masculine subjects of Kant 
and Levinas, so too does the dualism between masculine and feminine dress more broadly 
function to subordinate one to the other: indeed, to lend to the other its “seriousness.” 
Norms or requirements of “professionalism” also enforce this, where dressing “seriously” 
or “appropriately” is synonymous with a process of defeminization.  
 Attraction and eroticism play a sizable part in Fink’s analysis. He writes that dress 
both “refers to the living flesh underneath it” while it also “seems to have been invented 
and made only for the sake of undressing” (52). Unlike other erotic objects which have a 
taboo presence in social places, fashion objects are still able to participate in the insertion 
of the erotic into the social (53). It is in fact precisely in its concealing nature that Fashion 
objects are able to reveal images which stir the erotic imagination; it is precisely in 
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revealing (partially) that they conceal (53). The dynamic and ambiguous role they play 
already indicates that it is their characterization as mere appearance that is indeed what is 
shallow, and not clothing itself. 
There is a long-standing philosophical prejudice which holds that “what is valid 
and reliable must last a long time,” or even “defy” and “withstand” time itself. One main 
site of philosophy’s “prejudice” towards fashion thereby has to do with its relationship to 
time and temporality. Fink writes that since “the phenomenon of Fashion is related to 
change, impermanence, and volatility, it dances through time rather than resting on it, 
stone-like” (31). The “scale” or spectrum of this prejudice goes from “moral devaluation” 
to a “misunderstanding of the hovering fluff-like reality of Fashion” (31). On this view, 
what “blossoms, shines, and goes out” has no weight of being behind it. Rather than directly 
critiquing this paradigm, Fink points to the relative irony of the position, considering that, 
in comparison to the mountains, for instance, human beings are essentially no different 
than the temporally fleeting garb dismissed by philosophy for its ephemerality. In other 
words, we are pots calling the kettle black: the most ephemeral things ourselves, dismissing 
something’s import on account of its ephemerality? If we were really to take this prejudice 
seriously, then, we couldn’t pursue philosophy either, understood as the quest and love of 
a wisdom that bears on human life. Philosophy’s distrust, then, bespeaks a very particular 
brand of anthropocentrism, in which the objection on temporal grounds simply does not 
hold. In other words, if Fashion is rejected on the basis of its fleeting character (in favor 
of, it is implied, more enduring temporal structures) then what business does philosophy 
(or phenomenology) have in privileging the temporally enduring?  
In the narrower sense, fashion is “a phenomenon of taste” which proceeds to change 
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quickly. Fashion is a “delicate structure” which, like the Japanese cherry blossom, is 
“beautifully lit and soon blown by the wind” (31). As a human creation, it “is linked to the 
rhythm of the natural process, has its spring, summer, autumn and winter forms, but begins 
differently each spring; it adapts to the seasons, but does not return to the cycle with the 
same regularity” (31). Fink suggest that this prejudice persists even in those who “join the 
Fashion” (33). Perhaps ironically, at least in part, this manifests in the donning of 
(fashionably) “serious, solid, dignified, and practical clothes,” as if to counteract the 
frivolity that characterizes Fashion in its essence, or its perceived form.34 That is, the 
donning of “serious” clothing may at least in part be understood as a response to a fear of 
being perceived as being as “frivolous” as one’s clothing. Indeed, there is something in this 
identification of seriousness with fear that points to the normative impact of fashion’s 
association with frivolity.  
Fink considers four objections to fashion which inhibit its serious consideration in 
philosophy. These objections also constitute three misleading beliefs about fashion. The 
first belief is that ephemerality is the “nature” of fashion, when it is instead a condition 
produced and reproduced by the fashion industry itself, specifically, in accord with the 
dialectic of production and consumption: a “deceitful trick” by those in the business of 
perpetually selling clothes. While Fink actually says very little about the business of 
34 It is important to note here that the temporality of fashion (understood as one of constant change) does not 
also designate a more general, ubiquitous, or universal temporality of clothing. Since I have predominantly 
understood fashion to designate a system of change, its ensuing temporality is commensurate with its system 
(of consumption and production). This differs, however, from clothing more generally, since there are 
certainly clothing items that do not change, or change very little. Fink’s concern with fashion, then, ought to 
be understood as a concern with “Fashion,” that is, fashion as a system designating a particular temporality. 
This temporality, it is also important to stress, is bound up in the capitalist system itself underlying the 
production/consumption dyad, as most presciently remarked on by Marx. That is, Fink’s understanding of 
fashion is not only specific to his own historical and geographical location, but with the capitalist 
infrastructure undergirding those specifics. 
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“deception,” in Chapter III I argued (through Marx) that the “ephemeral” nature of fashion 
is in fact built into its manufacture, itself reliant on the dialectic of production and 
consumption. Echoing Marx, Fink discusses the fundamentally dialectical nature of both 
production and consumption, writing that “the manufacturers of Fashionable clothing are 
no less dependent on the buyers than they are on them,” and that both subsets depend on 
the game or play of imagination in the intersubjective sphere in which Fashion’s 
possibilities are animated (47). Deepening or expanding Marx’s analysis, I take Fink to be 
suggesting that an ontology of play undergirds or underlies the dialectic of production and 
consumption fueled by capitalism. There is an open space for free play, for creativity, and 
for expression—what I call an ontological fabric—even when it is foreclosed. Fink makes 
a distinction between “dress” and “Fashion” where the former is characterized by the 
function of the marketplace to produce clothing as a bare necessity. In this sense, the 
clothing market is always a stable one. This contrasts with the Fashion industry insofar as 
the latter relies on going beyond the function of dress or clothing as “mere” cover (i.e., a 
necessity in the same way that food and water are) in its reliance on novelty, luxury, etc 
(47). This industry has more to do with the “addiction to innovation” and the “unpredictable 
impulse for freedom” which cannot rely on taste as something already fixed and always 
stable (47).  
The second objection is that the fashion lover (or fashionable person) is just as 
“capricious” as their clothing. The heart of the objection, as Fink rightly points out, is that 
this prejudice or preconception actually reveals a fear or uncertainty about the nature of 
power, and, by extension, the power of fashion. The “power” is in its playful and 
imaginative nature, and in its ability to contribute to imaginative variation more broadly, 
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which I will address in more detail in the next section. Fink identifies play as an invariant 
structure of fashion which always remains despite its “ephemeral” iterations. In other 
words, despite its manifestation in ever-changing garments and trends, play functions as a 
crucial, ontological element of fashion’s nature. It is evident to Fink that play is at work 
“whenever there is an original cheerfulness,” a “relaxed … floating feeling in spite of all 
existence and life” (39). When such a feeling that corresponds to dress is identified, fashion 
“cannot be interpreted as capricious” (39). In other words, whenever fashion animates such 
a feeling, it cannot be dismissed as “merely” superficial or as capricious. What Fink misses 
is connecting the function of such naturalization (of capricious garments on capricious 
people) to his earlier identification of fashion as that which signals a fear of finitude, as I 
discussed in Section I. In other words, a philosophical resistance to or dismissal of the 
“capricious” actually indicates a disciplinary resistance to consider the finite, the 
emphemeral, and so on. In its privileging of the transcendental, philosophy displays more 
than a “distaste” for fashion—as if it was merely a matter of preference—but confesses its 
own resistance to making philosophy about human beings and their lives. 
 The third objection is that fashion is inherently wasteful and costly: that it 
necessarily involves the divestment of capital, material, and labor power away from the 
“productive economy.” The underlying assumption of this belief is that fashion is 
unnecessary, understood as both superfluous and capricious: that resources could be better 
allocated (and money better spent) elsewhere, perhaps on those things that are more long-
lasting. This evaluation puts fashion in a paradoxical position: as a system which produces 
commodities, it is inherently a part of the “productive” global economy. But since its 
products are themselves considered extravagant and superfluous, it is simultaneously seen 
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as unproductive. As Fink succinctly puts it in his own formulation of the paradox: “there 
is nothing more necessary than the superfluous” (1969, 43). In other words, the superfluous 
indicates what is necessarily human, or, what marks the human and thereby constitutes the 
relevant (and not “superfluous”) site of inquiry. There is no dispute that, as a global 
industry, fashion is both wasteful and costly in numerous respects, including 
environmentally. The industry is approximately the fourth largest global polluter 
depending on evaluation criteria, accounting for approximately 8% of global carbon 
emissions in 2018 (cf. Wicker 2020). Fink’s point is only that fashion’s “necessary 
superfluity” makes it a vital and relevant site of philosophical inquiry. Both can be true: 
the system, empire, and practices of fashion can be criticized, while the relevance of 
fashion as a site of inquiry and critique may also be acknowledged. 
Fink argues, in line with Georg Simmel, that one of fashion’s primary functions has 
been to signify wealth, and thereby, to differentiate between social classes. For Simmel, 
the form of fashion (opposed to its content in material garments) is to be understood as the 
mediation of dual tendencies: immitation and differentiation. Since fashions are always 
classed for Simmel, the imitation of “high fashion” by lower socio-economic classes is 
what drives the cyclical nature of fashion: its re-creation and continuous re-individuation 
by means of the upper class. In other words, it is the desire of upper classes to distinguish 
themselves from lower classes—to maintain and to exacerbate class stratification—that 
obstructs conformism (where lower and upper classes are dressed similarly) and motivates 
differentiation (the actualization of the principle of variation). Thus, the dual tendencies 
for imitation and differentiation manifest in fashion as: 1) the imitation by the lower classes 
of the upper classes, and 2) the consequent drive of the upper classes to differentiate 
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themselves from the lower classes. The contempt of the lower class built into the “form” 
of fashion on Simmel’s analysis indicates that the classed nature of fashion is not 
incidental, but central to its very being: indeed, to its enduring evolution. Fashion cannot 
exist without the desire for integration; yet as soon as it is universally recognized (namely, 
adopted by the masses), it paradoxically no longer becomes characterized as fashion (191, 
192). This “essential” feature of fashion is not a random penchant for the ephemeral, but a 
concerted effort to maintain and exacerbate class stratification. When Fink then writes that 
“public” and “individual” always oscillate, he refers precisely to this evolutionary tension 
between imitation and variation. This is importantly related to the analysis Fink gives of 
the development from unique, one-of-a-kind couture pieces to mass-produced 
commodities. For Fink, the original uniqueness of a garment becomes dispossessed, as the 
very site of its uniqueness changes in location: from the individual or specific garment, to 
the design (or “form”) itself (48). This is precisely the process by which fast fashion 
operates. In taking the general form or design of a garment and reproducing it for 
commercial sale (often poorly and with certain modifications), fast fashion has profited off 
of the idea that a once original “uniqueness” may be transmuted into the general form of a 
garment, such that the purchase of a knock-off or deviation from its original may still 
satisfy the drive to conform. 
As one of the most incisive indicators between “weekdays” and “weekends,” 
fashion has functioned as a powerful set of symbols demarcating the world of necessity 
from the world of “leisure.” The world of leisure, and leisure wear in particular, signifies 
the “disillusioned removal from the sphere of necessity” (36). For Fink, the disillusionment 
comes from the false pretense from which the distinction is forged and from which 
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“leisure” is derived: namely, the false belief that we may transcend the world of labor and 
the dictates of work that define and delimit experience. Fink argues that fashion has become 
one of the most dominant mechanisms of defining leisure: not only as a contrast from work, 
but as its end or ultimate goal. Leisure, in other words, incentivizes work and contributes 
to the imperative of/to work. As the concept and domain of leisure expands to include a 
variety of different activities, fashion expands along with it, as different forms of fashion 
become expected (or even required) depending on the activity and the situation. It is in this 
way that fashion steadily becomes, as Werner Sombart put it, capitalism’s favorite child 
(1902). 
The fourth and final major objection that Fink considers is the objection that fashion 
is exclusive: that is essentially belongs to the elite, or that it “cannot be applied to a broad 
consumer class” (38). Fink grants that while couture specifically is for the elite and the 
wealthy, fashion plays a much broader and important role in “intersubjective life” (38). 
Research shows, however, that fashion has a “trickle down” effect, and that even those who 
may believe themselves to be outside of its reach may still be participating in it. It is also 
worth noting that it takes only two weeks for runway designs to be (re)manufactured into 
their fast fashion versions (cf. Buckley and Clark 2017). As a phenomenon of public social 
life, fashion is one way or mode of being in “political community” (45). Fink’s conception 
of politics here involves publicness or public life, itself understood as that which is shared. 
Fink characterizes public life as “the general way in which one moves, behaves, [and] 
dresses” (46). What might also be taken as a definition of style—movement, behavior, and 
dress—equally describes Fink’s conception of public or political life. Style not only 
pertains to individuated existences, but characterizes a shared sense (or senses) of being in 
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shared community with others. 
Fink writes that the “instinct” for imitation governs fashion and biology alike (1969, 
19). Fink’s appeal to the biological may seem odd at first, but actually appeals to a history 
of debate on “vestimentary evolution,” a term coined by George Darwin (nephew of 
Charles, or as I like to refer to him, the other Darwin). In “Development in Dress” Darwin 
analyzed the parallels between biological development and vestimentary development 
(1872). His argument is firstly an analogical one: the garment corresponds to the organism 
in much the same way as the system of dress corresponds to a species. Like his rather 
famous uncle, Darwin locates survival as the mechanism for change and development for 
vestimentary evolution. This does not mean that Darwin’s analysis of dress locates the 
vehicle of vestimentary evolution in survival understood as the need to adapt to one’s 
climate, as one might expect. Rather, he suggests that dress evolves for the sake of its own 
own survival.35 While Darwin considers fashion to be an external force that meaningfully 
influences vestimentary evolution, it is not central to it. Fashion is external to processes of 
“natural selection” which would account for slight differences and variations in dress 
throughout time. On Darwin’s view, fashion is analogously related to processes of sexual 
selection, including both a love of novelty and penchant for exaggeration.  
The influence of Simmel on Fink’s work is both more explicit and more direct than 
that of Darwin. In Simmel’s work on fashion and evolution, he suggests that fashion 
operates according to dual principles: a principle of heredity and a principle of variation. 
35 This insight preempts a theory of memetics offered by more contemporary thinkers such as Dan Dennett 
and Susan Blackmore. While Richard Dawkins was the first to coin the term “meme,” Dennett and Blackmore 
have extended Dawkins’ analysis and cultivated memetic as the study of the replication of cultural units (cf. 
Dawkins 1976). Modern memetics like that taken up by Blackmore suggests that, similarly to a virus, memes 
care naught but for their own self-replication, even at the expense of their host (Blackmore 1999; cf. Dennett 
1998). 
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As antagonistic principles, the former (heredity) represents the drive for uniformity and 
stability, and the latter (variation) for motion and differentiation (1957). Evolutionary 
development, including vestimentary evolution for Simmel, is constituted by the dialectical 
movement between these two principles. The principle of heredity finds satisfaction 
through mimetic imitation. Mimetic imitation functions due to a combination of “charm” 
and “power.” In other words, charm functions as a mechanism of power which itself drives 
reproduction. In the context of fashion specifically, the allure of fashion as manufactured 
in editorials, advertising, etc., creates demand: I want to be wearing what she’s wearing, 
and so I purchase it, trying to attain the same allure of the ad. In driving and promoting 
actual consumption, “charm” is therefore fused with power. The increase in consumption—
in more people donning the same garment—fulfills the drive for mimetic imitation. By 
contrast, the principle of variation operates as a counter-purposive principle: by obstructing 
the principle of heredity. This means that variation or change occurs when there is an 
obstruction to the mimetic process, or to the continuation of the same. For example, a river 
will flow in the same direction unless it is obstructed, in which case, something different 
will arise, like a dam or a split in the river’s path. Similarly as on Simmel’s view, difference 
or newness emerges in instances of obstruction. On this view, creation does not occur “ex 
nihilo,” but emerges from points of tension or obstruction. On my view, this insight 
counters a conception of genius and of creativity which involves sudden epiphanies, rooted 
not in the world (or in struggle, instances of obstruction or frustration, etc.) but in the mind 
of the lone inquisitor. This “armchair philosopher” has no need for—and in fact, might be 
burdened or distracted by—the world of fashion. However, the counter-view that I have 
presented here describes a philosopher in the world—or at least, out of that armchair—for 
141 
it signals that true creativity emerges from something else, and is therefore not an 
abstraction from the world. For example, it was only in the felt absence of places to put 
things that pockets were created, and not from a general or abstract philosophizing of ideal 
garments (cf. Lubitz 2016). On Simmel’s view, difference (understood as variation from 
the same, or from custom) is nothing other than the obstruction of heritage. Variation 
thereby becomes derivative from heredity.  
Simmel’s conceptualization of the two principles of vestimentary evolution 
suggests a “dual directionality” of the drives. He calls this the dual direction of the “striving 
for the general” and the simultaneous “need to grasp the particular,” or, the drive towards 
both universalization and particularization (187). The dualism between universality and 
particularity is mirrored in the two principles: one, striving towards adapting and 
conforming, and the second, towards difference (or towards individuation). This 
“fundamental duality” pertains to fashion and to biology alike for Simmel.  Biologically, 
the duality is that between genetic heredity and genetic variation. The “social embodiment” 
of this duality, as Simmel puts it, is found in fashion through the competing drives to 
conform and to differentiate (or to “express oneself”). Simmel actually paints a rather 
sympathetic portrait of the “drive for imitation,” not dismissing it as an unthinking 
conformism (as Nietzsche did: as “herd morality”) (cf. Nietzsche 2011). Instead, for 
Simmel, imitation represents the drive towards political community. In conforming with 
others, one is met with “the assurance of not standing alone” in action (quoted in 1997, 
188).  
This background on vestimentary evolution provides context for what might then 
otherwise appear as a strange botanical interlude in Fink’s text. Fink writes that just as the 
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bud of a flower protects the “germ of the future leaf”, or as the “larva pupates in its self-
spun cocoon,” so too does man “cover the thing that he wants to protect, hide, keep” (49). 
For Fink, these comparisons suggest that the coverings themselves do not serve as 
independent mediums of expression. Rather, their function is to express its contents by 
cultivating the life and longevity of what is enclosed. Here, he compares the flower bud or 
the cocoon to a sword sheath. Not only does the sheath cover the sword, but is itself created 
in such a way as to “express” and indicate its contents (50). This is not to say, however, 
that our naked selves represent our “truth,” and that clothing merely expresses or indicates 
sex. For Fink, the body is not a “thing” in itself, but an “incarnated existence,” of which I 
will say more in the following section (50). Dress itself becomes part of the ever-changing 
development of bodily expression, rather than having a fixed signifying purpose, such as 
the sheath. This expressive nature of the human body is reliant on how it reveals itself 
through gesture, of which style is a vital component (50). Dress operates as a sort of 
language, or better yet, as a mechanism of translation, similar to the way that gestures may 
function to mediate a conversation between two people who do not share a common 
language (51). Indeed, the comparison Fink makes between clothing and language is meant 
to invoke clothing’s expressive capacity, whereby such expression refers not to the 
expression of an individuated, sexed existence, but the expression of the lived body. As 
Fink writes, clothing functions “as a second Leib” (69). 
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Clothing and the Lived Body 
Mode is a clear investment by Fink in social critique, as his focus on the phenomena of 
fashion illuminates its intersections with class, gender, and political economy in particular. 
But it is equally a work of phenomenology, as Fink develops a conception of dress not only 
as part of the lived body (Leib) but “as a second Leib” itself (1969, 69).36 It is to the 
phenomenological and the “lived” experience of dress in Fink that I turn in this section. As 
a phenomenon of public social life, fashion operates as “a way in which … each individual 
can emphasize his individuality and express his self-esteem in many ways” (45). However, 
Fink thematizes the expression of individuality not as a case of false consciousness under 
capitalism, but as indicative of the way that dress functions “as a second Leib” (69). At the 
same time, the previous section of the chapter showed that for Fink, dress is a central 
apparatus in our dealings with the world in all of its concrete, material dimensions: our 
dealings with others, with the political, and so on. Fink is not a “naive” phenomenologist: 
the lived experience of dress cannot be separated from a world that informs those 
experiences. In this sense, Fink is a critical phenomenologist who “refus[es] to accept the 
taken-for-grantedness of experience:” in this case, the understanding of dress as 
“superficial” (Weiss, Murphy, and Salamon 2020).  
36 From Husserl, Fink retains the notion of the lived body (Leib), although he develops it by considering dress 
as a “second Leib.” Crucial to his conception of the lived body is the idea of existence as “incarnated,” or, as 
belonging to this world. He writes that: “Fashion is a phenomenon that is essentially connected […] to the 
human being’s embodied nature, to our existence’s being-incarnated (ein Phänomen, das mit der Leiblichkeit 
des Menschen, mit der Inkarniertheit unserer Existenz […]. Zusammenhängt) (77). It is to Kant, and not to 
Husserl, that Fink’s notion of “incarnation” is indebted. Kant, he says, “is to be interpreted as the discoverer 
of the cosmological horizon of the being of beings [das Sein des Seienden]. Being [das Sein] = in principle 
worldly; beings [das Seiende] = in principle intra-worldly!” (V-11 4 (section 3)). As Ronald Bruzina writes, 
while this clearly echoes Heidegger’s 1929 lectures, it was to Kant that this insight is most primarily indebted 
(2004, 44, 202). It was Heidegger’s thinking however, Bruzina suggests, that encouraged Fink’s reading of 
Kant “in an ontological rather than epistemological orientation” (2004, 203). And as Fink himself notes: “Of 
course, [this also means] the transposition of ontology into the problem of cosmology,” including 
anthropology (OH-III 3-4 from 1935, emphasis Fink’s, bracket insertion Bruzina 2004, 203). 
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The sense of the public and of the political as “shared” enterprises, mentioned in 
the above section, also pertains to fashion. Indeed, fashion is often a key way or mode of 
“sharing” public or political space with others. The emphasis Fink places on the shared is 
fueled by what he writes is an “original instinct for imitation,” accounted for briefly above 
in a biological or evolutionary register. But Fink also writes that the “original instinct for 
imitation” that fuels fashion “can be sublimated and varied by human freedom.” The study 
of the body indicates to Fink that “reason” and “freedom” alike are informed, constrained, 
and even determined by divergent “bodily” ways of being. This bodily way of being 
manifests “not only in sensory experience” for Fink (seeing, touching, tasting, etc.): reason 
itself is bound and conditioned by bodily existence. To be in a “bodily way” does not only 
refer to sensory experiences, however.  
For Fink, sensory experiences are required for reason and for freedom alike. As 
living concepts, they do not “move in a bodiless unearthly sphere” (25). In contrast to Kant, 
for whom incarnation functions only as a stepping-stone towards reason, reason for Fink 
is something that “lives in the sounding language and in the images of the language” (25). 
Reason in fact “needs the sound of the word, the melody, and the rhythm of the human 
voice” (25). Fink intends this quite literally to mean that reason does not function as an 
abstraction from the material and the concrete. Instead, reason is demarcated by concrete 
possibilities and the worldly conditions which afford them. While he does not go this far 
in his critique of Kant himself, it is reasonable to say that Fink fundamentally disagrees 
with the disembodied, voyeuristic way that Kant reaches his insights into the nature of 
reason and its ascension in particular. Gazing at Eve—or imagining ourselves to be staring 
at her, clutching at her clothes, drenched in shame—cannot produce insight into reason, 
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since this would be a disembodied experience. In other words, Kant would have been better 
off reflecting on his own dressed existence as the catalyst for his thinking rather than 
peeping on Eve. This kind of reflection at a distance is only another form of “armchair” 
philosophy: looking out from the chair at an image hung on the other side of the room.  
Freedom is similarly conditioned by the body. When Fink writes that freedom 
“appears” in acts, works, struggles, etc., he means that freedom is not an invisible or 
abstract metaphysical force. Freedom literally appears because it is “sunk in the natural 
ground of our existence” (25). Freedom is also documented in “tools, machines and 
weapons, in all of these…artificial things” since such things are “necessarily only for 
people” (25). In Fink’s anthropological ontology, artifacts indicate and constitute 
something vital and telling of humanity. Since freedom is incarnated, the production of 
social and cultural objects provides a direct link between freedom and object. These 
artifacts are “necessary only for people,” meaning that, since freedom only exists as a foil 
to constraint, it is something that is distinctly human. In other words, the question of 
whether or not god(s) are “free” may not make sense in a metaphysics which supposes their 
omnipotence. Freedom “appears in the work, in the laborious acts that come out of the 
hand, appears in the warlike struggle for power and domination” (25). The creations and 
products of human beings, then, represent the conditions of their freedoms or unfreedom. 
As human creations, then, clothing ought to be a fundamental site of philosophical analysis, 
for in it we can gain insight into our freedom and unfreedom alike. The point is to say that 
its meanings are not predetermined in advance. 
More emphatically than Fanon, Fink emphasizes the cultural significance of dress. 
Fink writes that the body “expresses all … essential structures of existence, not only in 
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words and deeds, but also in gestures and facial expressions, attitude and gait—and not 
least in the way he dresses.” Dress “is the cultural thing that he carries on his body and 
through which the body manifests itself” (34). Not only is dress the most visible sign of 
culture—and as such has been utilized as an instrument of colonialism, as Fanon writes—
but the lived body is itself expressed through dress. In other words, clothing items are not 
purely “cultural” products distinguishable from the individual persons who wear them, but 
function to express personhood.37 Clothing affords various “possibilities of expression” 
which also “ignite the subconscious” (77). Fink rejects a conception of unique personhood 
as absolute psychic interiority, offering a phenomenological conception of personhood in 
its place. Fink’s phenomenological conception of personhood is in line with that of Husserl, 
for whom personhood is grounded in subjectivity without lapsing into solipsism: a 
constituting consciousness that exists within an intersubjective horizon (Husserl 1977). 
The history of phenomenology can also be told as a development of a certain anti-
Platonism. As Catherine Homan puts it, for many in the phenomenological tradition 
(including Fink) the terms “history of philosophy” and “Western metaphysics” are used 
interchangeably and synonymously to indicate a particular “mode of thought pervasive in 
the history of Western philosophy since Plato” (2019, 35). Merleau-Ponty crucially 
develops the anti-Platonist tendencies already present in Husserl. As Sara Heinämaa puts 
it, Merleau-Ponty argues that “we should not think that the meanings of bodies belong to 
another realm behind or above the visible and tactile world” (2003, 39). The expressive 
relation which constitutes Merleau-Ponty’s “gesture theory of expression” is thereby a 
relation “between the visibles” (Heinämaa 2003, 39). Whereas the expressive relation is 
37 I will attend to the de-personalizing aspect of clothing in the next chapter. 
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usually discussed in terms of visible gestures—such as the gesture of my smiling indicating 
my being happy—Fink extends the expressive relation to the dressed body. He writes that 
fashion is “fundamentally connected with the “corporeality of human beings … the 
incarnation of our existence …with the elementary cultural process of clothing becoming 
luxury… [and the] possibilities of expression …that ignite the subconscious” (77).  In 
analogizing dress to a house, Fink tries to suggest that they both have “ambiguous 
expressive value” (35). Like the body, the house “has a double orientation: inwards and 
outwards at the same time” (35). Both “contain and expose, envelop and represent” (35). 
Both function as shields or forms of protections (as shelters), and both—insofar as they are 
each limited by the “general style of the epoch”—are constructed within the respective 
constraints and possibilities afforded to thinking by environment, culture, peer groups, etc. 
This “epochal” sense of fashion, or, the idea that different times afford different styles and 
possibilities, regulate variances in expression while also making innovation possible. 
Difference or variation are the products of their predecessors: of age-old or time-worn 
traditions and customs which become outmoded or outdated, which is to say, become an 
“obstruction” which itself motivates renewed thought and creativity. 
In creating anew, fashion “act[s] as a wake-up call” (38). It is precisely through 
exaggeration that an “all-too familiar feeling” in a “new and unheard-of direction” can be 
motivated and catalyzed (38). This “all-too familiar feeling” is play: fashion’s most central 
ontological element. In play, fashion “shows possible variations” [Variationsmöglichkeit], 
or, a “playful effect” in exaggerated form (38). There is an important connection here to 
Husserl’s notion of imaginative variation. There is a long and important history of the role 
of imaginative variation (or eidetic variation) within phenomenology that has its origins in 
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Kant (cf. Mohanty 1991). Eidetic or imaginative variation is essential to Fink’s 
methodology as a phenomenologist. Understood as a method in itself, eidetic or 
imaginative variation is that which entertains and goes through differing possibilities 
(different variations) until an “invariant structure” is arrived at. As a communicative sign, 
the semiotician of fashion is able to “read” fashion forebodingly, that is, as an indication 
within a larger system of communication. This insight parallels that of Walter Benjamin, 
whose Arcades Project (1982) similarly looks to the communicative dimension of Fashion 
as a significant predictive tool. For Husserl, the imagination functions as a medium or a 
facilitator between hyletic data and “higher order cognitive processes” (Aldea 2013, 372; 
cf. Hua III/Ideas II 1989). In the phenomenological register, such higher order processes 
refer specifically to layers of judgment. The imagination [Phantasie] functions by 
modifying direct perceptual presentation (opposed to indirect perceptual presentations, or 
picturing [bildliche]. Imagination is not the same as image-consciousness; it does not 
require mental images (Aldea 2013; Hua XXIII). In other words, imaginative variation 
does not involve mimesis, understood here as a process of copying images from perception 
into “mental images.”38 It is Fink who, despite his “strong doctrinal allegiance to Husserl,” 
tries to “restore to images their inherent ‘intuitive’ character” (cf. Casey 1971, 485). 
“Intuitive” here refers to Fink’s notion of images as possessing a “self-designatability” 
(Sichzeigenkönnen): meaning that, unlike symbols and signs which typically have exterior 
references (mimesis), intuitive images direct us to themselves by drawing in our “aesthetic 
concentration” (cf. Casey 1971; cf. Fink 2016). Imaginative variation is thereby a playful 
38 Ed Casey puts the problem with this view as follows: “The very notion of ‘representation’ tends to deny 
any unique presentational feature to images, reducing them to second-order extensions of sensations” (1971, 
484-5).
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enterprise which suggests that the “images” we have are not direct copies or faithful 
representations, but are reflective of our lived experiences. This notion of images, and of a 
process of imaginative variation which remains grounded in the images themselves as those 
which retain our “aesthetic concentration” and do not point elsewhere, are in line with a 
philosophy rooted in this-world. 
Conclusion 
In his analysis of fashion as a kind of “serious play,” he writes that it has a mimetic or 
representational function, but is not limited to that. Fashion “illusorily” creates an imagined 
world, and in directing intentionality on that world (or on the images which demand our 
unwavering aesthetic concentration) we are able to analyze and critique our reality. In other 
words, the “illusions” created by fashion, in advertising and editorials most especially, are, 
as Fink puts it: “as vital in the ultimate sense as the truth” (99). An “uncovered” or naked 
truth that “leaves nothing in the dark …knows no shadows and cannot beautify and enchant 
anything with imagination … may belong to the gods and is inhumane if the human being 
is [understood as] a player [Spieler] and a friend of appearance” (99). Aligning himself 
with Kant, Fink affirms that the world of appearances is all that is knowable. Aligning 
himself with Nietzsche, Fink suggests that we celebrate, affirm, and interrogate that world: 
for it is the only world we have.  
150 
V. THE NATURALIZATION OF CLOTHING
Introduction 
While colonialism has primarily operated through force, coercion, enslavement, 
displacement, and exploitation, it has also capitalized on what I will conceptualize 
throughout as the naturalization of clothing. I understand naturalization to be a process 
whereby values and meanings become naturalized, or, made to seem and to appear natural 
understood as self-evident: embedded or embodied not only in or on individuals, but on 
groups and populations. Through naturalization, metaphysical binaries become 
sedimented: reinforced as a priori, natural, or otherwise irrefutable. In this second major 
part of the dissertation, I am concerned principally with the social and political implications 
of the metaphysical split as well as with the feminization of fashion as outlined in the 
introduction. This chapter attends to one of the most insidious manifestations of the 
appearance/reality dyad: its apparition in what I call the “coloniality of clothing,” effected 
by clothing’s naturalization.  
Colonialism, and its related iterations in neocolonial “dress policing” (including the 
criminalization of clothing and veiling bans) all gain traction through the essentializing 
production of homogenous groups and populations for policing. What I call the coloniality 
of clothing is a specific mechanism of clothing’s naturalization which has served 
colonialism’s ends, and which continues to wield power and dominance as a tool for 
neocolonialism. Naturalization is a continuously developing or ongoing historical process 
which not only makes natural, but functions by continuing to make natural in its reliance 
on sedimented meanings and values. In other words, while taken to be natural or self-
151 
evident—as “always having been this way”—I posit that naturalization is an ongoing 
process which is sustained by continued instances of reification. Naturalization, that is, 
endeavors to produce natural kinds. I do not understand natural kinds to be “unconditional,” 
as Quine or Kornblith might have it, but as historically conditioned and contingent (Quine 
1970; Kornblith 1993). In this chapter, I am not considering the natural kinds of semantic 
theorization, but concentrate primarily on the understanding of particular clothing items as 
natural kinds, produced as they are in images and representation. What becomes 
“naturalized” onto clothing are specific values, and the naturalization of those values often 
serve sexist, racist, xenophobic ends.  
It is worth briefly foregrounding the relevant metaphysical debates involving 
natural kinds by way of introduction. Throughout the chapter, I will show how particular 
values become naturalized onto garments, and how this naturalization participates in racist, 
xenophobic, colonial, and neo-colonial ends. Implicit in the argument I am making is a 
form of realism about values understood as natural kinds. I will suggest that the coincidence 
of clothing with naturalized values—or an understanding of clothing as literally valuable 
in this way—abets a “realism” about those values understood as physically coinciding with 
(belonging to) particular garments. This means that certain values may be treated as natural 
kinds which are considered to exist in, to be manifested in, or embodied in and through 
dress. Indeed, one of the most major successes of the fashion industry has been to 
promulgate a coincidence between clothing and value, whereby the attainment of a garment 
signals the ascription of particular values or virtues (cf. Barthes 1990; cf. Bernays 1928). 
In becoming naturalized onto material garments, particular values may become inseparable 
from their garments. But because naturalization often serves pernicious ends, garments 
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become the means of justifying violence in the name of such values. There are many ways 
that clothing participates in or fosters natural kind essentialism in which values become 
“essential” to particular garments and garments come to signify “essential” meanings about 
their wearers. The bifurcation of clothing into “women’s” and “men’s” or into “boys” and 
“girls,” for instance, perpetuates the “natural attitude” about sex and gender alike, whereby 
gendered forms of expression become naturalized onto differently sexed bodies (cf. 
Garfinkel 1967; Bettcher 2007, 2012).39 In other words, there is a pervasive “sex 
essentialism” surrounding clothing in which clothing is considered as an extension of 
biological sex. In being reduced to sex, the abilities and possibilities of clothing to signify 
diverse gender expressions (which may or may not correspond to sex) are precluded. I will 
address this topic in more detail in the following chapter. However, relevant to my 
discussion here is the idea that clothing has an “essentialism” problem. Unlike other forms 
of essentialism, in which traits or characteristics become naturalized as genetic or 
biological features of a sex or race, dress essentialism functions to naturalize values first 
onto garments and then onto bodies. The immediate visibility of clothing quickens 
processes of judgment and stereotyping. Indeed, stereotyping (including racialization) 
functions as a feature of perception, and not as wholly separate from it (cf. Al-Saji 2010).  
The wholly visible nature of dress contributes to the “kind realism” of dress 
essentialism. In other words, in always seeing dress we believe that we also see the values 
contained therein. Values themselves thereby become as “real” (as concrete, and as 
39 Stemming from Husserl’s conception of the “natural attitude,” Garfinkel develops a concept of the “natural 
attitude about sex,” which both reduces and naturalizes sex to strict genetic dimorphism. Bettcher’s critique 
shows how dimorphic gender conceptions become naturalized onto this conception of sex, participating in 
the labelling of trans people as “deceivers” which then provides justification for those who do commit 
violence and murder against them. 
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tangible) as the garment itself: possessing one is possessing the other, and equally, not 
possessing one may signal a deficit of the other. Kripke argued that kinds do not necessarily 
have characteristic observable properties (kind realism), and considers Kant’s claim that it 
is an a priori truth that gold is a yellow metal (1980, 118). In asking the reader to consider 
that the yellow-ish appearance has in fact been a longstanding illusion, Kripke argues that 
we should not employ this knowledge to support the conclusion that gold does not exist, 
or that it does not still have “essential” properties. Instead, it only means that we held a 
fallible belief about the expression of gold in observable properties. This is both a 
pernicious and potent insight and line of inquiry. On the one hand, such skepticism about 
appearances and presentation indicates an even more robust essentialism by promoting and 
upholding a metaphysical distinction between essences and appearances: the very heart of 
which is a distrust of appearances as “mere,” that is, as only appearance and not as an 
indication, expression, or instantiation of truth. In other words, it is not the case that 
appearances are distortions of reality that may still harbor some truth, but may be 
completely illusory in the sense that an object’s essence may not even appear (whether 
distortedly or not) at all. On the other hand, the position also suggests that in projecting a 
natural kind essentialism about values onto objects of dress, we falsely understand 
appearances as unfaithful copies or representations of their essence. To me, this holds a 
promise that we may therefore consider appearances on their own terms.  
The significant temporal function of clothing challenges its classification as a group 
of “unconditional” or a priori natural kinds. I will argue throughout that naturalization 
functions as a refusal to recognize particular garments and styles as belonging to larger 
frameworks of meaning and of communal sense-making. The acknowledgment that 
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particular garments, styles, etc., do in fact belong to particular groups, historical times, and 
loci, challenges the premise upon which naturalization justifies itself: namely, that 
particular garments or styles “always” index an “objective” meaning. The appeal to 
“objective” meanings are often motivated by racist, sexist, xenophobic ends. As Gilles 
Lipovetsky puts it, the “Western phenomena” of fashion abides by a “logic of change,” or 
by a “principle of ephemerality” that is itself complicit with a kind of liberal secularism 
(1994). Such a guiding logic may be incompatible in communities, tribes, societies, etc., 
where a deference to origin stories and guiding cosmologies functionally produce a “logic 
of tradition” which may stand at odds with a certain understanding of fashion as that which 
abides by the logic of change. This metaphysical difference manifests at the least as a 
relevant social and political one, as the association of “old clothes” with “old ways” 
functionally inscribes a distinct understanding of progress onto cultures and peoples with 
the expressed aim of eradication in the very name of—for the sake of—such progress.  
The chapter will proceed as follows. In Section I: Clothing, Naturalization, and 
Criminality, I will do two things. First, I will discuss the “naturalist” understanding of 
clothing with recourse to clothing history and fashion theory in order to anticipate the ways 
that the naturalization of clothing operates. Second, I discuss some ways that clothing has 
been criminalized and the reliance of an enduring “dress police” on pernicious, naturalized, 
essentialized conceptions of both race and nation. In Section II: Clothing and Coloniality, 
I show how clothing has been weaponized as a tactic of colonialism specifically. In Section 
III: Liberal “Values” and Naturalization, I show how certain values of secular liberalism, 
especially gender equality, end up promoting the naturalist understanding of clothing and 
thereby promoting harm and actively working against its own principles.  
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Clothing, Naturalization, and Criminality 
The naturalization of clothing produces those “unconditional” natural kinds referred to 
above: pernicious for their failure to incorporate the historical and the ideological alike. 
Understood as a priori, or as having a meaning that “always” pertains, the production of 
naturalized understandings of clothing continues to produce reductive, essentialist accounts 
about the “meaning” of clothing. This was indeed Roland Barthes’ critique of J.C. Flügel’s 
The Psychology of Clothes (1930). Flügel’s account—the first of its kind—was indeed 
remarkable, and it is worth briefly considering both Flügel’s account and Barthes’ critique 
in order to better appreciate and understand the enduring force and mechanisms of the 
naturalization of clothing. The impetus for Flügel’s undertaking was twofold: first was the 
realization that religion and clothing bear an intimate, shared, mutually-constituting 
history, and second, that the proliferation of academic monographs on psychologies of 
religion had not been met with any development in the psychology of clothes. Flügel’s 
brief response to this seemingly illogical and conspicuous absence of the topic is that 
perhaps the topic of clothes is both too familiar (that is, too mundane) and too frivolous 
(that is, too inconsequential). The topic of clothing is to philosophy today what it was to 
psychology in 1930: too mundane, and too frivolous.  
Neither of these judgments are epistemically neutral, as both substantiate a 
conception of clothing as essentially irrelevant to both a study of knowledge and as a form 
of knowledge itself. The claim of its mundanity is equivocal to the claim that clothing does 
not need to be probed as a topic because its meaning is already transparent or familiar, or, 
worse yet, the prejudice that there is not much meaning to be discovered at all: that it is, in 
a word, shallow. The “too frivolous” claim is a more complicated one. It posits a conception 
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of clothing as literally non-essential, while harkening to a conception of femininity as 
equally inessential or frivolous: in a word, as superfluous. Free from the “triangle of 
motivations” (protection, modesty, and ornamentation), clothing instead comes to signify 
the deep psyche on Flügel’s account, and thereby becomes an extension of the 
psychological self.40 On Barthes’ critique, Flügel’s overly reductive, essentialist account 
would consequently lead to a universal form of clothing, or at least to very weak variation 
instead of the absolute variation that exists (2006). For Barthes, Flügel’s psychological 
account fails to consider the links between clothing items themselves which would allow 
for a systematic attempt to consider clothing as a structure opposed to an “anarchic 
collection of tiny events” (2006, 33-4).41  
Psychologistic accounts like Flügel’s easily lend themselves to naturalization. For 
instance, for Flügel, the drawing of our garments “closely round us” in “unfriendly 
surroundings” expresses a psychologized need to protect oneself without accounting for 
the rather contingent nature of that need as (often) produced or informed by socialized and 
prejudicial conceptions of others as dangerous (Carter 2003, 89). Barthes’ critique might 
then be better understood as a criticism of Flügel’s reductionism of otherwise complex 
social, historical, political, and ideological phenomena to “primitive” or “primary” urges 
of a psychic subject, although he also does not address, or rather, redress these issues 
40 Flügel identifies three such meanings: protection, modesty, and ornamentation. Flügel conceives of his 
work as moving beyond this “triangle of motivations,” naturalized in their own right in histories of clothing 
and hygiene up until that point. However, by naturalizing all three onto the psychic subject (instead of 
understanding them as external motivations), there persists a “latent essentialism” in Flügel’s account 
(Barthes 2006). 
41 Barthes’ critique, however, is not entirely accurate. Indeed, Flügel did consider the spectrum of differences 
characterizing different kinds of clothing. However, Flügel’s move was to reduce such differentiation to a 
fundamental tension between exhibitionism and modesty: between those who consider clothing to be the 
outer layer of themselves, and those who view clothing as “other” to their sense of selves (Flügel 1929, 1930; 
cf. Carter 2003, 84). 
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sufficiently himself. 
It is not only the case that clothing has come to signify some expression of 
individuality through the psychic subject, but a certain kind of psychologistic individualism 
produced under capitalism. Edward Bernays, considered to be the founder of public 
relations, is known by many for his program of engineering of consent: a coordinated 
system of propagandist advertising toward the “conscious and intelligent manipulation of 
the organized habits and opinions of the masses” (1928, 9). In his seminal book, 
Propaganda, Bernays writes that fashion occupies a particular role in driving communal 
change. The nephew of Sigmund Freud, Bernays was versed in his uncle’s theories and 
effectively employed them to exploit, sell, and control the masses. By “introducing eros 
into the marketplace,” as MJ Lusensky puts it, Bernays was revolutionary in making mass 
consumption feel personal (2014). Drawing again on Barthes, it is not any garment that I 
want, but this one (even though this one is also what everyone else wants).42 Such a 
psychologistic naturalism about clothing theorized by Flügel and assumed in practice by 
Bernays introjects garments into the psyche as a means of justifying attitudes and beliefs 
about those very same garments. Reduced to natural drives and impulses, beliefs about 
clothing which inform action thereby become justified, and hence, themselves become 
justifiable.  
Capitalism, and its agents in advertising, create specific desires that can only be 
satisfied with recourse to the purchase of specific commodities. More than this, however 
42 Flügel’s Psychology of Clothes was also steeped in Freudianism, although he differed from Freud on his 
interpretation of clothing. For Freud, clothing (and clothing fetishism) are more or less reductive to their 
symbolization of genitalia (cf. Freud 1927, 1928). The sexual symbolism of individual garments is where 
Freud’s treatment of clothing ends, but Flügel propels clothing into the deep reaches of the psyche. For 
Flügel, clothes have “entered into the very core of our existence as social beings,” and are not “seemingly 
mere extraneous appendages” (1930, 16). 
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paradoxically, “I” only come to be by (quite literally) buying in. Bernays’ calculating 
genius was to promote the myth that one need to buy the clothes that “express” their 
individuality, even though “individual expression” is for the most part offered in pre-
determined forms. This myth continues to express itself in variations of American or 
Western exceptionalism, where the “freedom” to dress as one pleases is understood as a 
freedom to express oneself in clothing, understood as a kind of seminal and hallmark 
individual right. However, it is far from true that such a freedom even exists. Instead, it 
exists within a narrow form of acceptable judgments, where deviations are often violently 
enforced. It is also the case that available forms of expression are predominantly pre-
determinate in the sense that the margin of people who create their own clothing is quite 
small. In other words, we are prey to the forces of fashion whether we like it or not.43 These 
often invisible realities challenge the alignment of dress with “freedom” in any robust 
sense. It instead appears to be a great folly, an embarrassing error, to mistake freedom of 
dress for material freedom. 
For Barthes, the many variations that exist in clothing and in traditions of clothing 
is itself evidence that we ought to be weary of naturalist psychologies like those of Flügel. 
Certainly owing to the intuitions considered above, clothing becomes one of the primary 
engines of naturalization, plugging along without much notice or suspicion. While 
naturalization can serve many ends, it finds an ally in what Barthes calls democratization. 
Democratization happens through a process of naturalization and “myth-making.” In 
“From Gemstones to Jewellry,” Barthes chronicles the naturalization of various 
43 Hazel Clark and Cheryl Buckley’s work in ‘ordinary fashion’ discusses the trickle-down effect from high-
fashion to ‘low’ fashion, where designs are cheaply reproduced and purchased and worn by those who are 
unaware of these processes and thus don’t consider themselves to be participating in the “fashion system” 
(cf. Buckley and Clark 2017). 
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mythologies of women onto objects. Such naturalization occurs through something like a 
transitive property of signification, where values themselves are transacted between objects 
and persons. For example, Barthes details the way that gemstones initially became 
associated with women, tasked with (literally) making the wealth of her husband visible 
(1990, 56).  
 The naturalization of value onto particular objects or garments (and through the 
transitive property, onto persons) is aided semantically through demonstrative pronouns in 
particular. In the Language of Fashion, Barthes argues that such elliptical shifters enable a 
temporal confusion which permits (indeed, which accounts for) the efficacy of fashion as 
a global, capitalist system (2006). For instance, it is not that any dress will confer said 
values onto its wearer, but this dress in its particularity (or “this tailored suit, “the shetland 
dress,”) (1990, 7). This “shortcut” of naturalization achieved by the demonstrative 
language of advertising promises a direct link between value and garment. Barthes’ 
conceptualization of the representation (imaging) of clothing as a kind of temporal 
confusion is also significant for naturalizing (perceived) value onto the garment which 
signifies in excess of its wearer. But as simultaneously bound to its wearer—by being 
animated by its wearer— such (naturalized) significations may become perceived as 
competing values and perhaps even as aggressive or threatening. I will discuss this idea in 
further detail in the next section.  
 Barthes worried that discrimination becomes more difficult to discern and identify 
as such when it becomes couched in the language of “taste,” (i.e., of personal preference), 
and clothing is an all too easy avenue of disguising one’s prejudice in making recourse to 
the judgment of “taste.” Consider the claim that someone might allege at a workplace, that 
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“I am not racist; I just think that natural hair in the workplace is unprofessional.” In other 
words, “you shouldn’t have been wearing that” becomes code for “you shouldn’t be who 
you are, or, “you shouldn’t be who I think you are.” “Bad” and “poor” are not neutral 
descriptors of taste, but to be understood as synonyms. Luc Ferry argues that the judgment 
of taste (and the power of taste to exercise judgment) arises as a sort of secular stand-in for 
divine judgment, or as Kant puts it: “Taste …clip[s] genius[s’] wings” (Kant 2001, 197; 
cf. Ferry 1993, 10). It is because, as Ferry writes, “the classical genius is not that which 
invents, but that which discovers,” that taste inherits a privileged role in determining the 
good, the great, and the beautiful. This is to say that taste is not “purely subjective,” but 
implicated in a certain privilege and power of judgment. Or, as Barthes puts it, 
democratization (as a mode of secularization) “does not escape from new ways of 
conferring value” (2006, 57). Taste may therefore become “another form of 
discrimination” (Barthes 2006, 57). Whereas what used to indicate good taste was that 
which stood out (i.e. as the opulent display of prestige and wealth) is now “bad taste” in a 
democracy on Barthes’ view.  
Clothing’s signifieds become part of the discourses which work to define them 
(Barthes 2006, 39). For instance, hoodies have come to stand in for criminal activity and 
affiliation and inform a larger discourse about Black males as criminals. Not only do 
hoodies stand in for Black male bodies, but Black male bodies more specifically 
understood as about to commit a crime. Anti-Black racism is indeed informed, fueled, and 
even justified by this naturalization of immorality onto hoodies and onto Black bodies 
themselves. The futural about to (commit a crime, an act of terror, etc.) not only seems to 
extend “naturally” from both garment and body, then, but seems to be elicited from them. 
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The reader may recall when George Zimmerman attempted to justify his brutal murder of 
Trayvon Martin on account of what he believed Martin was about to do. In 1991, jurors in 
the Rodney King case similarly justified the actions of the white police officers based on 
the officers’ testimonies of what they believed King was about to do (cf. Pollizi 2012). The 
naturalization of value—in these cases, of morality or immorality—incite the futural about 
to which becomes the justificatory means to actively target persons without due cause.  
 The United States has a long and enduring history of criminalizing clothing. 
Ordinances against sagging and against hoodies alike continue to systematically target 
Black male bodies (cf. McIlwain 2012). One might be kicked out of school, fined, kicked 
off public transportation (including airplanes), or even arrested. While many styles garner 
public disapproval, few have produced the “moral panic” generated by sagging (cf. Demby 
2014). As Gene Demby puts it: “anxieties around something like goth dress don’t get 
codified into laws that threaten jail time” (2014). Arguments against sagging continue to 
betray an obvious hypocrisy: other styles or symbols with related histories involving 
imprisonment (tattoos, for instance) do not evoke the same “moral panic.”44 The zoot suits 
of the 1940’s similarly invoked “moral panic” surrounding Black and Mexican-American 
men in particular. Often stripped of their clothing and badly beaten by policemen and lay 
white persons alike, zoot suiters—in their signature oversized suiting—became similarly 
associated with criminal activity and gang affiliation.45 
 
44 There are multiple myths and conflicting origin stories about the genesis of sagging, many of which involve 
incarceration. On one account, convicts prohibited from wearing belts maintained the sagging look once they 
were released. On another, more prolific account, prisoners sagged their pants to indicate sexual availability 
to fellow inmates. Both confer the status of criminality onto the style. 
 
45 Historian Alison Ford writes: “The style is linked to jazz music, it’s linked to urban spaces, it’s linked to 
a criminal underworld” (quoted in Demby 2014). Historian Luis Alvarez, author of The Power of the Zoot, 
writes that the zoot style “came to represent what was morally and politically deficient with the home front 
during World War II—violence, drinking, premarital sex, and the threat of street attacks” (Demby 2014; 
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The zoot suit style came to represent both the political organization and 
coordination of low-income Black and Brown communities. When rations were put on 
textiles and fabrics in the early 1940’s, the excessive use of fabric which characterized zoot 
suiting came to be seen by opponents as “an affront to the nation’s war goals” (Demby 
2014). This set the stage for what was already an anti-Black, anti-Brown, anti-poor 
sentiment to develop into accusations of anti-Americanness, whereby being American 
meant being white and at least passing as middle-class. On June 3, 1943, mobs of white 
policemen and white servicemen (including many sailors) searched for, beat, and brutalized 
hundreds of zoot suiters in an extraordinary and harrowing coordinated program of 
violence. The riots ensued for four days, and hundreds of zoot suiters (mainly Mexican-
American) were arrested. These men, including many young teenagers, were publicly 
stripped of their clothing and their suits were burned in the streets (Alvarez 2008; Demby 
2014; Ramirez 2009).  
Perhaps it is also because uniforms are most readily associated with military 
costume that the zoot suiters appeared as a coordinated threat or as a paramilitary 
organization. But not all “coordinated dress” of American peoples was equally or 
democratically targeted. And so the threat, or specter of a threat that the zoot suiters 
“instigated”—instigated among white servicemen—was not the threat of military-like 
action, but the threat of challenging and destabilizing a certain self-understanding of good, 
white masculinity as loyal patriotism. In critiquing America—in doubting her—the zoot 
suiters ignited a gendered insecurity in male servicemen in particular, whose masculinity 
Alvarez 2008). The origin of zoot style is perhaps less mythic than that of sagging, although there are still 
competing accounts. Largely, however, the style came out of improvisation according to Ford. Poor teens 
would buy suits at thrift-stores but were unable to afford tailoring. 
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was exposed as bound up simultaneously in whiteness and in unwavering patriotism. 
Women zoot suiters, or pachucas, have received far less academic and cultural 
attention. In an astonishing account of historical recovery, Catherine Ramirez analyzes the 
circumstances surrounding the pachucas’ absence in cultural memory. While many donned 
a recognizable, hyper-feminine look (tight skirts and red lipstick), many adopted the 
oversized suiting of their counterparts (cf. Ramirez 2009). Those who did so were deemed 
unpatriotic, where unpatriotic was not only to be understood in the sense of being un-
American described above, but as a transgression of appropriate, patriotic, white 
femininity. The patriotic feminine was the domestic woman who supported the war-time 
efforts by upholding “American” values at home. Mexican-American pachucas truly found 
themselves in a double-bind: dismissed both as un-American and as un-Mexican for 
“threatening the gender order of heteropatriarchal Mexican families” (Mora 2010).  
Patriotism remains bound up with class, race, and gender, and often relies on 
naturalized conceptions of clothing to further its ends. The zoot suit riots explicitly 
demonstrate the intersection between patriotism and racism. As Les Back writes, “revolts 
in style” are often read in contexts of “postwar explosion[s] of teenage consumption” rather 
than as incisive indicators of the complex cultural politics of race (cf. Back 2002, 439; cf. 
Melly 1970). Indeed, much overt racist violence has been perpetuated in the name of 
“nationalism” or “patriotism.” In 2005, for instance, the Cronulla race riots involved a 
group of Australian flag-wielding Anglo-Australians who attacked a group of Middle 
Eastern men based on their appearance, expressing their fervor for “white Australia” in 
slurs such as “We grew here. You flew here” (cf. Due and Riggs 2008). In Cronulla, the 
violence was incited by the mere appearance of the “foreign” (non-white) other. In the zoot 
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suit riots, the violence was incited not only by the presence of Black and Mexican-
Americans, but by their uptake and caricature of the suit, itself understood as an incitement 
to violence, or as a kind of taunting. In changing and adapting the suit, zoot suiters 
communicated their refusal to be sidelined or invisibilized in their difference. The 
recognizability of the suit communicated a kind of assimilation which acted as an affront 
to white servicemen. The threat of assimilation, perhaps, was even greater than the threat 
of difference. The hostility and violence towards zoot-suiters by servicemen in particular 
indicates that the “ill-fitting’” suits did much more than offend taste or aesthetic sensibility, 
but presented a perceived threat or challenge to a way of life: a way of life where service 
and dedication to the country (for which being “in uniform” is a euphemism) becomes an 
extension for the system of values worth fighting for back at home. The “mockery” of value 
that zoot-suiters were seen as making thereby challenged the status of the servicemen as 
the supposed guardians of those values. Gender, race, and class all converge in the values 
which become naturalized onto suiting.  
 The baggy, oversized suits that came to be known as zoot suits contrasted with 
tailored suits (Breward 2016). The “modern” suit of the 1920’s and 1930’s contrasted 
greatly with its earlier counterparts and iterations, which were highly decorative, intricate, 
and had much longer jackets (down to the knee) (cf. Hollander 1994). Ann Hollander 
argues that the evolution in suiting that occurred in the nineteenth century changed in 
conjunction to a change in the appearance of the ideal man. The tapered shoulders and 
waist of the “new” suit also “suggest a male body that tapers from broad shoulders and a 
muscular chest, has a flat stomach and small waist, lean flanks and long legs” (1994, 84). 
Instead of “ignoring” the body by covering it up in extravagant layers of fabric, the new 
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suit drew attention to it by clearly highlighting and differentiating between the limbs. This 
“system of clearly delineated limbs” was “adopted as the most authentic vision of the body, 
the real truth of natural anatomy, the Platonic form” (85-6).  
In the post-WWII years of Britain, a “similar rhetoric of moral panic was in 
operation … [which] more firmly focused on the sartorial habits of young working-class 
men” (2015, 222). The “subcultural” reading of the loose-fitting, draped suits donned by 
British youth understands the wide-spread phenomenon as an intentional and deliberate 
way of marking difference from dominant culture, which, at the time, was seeing a 
resurgence of Edwardianism (222). The teddy boys, as the subcultural group came to be 
known, supported their lifestyles thanks to rising incomes (150, 222). The moral panic 
elicited by the teddys did not, however, result in violence. Instead, they were protected by 
their status as raucous but upwardly-mobile teenage youth. Following the war and the 
Macmillan economic boom, these teenagers had nearly twice as much disposable income 
comparable to their parents when they were their age (150). 
Just as demonstrative language may function to boost advertising in creating an 
identification between the garment and consumer, demonstrative language also functions 
to aid and abet the naturalization of specific garments onto persons. For instance, the 
naturalization of hoodies onto Black bodies, or of zoot suits onto Black and Brown bodies, 
perpetuates an understanding that these garments signify immoral, dangerous, and criminal 
activity. Of course, it often is the case that particular garments, when they become a 
“uniform,” do in fact willfully and intentionally signify specific meanings to its wearers, as 
with Nazism. Roger Griffin (2001) distinguishes between a “cosmetic” and “non-
cosmetic” Nazism, where the former designates the “cosmetic use of Nazi trappings … 
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simply as a uniform for racial hatred,” opposed to a “non-cosmetic” Nazism, understood 
as a “real commitment to National Socialism’s underlying palingenetic vision” (cf. Griffin 
1991, 164). Griffin’s distinction, however, seemingly simplifies the way that clothing 
(deemed as “superficial”) is often a vehicle for “deeper” meanings. In other words, it is 
often not actually the case that there is a distinction between clothing and meaning (here 
understood as “serious” intellectual or ideological commitments). In contrast to Griffin’s 
distinction, Tynan and Godson understand uniforms to function as a “mediator” between 
ideology and the “the individual” (2019). The authors therefore do not understand uniforms 
to be (merely) “outward emblem[s] of power and authority,”—although they certainly 
function this way as well—but understand them as part of an “embodied social practice 
that involves the mutual constitution of objects and subjects” (2019, 2). As I will show 
more explicitly in the next section, the bifurcation between clothing (as “shallow”) and 
meaning (as “depth”) is a reproduced misconception which actually abets colonialism. In 
other words, colonialism has in fact relied on this misconception in order to quietly effect 
“cultural destruction” through forced unveiling, etc. (cf. Fanon 1994, 38).  
Clothing and Coloniality 
In this section, I will argue specifically that naturalization has functioned as a feature of 
coloniality. As Frantz Fanon observed, it is precisely because clothing constitutes “the most 
distinctive form of a society’s uniqueness” that it becomes the avenue for its destruction 
(1994, 37). While cultural identity has many components, clothing occupies a privileged 
and unique role. The colonization of Algeria by France relied on a systematic program of 
forced unveiling. Fanon writes: “converting the woman, winning her over to the foreign 
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values, wrenching her free from her status, was at the same time achieving a real power 
over the men and attaining a practical, effective means of destructuring Algerian culture” 
(1994, 39). This strategy persists in making women the continued bearers of culture (cf. 
Brown 2012). The acquiescence of Algerian women functioned as evidence of the 
“goodness” or “rightness” of French values and thereby sanctioned unveiling as a 
requirement of freedom. The resistance on the part of Algerian women, however, also 
worked in French favor, as those who refused had their intransigence attributed to (or 
reduced to) “religious, magical, fanatical behavior” (Fanon 1994, 39). Algerian women 
were put into a double-bind, where both their acceptance and refusal were made intelligible 
through the value of freedom as it was conceptualized and deployed within the colonial 
program.  
Unveiling thereby came to signify a form of acquiescence or consent which itself 
aided and abetted the colonization of Algeria. As a way of destabilizing both intimate 
relations and social norms, unveiling relied on the particular location of women within the 
cultural-religious hierarchy in order to engender such destabilizations. Anibal Quijano’s 
conception of the coloniality of power and Maria Lugones’ development of Quijano’s 
thought are relevant here. For Quijano, superiority and inferiority exist as categories of 
relation which become established through coloniality and domination. These categories 
thereby become naturalized (Quijano 2000). Despite challenging the enforced 
sedimentation of racial categories as “naturally” superior or inferior, Quijano’s account 
naturalizes both gender onto sex (understood as strict biological dimorphism) and 
heterosexuality as natural and thereby as compulsory (cf. Lugones 2007). Lugones reads 
the absence of these analyses in Quijano’s work as indications that Quijano has taken for 
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granted the “light side” of the modern/colonial gender system which “accommodates rather 
than disrupts” the subordination (or naturalized inferiority) of colonized women in 
particular. Lugones’ critique is also relevant for understanding the force of heterosexualism 
as an instrument for colonization.  
While the identification of the force of heterosexualism is not directly addressed by 
Fanon, he does write of the particular gender politics that underlied colonial unveiling. 
Unveiling was employed as a tactic which would specifically “get to” the men through the 
women: this, in addition to actual rape, as well as consumptive and voyeuristic displays of 
public unveiling (Lazreg 1994; cf. Drif 2017; cf. McMahon 2020). In this way, the 
colonization of Algeria is analyzed by Fanon in terms of the reliance on a kind of disruption 
of the control men have over their wives and the other women who figure prominently in 
their lives. Seducing the women with French values simultaneously acted as a mechanism 
of shaming Algerian men (“‘We want to make the Algerian ashamed of the fate that he 
metes out to women’”) (Fanon 38). As Fanon writes of the colonial mindset: “‘Let’s win 
over the women and the rest will follow’” (1994, 37). This “winning over” involved the 
presentation of a false binary between necessarily patriarchal, repressive subjection on the 
one hand, and “freedom” on the other: the very same binary that dominates many debates 
around unveiling today. In falsifying the choice—and indeed, in misleading the women to 
play “‘a functional, capital role’ in the transformation of their lot,” unveiling was “forced” 
onto the women, whose autonomy was neither genuinely respected nor encouraged in the 
process (38). In other words, there was no meaningful choice to be made to remain veiled 
in a colonial context in which women’s unveiling was made to be a public spectacle. In 
undressing themselves, however, Algerian women could be viewed as “consenting” to 
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French values. 
As a mechanism of coloniality, unveiling is rife with its own complicated set of 
meanings. Its violence, too, takes on its own speed, form, and force. It operates in tandem 
with what Alejandro Vallega has called “the coloniality of images” (2011). More recently, 
Mariana Ortega has proposed a concept of “photographic incandescence” as a fecund site 
of ambiguity and potential for the photographic imaginary to both undo and remake the 
self (2019). For Vallega, the coloniality of power and of knowledge alike work to “sustain 
the Eurocentric image” understood in both its symbolic and literal registers (2011, 208). In 
other words, knowledge (including self-knowledge) becomes dependent on “images that 
are not our own” (Vallega 2011, 207). Vallega’s research concerns the “liberation of the 
colonized from the coloniality of images” (208). My project is instead oriented to tracking 
the histories of naturalization which further the aims and ends of coloniality. In the vein of 
Vallega, the image of the unveiled woman came to symbolize a Eurocentric conception of 
freedom. This understanding is problematic for the ways that it continues to gain purchase 
by distorting the significance of Muslim women choosing to unveil. As Fatima Mernissi 
argues, the view that only Muslim women brainwashed by Western notions of liberalism 
and democracy would seek their rights to citizenship is a false conclusion itself based on a 
misunderstanding of Islam (Mernissi 2003; Moors and Tarlo 2013). Indeed, a naturalized 
binary between veiling and democracy obfuscates the tensions and paradoxes (in addition 
to the terror, the violence, and policing) of Muslim women living under compulsory hijab. 
In this way, relations of superiority and inferiority persist as naturalized relations whereby 
the unveiled (“free”) women are lauded as superior over the veiled (“unfree”) women.  
When George W. Bush proudly and sternly proclaimed America’s investment in 
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liberating “women of cover,” he invokes Muslim women as a means of “getting to” the 
men, as Fanon had put it. But Bush’s rhetoric also functioned as a palliative to reassure 
Americans about their own freedom. In specifically reassuring American women about 
their freedom—manifested in a freedom of dress—Bush also attempted to “get to” the men 
through the women by signifying that Americans are free because they are equal. In this 
way, Bush invoked gender equality (itself reliant on a conception of freedom as freedom 
of dress, or of “sexual freedom” as Kelly Oliver puts it) as justification for the U.S. invasion 
and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. As Oliver puts it, the rhetoric of justification not 
only functions to reassure “Western” women about their own sexual freedom, but to 
“legitimate constraints on women’s sexual agency here and there” (2010, 127). Bonnie 
Mann’s conception of gender as justification is relevant here. Drawing on Beauvoir, Mann 
argues that justificatory accounts of gender rely on the “entanglement of power with 
nature” and on essentialized appeals to human nature more broadly (and by extension, I 
would add, to naturalization as an enduring mechanism of making nature by making to 
seem or to appear natural) (Mann 2014, 38).  
Gender works as justification because of the norms, traits, etc., which have become 
naturalized upon it. When gender is carried out as justification, as it is in sexualized forms 
of torture, it functions precisely because gender differences are not considered value-
neutral differences. Rather, femininity and feminization are put to work in order to 
destabilize their counterparts. As Fulden Ibrahimhakkioglu argues, feminization also 
indexes racialization understood as a “mark of inferiority,” since “it is culturally 
understood that femininity is marked by shame” (2018, 422). In the Turkish context of 
which Ibrahimhakkioglu writes, feminine bodies are “inherently shameful” because of the 
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“possibility of impurity” that they designate (419). Feminization thereby becomes a set of 
mechanisms which mark (that is, which visibilize) and thereby make shameful bodies, 
enacted through “willful misgendering, sexualization, and sexualized violation/violence” 
(2018, 420).  Although we are a far cry away from Kant, there is a significant parallel to 
be made in understanding femininity (feminization) as a willful process of subordination. 
Although underthematized in both Mann and Ibrahimhakkioglu’s account, clothing and its 
naturalized meanings (bound up with both gender and race) plays a vital role in the 
continued production of colonial others. Scholars have attended in great detail to the role 
of violence (especially torture) in dehumanization and still further to the role of 
feminization in such processes (Ibrahimhakkioglu) as well as to the upholding or 
presentation of pernicious conceptions of masculinity which enable them (Mann). Less 
attention has been given to the specific histories of clothing in sedimenting and naturalizing 
meanings, which are necessary for effective violence and torture.  
The account of unveiling offered earlier is not non-violent but, as noted, functioned 
as a particular form of violence. Relying largely on the efficacy of imagic coloniality—that 
is, on the function of representation to produce new forms of (self)-knowledge and 
understanding—efforts geared toward unveiling continues to rely on the aesthetic 
transmission of colonial values effected through the sight of the unveiled woman. The 
mechanism of unveiling is meant only to indicate one of colonialism’s many forces. As 
quoted earlier, Fanon observed that clothing constitutes the “most distinctive form,” its 
most visible and observable form, of a society’s uniqueness (1994, 37). I understand 
clothing to similarly constitute the most distinctive form of a person’s uniqueness. In my 
estimation, this understanding of clothing as fundamentally compository of unique 
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personhood is what makes it efficacious as a tool of de-personalization. When the Chilean 
Luis Muñoz was tortured under the Pinochet regime, torturers took his clothes and wore 
them while torturing him: a common practice in torture. Of the violence, Muñoz wrote: 
“It’s as though they want you to feel you are torturing yourself, something that you’ve 
honoured and bought and worn, your leather jacket, your jeans, your shirt, they are 
suggesting to you that they have completely removed your personality, and it reverses 
everything, takes a personality and destroys everything a person loves” (quoted in Belton 
1999, 276; cf. Soper 2001, 21). As Kate Soper observes of Muñoz’ testimony, denuding 
within contexts of torture occurs as “the power to depersonalise the other’s clothing or 
adornment: to treat it as mere use-value without ulterior significance” (2001, 21). As Mann 
puts it, it is the dimension of “self-betrayal” in torture, understood as simultaneous 
powerlessness and complicity, that constitutes it as a “particularly virulent moral wrong” 
(2014, 196; cf. Sussmann 2005, 3).46 
Sophie White argues that it is because clothing functions to both affirm and uphold 
identity on a daily basis that it is employed by colonizers to quite literally strip colonized 
subjects of their identity (2013). This also helps to explain accounts of the re-appropriation 
of clothing by colonized subjects against their colonizers. I will briefly discuss two such 
notable accounts: the first is the 1729 uprising at the original land of the Natchez peoples, 
renamed Fort Rosalie (Louisiana, USA), and the second is the sapeur movement in the 
Congo. The account of the former is based largely on the narrative reports of Marc-Antoine 
46 Writing specifically on the role of pain to index such self-betrayal in torture, David Sussman writes: “What 
the torturer does is to take his victim’s pain and through it his victim’s body, and make it begin to express 
the torturer’s will… now [the victim] experiences within himself something quite intimate and familiar that 
speaks for the torturer” (2005, 21). Mann shows in great detail the privileged function of sexualized torture 
in enacting the most harrowing, and on some accounts the most unbearable acts of torture, but 
underthematizes the specific function of clothing in effecting de-personalization. 
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Caillot, then clerk for the Company of the Indies in Louisiana. In 1729, the indigenous 
Natchez peoples rose against their French colonizers at Fort Rosalie by capturing, torturing, 
and killing them (2013). The Natchez stripped the French and donned their clothing. In the 
aftermath of the events, accounts by the French suggest, as White puts it, “the passivity of 
being stripped with the agency of getting re-dressed (or dressed up)” (2013, 498). Caillot’s 
narrative details “the theme of metamorphosis: the loss and transfer of power when 
stripped, tortured, and killed, or the renewal of power when colonists’ bodies that had been 
temporarily divested of their conventional sartorial markers recovered their Frenchness 
through the material act of dressing” (498). The actions of the Natchez, who had been 
divested of their home, can be understood as attempting to reclaim it by divesting the 
French of France, including that part of their French identities bound up in their clothing.  
The SAPE movement (Societé des Ambianceurs et Persons Élégants) in Congo-
Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a sub-culture marked by a 
sartorial style often compared to dandyism. Sapeurism has often been dismissed as the 
mere mimicry of European colonizers and thereby minimized as a byproduct of 
colonialism. While not an analysis of sapeurism specifically, Terneus argues that the 
reappropriation of clothing by colonial subjects is a politically-motivated exhibition of 
agency by those subjects: an intentional distortion, a mockery of the power of their 
colonizers in making themselves in a version of their master’s image (Terneus 2016, esp. 
112; cf. Bhabba 1994, 121-132). The “mere mimicry” narrative divests (by de-
personalizing and de-politicizing) the sapeurs by imposing a colonial understanding or a 
colonizing reading. Such accounts are in line with the “coloniality of images” discussed 
earlier. One element of sapeurism is its willful perversion of the colonizer’s image: a 
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resistance against the idea that their knowledge of themselves (self-knowledge) is produced 
by the image that the colonizer has of them. There has been much work on the complex 
processes of resignification that took place as garments were literally translated and re-
signified: both sartorially (being worn in different ways) and linguistic-materially (as new 
words and slang came to identify SAPE-specific garments) (cf. Porter 2010).  
The reduction of clothing to “mere mimicry” parallels its characterization as 
frivolous or superfluous. However, the systematic, intentional, and coordinated program of 
the coloniality of clothing indicates that those perpetuating such programs have capitalized 
on the undisturbed, persistent conception of clothing as too inconsequential to be part of 
the carrying out of colonial programs. Indeed, accounts like the one recounted by Fanon 
show that colonization has relied on a more nuanced understanding of clothing as both 
personalizing and culturally significant. The coloniality of clothing continues to gain 
purchase as a method of coercive political and cultural assimilation which uniquely targets 
women as the bearers of culture through their dress, and continues to police women and 
men of color. Falguni Sheth has argued that the dress-policing of women politicians of 
color in particular is part of a new colonial enterprise which harkens to a long history of 
colonialism. But, as Sheth writes: “Demands to behave or comport oneself ‘properly’ were 
not only about modesty or perceived liberation as in the case of Algerian women, they were 
often about knowing one’s place . . . The regulation of clothing then, like today, was a 
vehicle to require women and men of color to know—to submit—to their subordinate place 
in relation to their masters and other free/elite populations” (Sheth 2019).  
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Liberal “Values” and Naturalization 
The key component of the naturalization of value onto clothing relevant to its function in 
colonial projects is the refusal of the intersection of values. That is, the coloniality of 
clothing (including its contemporary iterations in veiling bans, dress policing, and clothing 
bans) functions by positing a primary signification, both pre-determined in advance and 
pre-structured by coloniality. For example, then French President Nicholas Sarkozy’s 
statement that the burka “is not primarily a sign of religion, but of subservience” harkened 
to a history of French colonization which has similarly wielded the equation of veiling with 
unfreedom. In other words, by naturalizing the burka as an imminent threat to gender 
equality—understood as a value of liberal, secular democracy—those who argued in favor 
of the French veiling ban necessarily capitulate to the tactic of homogenizing groups and 
populations in order to advance their (rather paradoxical) ends of achieving “equality.” As 
Sheth argues, the veil has taken on symbolic force as an imminent threat to liberalism 
largely because it is seen as a homogenous signifier instead of being seen as a part of 
heterogenous practices (2012). But, as Sheth writes: “veiling is neither purely embedded 
in a monolithic culture nor purely strategic, but rather inhabited for a variety of motives 
and reasons that will appear to be ‘incoherent,’ exploitative, or perceived as oppressive 
regardless of circumstance” (2012, 918).  
Sarkozy’s statement, echoed by lawmakers in Quebec in 2018-19, capitulate to the 
faulty logic of what Joan W. Scott calls “emancipation by association” (2018; cf. Scott 
2012). The governing belief is that secularism reinforces a “universal code of justice” 
brought about by the “subordination of inherently patriarchal religions to gender neutral 
legal liberalism” (Brown 2012, 2). Carol Pateman and Charles Mills have shown, 
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respectively, how liberalism is not only bound up with sexism and racism, but that its 
principles are such because of its erasure of numerous intersecting histories of oppression 
(Pateman 1988; Mills 1997). Their critiques show that secular liberalism relies on an ideal 
and idealized (bordering on metaphysical) race and gender-neutral conception of equality, 
or rather, that such a conception proffers the white man as its ideal citizen.47 The orthodox 
interpretation of the social contract is that such a contract is the very basis for freedom. 
Pateman and Mills alike show that such freedom is the freedom of the white man which 
requires the subordination of Black men and women and white women in differential ways. 
The social contract theory upon which liberalism relies not only excludes these bodies, but 
props up the great “myth” of liberalism that all citizens within a social contract are free, 
equal, and equally free. As the Black folk aphorism goes: “when white people say ‘Justice,’ 
they mean just us” (cf. Mills 1997).  
It is not only liberalism, but secularism and secular liberalism which has 
systematically relied on gender and racial inequality in order to prop up its own great myth. 
Scott shows that gender inequality was “fundamental to the articulation of the separation 
of church and state that inaugurated Western modernity” (2018, 3). This “new order” of 
women’s subordination assigned them to a feminized familial sphere designed both to 
complement and ensure the separation of this sphere with the “rational masculine realms 
of politics and economics” (2018, 3). As introduced above, the “emancipation by 
association” belief prescribes the destabilization of “inherently patriarchal religions” as 
absolutely paramount to women’s equality understood as a guiding value of secular 
liberalism. In other words, gender equality as a value often becomes weaponized as 
47 Iris Marion Young brings explicit attention to the “metaphysical presuppositions” undergirding liberalism 
and the paradigm of distributive justice specifically (cf. Young 1990). 
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justification for, to use an enduring example, the legalization of veiling bans. The enduring 
(although fundamentally misguided) belief in fundamental or inherent gender equality 
which a discourse of secularity relies on is thereby used to “justify claims of white, 
Western, and Christian racial and religious superiority” (Scott 2018, 3-4). Such a view also 
functions to reinforce distinct cultural norms of feminine dress under the guise of gender 
equality promoted as a universal value which does not take cultural or religious 
considerations into mind as composites of gender. In other words, not only is the value of 
gender equality taken to promote the same interests across the globe, but its expression is 
also understood to look the same way irrespective of location. Such a view fails not only 
to take an intersectional approach to identity more broadly, but to understand that gender 
more specifically is necessarily made up of intersections.  
 The argument that veiling should be banned because it is a symbol of male 
domination is an inconsistent one. Writing on the 2010 debate in Catalonia on the proposed 
ban on burqas in public places, Martha Nussbaum writes that legislators who advance this 
line of argumentation do not also propose bans on other symbols of male domination 
(2012). The inconsistency betrays that the ban is itself a justificatory means to some other 
governmental ends. While Nussbaum couches the inconsistency within a broader 
framework of the politics of fear, I take it to indicate a gendered insecurity or anxiety about 
the inherence of equality within the nations proposing such bans, where a freedom of 
(women’s dress) has been taken to be a stand-in or universal signifier for women’s freedom 
and for equality. A challenge to the former thereby challenges the latter, even though the 
brief history of clothing’s coloniality indicates that the promotion of the former is often 
employed as mere cover or as cover-up for programs of colonialism, domination, or 
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assimilation. For some women in Muslim-majority countries, veiling is an active means of 
resisting sexualization, and some women take up hijab as a form of protection (Lazreg 
2009). The naturalization of religiously-based gendered oppression onto the veil would fail 
to seriously consider veiling as a response to persistent sexism and sexualization, among 
many other reasons behind Muslim veiling.  
The naturalization of the veil also creates a false binary between anti-sexist and 
anti-racist efforts (Al-Saji 2004). When France banned “conspicuous religious symbols” in 
2004, a false binary was created between anti-sexism and anti-racism, where critics of the 
law understood the French to be capitulating to the same tactics of the French colonization 
of Algeria. However, such a view was heard as “anti-feminist” or as sexist, since it argued 
against the supposed promotion of gender equality to which the ban was seen as supposedly 
contributing. The false binary pits anti-sexism against anti-racism which, as Al-Saji argues, 
logically excludes their interrelation and intersection. When debate ensued about loi 21 in 
Quebec in 2019, the rhetoric of legislators advocating the ban similarly invoked secularism 
as a value which necessarily entailed the denial of religious expression through dress. The 
bill’s passing, much like its counterparts, unequivocally targets non-Christian women of 
color and wields its support in the name of gender equality and freedom from oppression. 
Al-Saji writes: “In the case of Quebec, it is worth remembering that the social fabric from 
which Muslims are now being excluded was constructed via the excision, assimilation, and 
decimation of indigenous peoples and by suppressing the history of indigenous and Black 
slavery” (2019). Understood in light of an enduring legacy of colonialism and active 
ignorance, such policies shift the focus from one about “transparency and ‘security’” to 
“an attempt to whitewash Muslims, by assimilating those who are ‘moderate,’ head-
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uncovered,’ and ‘secular,’ while excluding those hijabi women who are cast as unruly and 
unassimilable” (2019).  
Assimilationist policies and politics are indeed compatible with secular liberalism, 
although at odds with its purported value of multiculturalism. In the U.S. context, 
assimilation was an express aim of early New Deal era welfarist policies which drew on 
the belief that the welfare state was “a tool for turning peasants into Frenchmen,” or 
“immigrants into Americans” (cf. Weber 1976; cf. Kymlicka 2019). Insofar as liberal 
secularism also purports to uphold values of equality and multiculturalism, the tensions 
that emerge between them are relevant. Even though scholars have pointed out the 
unsustainability and unlikelihood of the welfare state to integrate and assimilate, it is worth 
reflecting on the enduring understanding of liberal, welfarist ideology with a certain 
assimilationist vision of nation-statehood. Even John Rawls defended the welfare state, 
which, Katrina Forrester writes, must be contextualized as a view that was forged in an era 
when liberalism was full of contradictions, “namely, a fundamental contradiction between 
equality and exclusion” (2019, xi). Such a contradiction is mirrored in that between 
assimilation and multiculturalism, where the former is bound up not only with the 
naturalization of value onto (reductive) gender-differentiated, racially-marked clothing, but 
with a conception of nationhood as European, white nationalism.  
Liberal nationalism holds that a distinct obligation to national members can be 
squared with the values of liberty, formal equality, constitutional law, nondiscrimination, 
and democratic procedure (cf. Young 2000). Iris Marion Young has argued that efforts to 
distinguish the nation as a unique cultural group meriting its own distinct set of moral 
considerations presupposes what they aim to justify: that the nation is itself a particular 
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cultural group which one has special obligations of justice to above and beyond those of 
other nations (Young 2000, 148). European iterations of nationalism in particular, Young 
argues, tend to justify themselves as being “cosmopolitan,” where cosmopolitanism is 
understood as a form of nationalism insofar as it privileges sameness over difference (2000, 
147-8). Young here draws insights from Derrida’s reflections on European identity. 
Derrida describes the dual imperative or contradiction between national and European 
identity, writing that Europe exists only through “non-identity to itself” (cf. Young 2000). 
As Young argues, nationalist ideologies capitulate to an essentializing tendency which 
maintain that there is some “essence” to nations and to national identity specifically. 
Nationalist ideologies thereby tend to define groups in “either/or” terms, conceiving of the 
nation as “strictly bounded between insiders and outsiders” (2000, 252). An integral part 
of Young’s critique against liberal nationalism is the insistence of liberal nationalists that 
a nation is able to be distinguished from other ethnic communities by a distinct public 
culture (this is, at least, the most overt in David Miller’s account, but also in Will 
Kymlicka’s).48 At the core of this new neo-nationalism is a rejection of cultural plurality 
understood as multiple modes of occupying the public sphere. Veiled women represent an 
affront to culture understood as secular, despite the role of religious plurality (understood 
as freedom of conscience) in the constitution of secular society. The affront is a prejudice 
masked (or veiled) as a political one (the issue of secular nationalism), itself bound up in 
the scapegoating of prejudice onto “taste.” The aesthetic affront to taste (the perception of 
 
48 This results in the following binary: “Either a group is a historical community, living in its historic 
homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture, or it is a cultural group whose members have left their 
homeland voluntarily to make a new life within another nation. The concept of nation thus dominates the 
logic of the distinction between nation and ethnic group, as the hegemonic unity of a society that justifies 
both separate government and the expectation that newcomers will integrate. This either-or concept of nation, 
however, does not accommodate well to the actual diversity of peoples.” (2000, 153-4) 
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differently dressed others) becomes perceived as a threat rather than an iteration of 
multiculturalism. 
It is relevant to consider the interrelation between democratic liberalism and 
aesthetic individualism. To draw on earlier, “freedom” is often confused with, or seen as 
being expressed by, a “freedom to dress,” where the assurance of the latter acts as a 
palliative to assure oneself that one possesses the former. Luc Ferry traces a history of 
democratic liberalism and aesthetic individualism. The capacity for self-determination and 
self-governance (freedom)—“to give oneself one’s own laws”—is itself bound up with 
“the death of God” (1993). To put it simply: religion opposes freedom for Ferry. 
Substituting religion for culture, Ferry argues that in contemporary times, the expression 
of individuality creates the world rather than merely reflects it: that is, expression or 
representation does not refer itself to another world order. Ferry’s position is ironic insofar 
as it maintains individual expression as both a contemporary value and as fundamentally 
creative, and yet denies that religious expression could have the same function. It will 
perhaps then be of little surprise to hear that Ferry was the architect of the 2004 French law 
banning conspicuous religious symbols (law 2004-2028 of 15 March 2004) while he was 
serving as the Minister of Education (2002-2004) under conservative Prime Minister Jean-
Pierre Raffarin.  
I previously indicated that the maintenance of freedom to dress as a value worth 
fighting for diagnoses an insecurity or an anxiety about gender and gender equality 
specifically. Based on the analysis above, this insight can be expanded even further, and 
the appearance of veiled women can be understood as signaling a threat to a particular form 
of liberalism as it is bound up with capitalism. Indeed, legislation aimed at unveiling may 
182 
thereby also be understood as an effort to maintain the capitalist order upon which 
liberalism relies, where freedom to dress may itself indicate free purchasing power (all for 
the sake of truly expressing your individuality. “Free dress” is then not only associated 
with (or justified by) the sexual freedom of women in particular, but with economic 
nationalism. Under this lens, the zoot suiters flaunted or made visible their poorness, and 
indeed mobilized their status as a form of collective order which reflected, like a mirror, 
the system’s failings (or maybe, the system working). As literal caricatures of their white, 
middle-class counterparts, zoot suiters represented both scrap and excess, leftovers and 
waste. Their clothes did not fit them. This of course has a meaning that is at least double. 
In the most literal sense, the clothing was too large: over-sized in a time when this was not 
the fashion. In another, the suits did not appear to fit them in the sense of “being right” for 
them, since suiting designated white and middle-class. As indicated above in Section I, the 
“mockery” of value that zoot-suiters were seen to be making functioned to challenge the 
status of the servicemen as guardians of those values.  
“Value guarding” is perhaps just another way of saying “moral policing.” At least, 
both emerge in the face of “moral panic,” which manifests along a spectrum of public 
disapproval and is often disguised in decries against “bad” or “poor” taste. Here, I am 
adapting the view (and outdated legal “defense”) that confrontations with sexual difference 
may incite a “panic” which results in violence (cf. Lee 2009). Gay and trans panic defenses 
have historically justified homophobic and transphobic violence. In the case of the zoot 
suit riots, the perceived “mockery” of values instigated by the suited zoot suiters functioned 
to create a “panic” in white servicemen in particular. The violence was ultimately justified 
against the zoot suiters on account of their perceived stance against the war: the “bad taste” 
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of donning garments with an “excess” of fabric in the midst of a fabric ration. But as I 
wrote above, the fabric was not in fact “excessive” understood as the product of deliberate 
consumption. Instead, the suits were often thrifted and oversized. Amateur tailoring (or no 
tailoring) is what resulted in the oversized look, not eager and wasteful shopping. In fact, 
the zoot-suiters had the most sensible and considerate response to the rations. In line with 
the analysis I have been giving throughout, I understand their “panic” to be better justified 
by a certain threat of emasculation. Here, the threat of emasculation does not come from a 
“making feminine,” but in expanding masculinity beyond whiteness and beyond (or below) 
the middle-class: in making suited masculinity Black, Brown, and poor. This was the 
“threat” posed by the zoot suiters, who also threatened to expose white masculinity as 
having an unthinking nationalist loyalty, which they called into question. It is for this 
reason, too, that we cannot see the sapeurs as merely wearing their master’s clothes, when 
they are in fact using the master’s tools. 
My argument throughout this chapter extends the insight that “taste” functions as a 
mode of discrimination by foregrounding the role of naturalization in colonial domination, 
the criminalization of clothing, and violence abetted by aesthetic appearance. The 
naturalization of particular values onto garments has both promoted racist, xenophobic 
violence (whether in physical violence or in the imposition of ordinances or bans) by 
naturalizing particular garments, styles, etc., onto bodies. Garments, in other words, come 
to stand in for bodies and perceived actions or threats alike by coming to signify particular 
values and ideas. The assumed transitive property taking place between garment and 
meaning elides the ways in which meaning(s) are transformed, altered, and adapted by 
lived experiences of dress. For instance, in naturalizing the veil as inherently oppressive to 
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women, the discourse and debates surrounding veiling legislation were forced into a binary: 
either veils are or are not oppressive. This view, as scholars like Al-Saji and Akbar Akhgari 
argue, both obscures nuance and reduces (complex) lived experience into a simple 
either/or. In the case of the zoot suits, the naturalization of value onto the traditional “suit” 
informed the perceived “threat” of those values posed by the zoot suits.  
Conclusion 
In its essentialism, naturalization functions to erase or to minimize difference. The 
judgment of clothing as too mundane or as too frivolous to warrant “serious” attention is 
indeed what has permitted the events I have detailed throughout, or at least has contributed 
to its success in not raising much widespread alarm, panic, or criticism. As I suggested at 
the beginning, neither of these judgments are epistemically neutral, but neither are they 
socially and politically neutral. Part of the efficacy of processes of naturalization is owed 
to such judgments, which both distracts and deflects from any “serious” attention paid to 
clothing. As Falguni Sheth recently observed, the dress policing of women of color 
politicians in particular is a tactic of neocolonialism when it is understood in its larger 
historical context, only part of which I have accounted for here. But in naturalizing values 
onto garments, these items function as synecdoche: aiding in the maintenance of harmful 
stereotypes and biases. In other words, a particular part—the perceived value(s) of 
particular garments—stands in for a whole (in this case, whole persons or entire 
populations). Individual personhood—including that person’s lived experience of dress, is 
subordinated to broad or general categories which are themselves marked by non-neutral 
descriptors. For instance, it is not just the case that a hoodie may signify a Black body, but 
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a criminalized Black body: or a Black body about to commit a crime. Similarly, hijab may 
not just signify “Muslim woman,” but oppressed Muslim woman. The synecdoche affected 
by garments is therefore not a simple one. “Suits” is a common synecdoche designating 
“businessmen.” Even the presence of suits may designate this group of corporate go-
getters. But as my analysis of the zoot-suiters shows, “suits” are not themselves neutral 
signifiers, and in fact the term, as synecdoche, is inflected with both race and class. If it 
were not, the zoot suiters would not have incited such “moral panic.”  
On my view, the histories of clothing’s coloniality and enduring forms of 
prejudicial policing indicate a distrust of appearance: not as “mere,” but as an expression 
of competing truths or world-views. At the same time, an essentialist belief about values is 
projected onto clothing, precisely as a way of snuffing out competing interpretations of 
those values, where such competing values may be perceived as threatening values which 
themselves compete with others. As I have shown throughout, values like freedom in 
particular are not racially neutral, ungendered, or unclassed. Indeed, freedom and related 
notions of patriotism, secularism, and nationality are implicated in fraught histories and 
fierce battles involving clothing, and efforts at denuding a person or a people are part of 
enduring legacies of imperialism and colonialism which have themselves relied on a 
transitive property of consent, but which more broadly refers to a program of value 
transference. The naturalization of clothing continues to gain purchase in various methods 
of attempted political and cultural assimilation. As Representative Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez (D-NY) put it at her Congressional swearing-in ceremony in 2019: “Next time 
someone tells Bronx girls to take off their hoops, they can just say they’re dressing like a 
Congresswoman” (2019). 
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VI. RECOVERING OUR CLOTHES 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter V, I suggested that it is only because dress personalizes its wearer that it works 
so effectively as a tool of depersonalization. I understand personalization as the formation 
rather than the destruction of subjectivity. And while its role in depersonalization was made 
apparent by the last chapter, I here want to emphasize the role that clothing plays in the 
formation of subjectivity.49 Iris Marion Young turns to the sense of “touch” as a modality 
by which (feminine) subjectivity is meaningfully constituted. While her focus is on 
feminine subjectivity in particular, the insight is a crucial one for understanding the role of 
dress more broadly in the constitution of subjectivity. The theorization of touch is inspired 
by the work of Luce Irigaray, who also advocated a “turn” to touch as an alternative to the 
male gaze, or what Irigaray thematizes as a particular mode of vision which represents, 
objectifies, and sexualizes (1985). Although indebted to Irigaray, Young’s work does not 
encounter the same problem of essentialism as Irigaray’s work. In developing a “feminine” 
alternative to “masculine” vision, Irigaray both concedes vision to the male gaze and 
essentializes femininity as a soft, supple, gentle counter-part to an equally essentialized 
conception of masculinity as rigidly objectifying. I will argue that Young does not, as 
 
49 Throughout, I will focus on “feminine” subjectivity in particular, which I understand as an identification 
with and/or a pleasure derived in dressing or in otherwise appearing feminine or as femme. I do not 
understand feminine subjectivity as an identificatory marker of biological sex. In the topic of femininity, the 
two main motives of my dissertation collide or align: 1) the metaphysical subordination of appearances to 
essences; and 2) the feminization of fashion, and subsequent subordination of the feminine within philosophy. 
It is my view that the “feminization” of fashion, or the designation of clothing as primarily a feminine 
concern, has perpetuated its erasure as a meritorious topic of philosophical concern. I understand 
“feminization” itself as roughly synonymous with the concern for (or love of) the world of appearances that 
has itself been denigrated throughout the history of philosophy. I thereby take the feminization of fashion as 
an extension of the subordination of appearances to essences. 
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Irigaray does, problematically invert the vision/touch dyad, so that (feminized) touch is 
privileged over and against (masculinized) vision. Instead, I argue that Young develops a 
conception of touch and of the “tactile imagination” which shows how the lived experience 
of dress and of being clothed both personalize and inform subjectivity. The “pleasure” one 
may take in one’s own clothing cannot be reduced to or delimited by eternal signifiers or 
“a priori” meanings. I develop instead—following Young following Merleau-Ponty 
following Husserl—a conception of clothing (a conception of pleasure in clothing) as a 
multi-sensory and affective experience.  
The chapter will proceed as follows. In the first section, I make recourse to Husserl 
and Merleau-Ponty in order to show how the role of clothing’s materiality in eliciting 
sensations is vital in disrupting a conception of clothing as a set of overdetermined 
signifiers. The accounts of matter, sensation, and style that I develop in this section will 
suggest that lived experiences of dress animate subjectivity in a central, and not merely 
“superficial” way. In the second section of the chapter, I introduce Young’s discussion of 
touch as a resource for the recovery of a genuine pleasure in clothing (not only for feminine 
subjects, although this is the focus of Young’s essay). I argue that her thematization of 
touch in the essay does not capitulate to a mere reversal of the vision/touch dyad, in which 
objectifying, masculinist vision is simply traded for a feminine sensibility of touch. 
Ultimately, my analysis here situates lived experiences of clothing and femininity alike as 
meaningful and constitutive sites of subjectivity.  
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Recovering a Sense of Clothing with Husserl and Merleau-Ponty 
Before turning to Young’s analysis of touch as a mode through which to access the clothed 
body-cum-lived body of phenomenology (Section II), I will first show the import of matter 
(hyle) in constituting perception. Filling out this missing phenomenological background 
will show that Young’s analysis of touch as a vital resource in “recovering” pleasure in 
clothing does not merely constitute a (problematic) reversal of the vision/touch dyad. In 
what follows, I detail the role of matter in both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, including 
relevant corresponding concepts, including: sensations, imagination, depth, and style, in 
that order. By showing that matter exists neither as a set of external properties nor as 
experiences of external properties, I will then be equipped to suggest that the experiences 
of touch and of pleasure function phenomenologically as constitutive of subjectivity. In 
other words, touch experiences are fundamentally generative of meaning, experience, and 
of the meaning of experience, and thereby to a sense of clothing as constitutive of 
subjectivity by way of perception. To put it simply, the phenomenological conception of 
subjectivity I develop here as pertains to dressed experience directly challenges the view 
that femininity is (over)determined from the outset in its signification. In refusing to 
concede subjectivity to discourses of clothing and femininity alike, I—along with Young—
argue that the overdetermination of meaning (the meaning of femininity, the meaning of 
clothes) effected by naturalization covers over or elides the import of clothing in 
constituting subjectivity. 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty both suggest that sensory experiences ought not to be 
understood as capturing objects (as objectifying), but as modes of orientation which 
commune with the world, and not over and against it. The analysis provided here suggests 
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that even objectifying vision does not overdetermine or wholly constitute subjectivity such 
that there is no individual subject that remains. If this were the case, there would be no 
pleasure (or dissatisfaction, or anything else for that matter) that was my own in any 
individuated way (i.e., apart from the influence and internalization of discourses and 
norms). Insofar as it is my body that responds to, for example, the experience of 
objectification, the experience of individual sensations that arise in and on it impact and 
augment my perception, including self-perception. My own self-image is modulated by the 
feeling-sensations elicited in experiences of myself as a dressed being, meaning that the 
image I have of myself is forged from these sensations and not separate from them. In other 
words, the image I have of myself has not been “put there” from without. While this means 
that negative or even violent occurrences of objectification are also not superficial—that 
even a stare from afar can actually make me feel differently in my clothing and in my body, 
in both Leibs—it also means that my own feelings, such as those of myself in clothing, can 
similarly affect and constitute my perception. It is not only that vision (the stare) affects 
touch (the feeling of myself in my clothing), but that touch also affects vision. Young’s 
turn to touch can only be understood as an uncritical turn from vision to touch if the 
phenomenological account of sensations I have detailed here is ignored. Understood as a 
mere reversal which does nothing to subvert objectifying, masculinist vision, touch could 
only be understood as an uncritical valorization of the feminine. 
Hyle (Matter), Sensations, and Imagination 
For Husserl, touch (or touch-data) constitutes a type of hyle or matter. Invoking Kant, hyle 
refers to the schematic content of experience: formless content that both has the potential 
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to receive form and which is itself not directly perceivable (cf. Gallagher 1986, 132). 
Husserl’s examples include “color-data, touch-data, and tone-data,” but also include 
“sensuous pleasure, pain, and tickle sensations, and so forth” (Hua III/I, 192/203). Hyletic 
data compose “a constantly changing flux of sensed material” (Gallagher 1986, 134). Hyle 
is not out there or external to perception, but comes to consciousness by being made 
available for perceptual and reflective experience alike (cf. Gallagher 1986, 134; cf. Hua 
XIX/I). In other words, it is through experience and reflection on experience alike that 
sensations come to have meaning:  that is to say, come to consciousness at all, since 
consciousness is always inflected by the meaning(s) of things, and not just by “things.”  
 Hyletic data are not the same as “objective properties.” Hyletic data refers to the 
contents of consciousness which are necessary for the constitution of noetic 
phenomena/appearances. Early in his writings on hyle, Husserl wrote that hyletic data have 
no intentional content in themselves.50 He amended this view later on, writing that 
intentionality is in fact at work in the hyletic stratum itself (Husserl 1907, 1991; cf. Staiti 
2019). The change of heart is significant. Not only is it a direct rebuke of Merleau-Ponty’s 
later claim that Husserl submits to a realism about matter, but more directly to my purpose 
here, it suggests that matter is affectively laden: readied for apprehension and engagement 
with subjects. In other words, it is not the case that hyletic data exist “out there,” ready 
only to be apprehended as they are in their concrete existence, as objective objects with 
naturalized meaning. Instead, they exist as “tendency” [Tendenz] which operates in tandem 
with other data and with subjects.51  
 
50 Husserl first discusses the particular intentionality of hyle in his analysis of inner time consciousness (Ideas 
I 1931/2012; cf. Hua X 1905). 
 
51 The intentionality at work within the hyletic stratum is not the intentionality of consciousness, however. 
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Concretely, this means that experiences of particular sensations are informed by 
experience and by perception more broadly: zoomed-out from the localizable sensation. 
While the “push and pull” of my clothing constitutes a sensation of touch for Husserl, the 
sensation is itself contingent on a host of other factors, including but not limited to my 
mood and intentionality. So, for example, the garment may appear to me to be 
uncomfortable and constricting if I am experiencing anxiety about an upcoming 
presentation: since I am “there” in consciousness (at the presentation, worrying how it will 
go). Even though Husserl writes that there are “real properties” or “material qualities,” he 
does not invoke this as a juxtaposition to “sensed” or presumably “unreal” properties. 
Rather, real properties (the matter of a thing, including its extension, color, etc.,) are just 
as subject to affection as sensings, which we can understand as the experience of 
sensations, including, for example, the warmth of a hand or the “pressure and pull” of my 
clothing (Al-Saji 2010, 19; Husserl 1999, 176).52 The difference for Husserl is not one of 
reality and irreality, but of the perceived place or localization of the sensation. 
Understanding that hyle has intentionality is vital in disrupting the view that matter 
(including clothing) is immune to shifting significations.53 In Ding Und Raum (Thing and 
Space, 1907), Husserl writes of the central role that kinesthetic data play in shaping or 
The former exists as “tendency”” [Tendenz] which, as Andrea Staiti puts it: “creates synthetic connections 
among the rudimentary sensory materials of hyle and organizes them in pre-objective unities that are ready 
for objectual apprehension” (Staiti 2019, 12). Tendency here indicates only that hyle are not directed towards 
a transcendental object, by transcendental consciousness, or by teleology. Instead, tendency indicates that 
hyle are affectively laden, readied for apprehension. 
52 For Al-Saji, “sensings” is a concept with potential to undermine the active/passive, subject/object binaries 
(2010, 19). 
53 Upon hearing the enduring note of the violin, the process of abstraction results in the remaining or residual 
sense datum as inextricably linked to time and to temporal extension specifically (Ideas I 1931/2012; see cf. 
Addition to Ideas I, Hua IV, 22; Hua X; Rabanaque 2003, 208). Hyle compose sensations: both by giving 
sense (in the apprehension of sensation), illustrated in the example above, and by organizing fields of sense. 
An analysis of the latter is taken up in Ding Und Raum (Thing and Space) (1907). 
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morphing sensations in making the ego aware of bodily motion (cf. Hua XVI; cf. 
Rabanaque 2003, 209). The intentionality of hyle ought then to be understood not as a kind 
of vitalism or realism about matter, but as the capacity for things to make us aware of them, 
instead of the intentionality of consciousness acting as the filter for what we do and do not 
notice, and in what ways. This is applicable to specific sensations as well (such as in “push 
and pull” of clothing mentioned above), and not just to “objects” of matter. The process of 
making the ego aware occurs because hyle have affective force (affektive kraft) comprising 
both attraction [Anziehung] and repulsion [Abstoss]. That hyle have such affective force 
means that the ego is made aware of the body precisely because hyle contribute to 
sensations of both attraction and revulsion, including pleasure and pain (cf. Manuscript C; 
cf. Rabanaque 2003, 211). Hyle thereby works affectively by attracting or repulsing the 
ego: in bringing background to foreground or by relegating foreground to background. To 
draw once more on the example given above: while I may be aggravated and uncomfortable 
at the constricting sensation elicited by my clothing (itself elicited by my nerves), I may 
experience it very differently the following day, while unwinding with friends. In the 
former instance, my ego is “repulsed,” while in the latter, it is “attracted.” 
For Husserl and Merleau-Ponty alike, sensations are not what happen on or to the 
body, but constitute the lived body in its relation to the world. Consider Fink’s notion that 
clothing constitutes a second Leib. Concretely, this means that the sensations afforded by 
clothing not only effect or impact the Leib—a derivative account which would reinforce a 
subject/object dualism—but are themselves fundamental to the lived body in a particularly 
special or unique way. While it is the case that all sensations are constitutive (and ought 
not to be understood as external perceptions/experiences of matter), the proximity that 
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clothing has to our skin—the constant and consistent elicitation of sensations—makes it 
both a vital and enduring part of the lived body’s constitution. While we may only 
occasionally burn a hand, be embraced, or hear music, we are almost always clothed. To 
be clear, all sensations are “intentional” and vital for both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological accounts of subjectivity. But while all sensations are meaningful—that 
is, participate in meaning-making—clothing is uniquely situated as a constant site. 
 Husserl’s insight into the fundamentally temporal nature of sensations is extended 
by Merleau-Ponty, for whom they also become spatialized. This means that sensations 
spatialize, understood as giving shape or form to the world.54 It is not just that they 
spatialize in the sense of differentiating—between self and other, self and hot stove, and so 
on—but spatialize in the sense that they attract and repulse the ego: the idea of which I 
introduced above. In bringing consciousness closer to (or farther away from) certain 
sensations, the world takes shape as a world where I am moved to (and away from) 
particular sensations. This is significant because it suggests a process of dynamic and 
contingent interaction between self and world, and means that consciousness is at the ready 
to be affected by sensuous elicitation (which is not to be understood as predetermined in 
any way). This capacity of consciousness relegates dressed experience as consistent and 
contingent sources of sensuous elicitation and of meaning, and not as a stable site of 
meaning in which significations are predetermined or else otherwise predictable and 
determinable. Concretely, my experience of my dress as constricting may also constrict 
 
54 This does not also mean that sensations themselves have a discrete form for Merleau-Ponty, who rejects 
the hyle/morphe distinction itself. For Husserl, the hyle/morphe distinction was first introduced in Ideas I as 
the twofold structure of a noesis (an act of intention). For Husserl, morphe is merely that through which hyle 
are apprehended. For Merleau-Ponty, the distinction exists as a secondary or as a derivative one; he argues 
that Husserl’s account considers hyle as void of meaning, whereby he himself maintains that the field of 
sense is “already charged with meaning” (2012 4). 
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my world, which may not appear to me then as one in which I can move freely in. I may 
be more timid, inward, and distracted, such that my sense of the world as an open space 
augments in conformity with the sensations elicited by my dress, my mood, and so on. 
 Sensations are also affective. Affective or sensuous sensations (“feeling-
sensations”) are kinesthetic, meaning that “they are cut off from the representative function 
ascribed to presentational-sensations (Al-Saji 2000, 52). By motivating both tactile and 
visual sensations alike, kinesthetic sensations play a “constitutive role in perception” 
(2000, 52). They “outline the features and possibilities of the world” which are then 
represented by visual perception (2000, 52). Feeling-sensations, and the broader view of 
sensations offered by Husserl, suggest a different way of considering presentation-
sensations, or sensations of vision in consciousness. Instead of considering presentation-
sensations and affective sensations to be wholly different in kind, or as having a causal 
relationship where the latter is the condition of possibility for the former, the very 
recuperation of affective sensations may refigure our understanding of presentation-
sensations (cf. Al-Saji 2000). In other words, the feelings elicited by tactile sensations (the 
feelings one has in clothes, for instance) are not only relevant and constitutive of and for 
perception, but visual perception as well. Concretely, this means that the overdetermination 
of the meaning of clothing is incompatible with a truly phenomenological account. 
 What is significant about this idea is that it challenges the primacy of visual 
perception in favor of a more complex multimodal system or network of sensations which 
includes the affective and the kinesthetic. On this new (old) Husserlian model, the lived 
body is “constituted through the localization of sensations in and on it, for which touch 
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(bound with kinaesthesis) is of particular importance” (Al-Saji 2000, 54).55 Said otherwise, 
experiences of visuality are not wholly or solely visual in nature, but are themselves 
informed by and through a constellation of other sensations.  
 Affect functions to orient both temporally and spatially for Husserl (cf. Rodemeyer 
2006, 159; Zahavi 1999, 116). As Dan Zahavi puts it, to be affected is tantamount to being 
“invited” to “turn one’s attention toward that which exerts the affection” (1999, 116). It is 
not that touch is wholly other to vision, but that it disrupts “a particular model of vision 
and more generally of perception” (Al-Saji 2010, 27). On Al-Saji’s reading, touch operates 
as such an interruption which does not naively turn away from vision, but shows how the 
monolithic understanding of vision as objectifying (as inhibitive of subjectivity, as Young 
will write) simply misses the import of sensations in generating a subjectivity which is 
more than passive, objectified, or lacking (2000, 2010).56 For my purpose here, the reading 
I have been giving refutes the idea that clothing is overdetermined: not only or just by 
vision, but by the objectifying gaze in particular. 
 The imagination is vital in bridging hyletic data with judgments and with reflections 
of one’s own experiences: reflective consciousness opposed to consciousness. In a 
phenomenological register, such higher order processes refer specifically to layers of 
judgment. The reader may object that this understanding of hyletic data as the first step of 
higher-order judgment functionally subordinates the data to revered processes of judgment: 
 
55 The difference between Körper and Leib is “the insertion of sensings [Empfindnisse] into the body [Leib], 
or in its possession of sensations” (2000, 54). Indeed, the lived body is nothing but “this field of localized 
sensations” (2000, 54). The lived body is a body for whom matter matters, and such mattering occurs through 
sensations. 
 
56 This points to a crucial difference between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl’s respective accounts of the 
touching-touched hands. As Al-Saji puts it: “Whereas for Merleau-Ponty being-touched interrupts the 
subjectivity of the hand, identified with its intentional activity, for Husserl this generates a subjectivity 
inseparable from passivity and affectivity” (2010, 29). 
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the very charge I accused of Kant in Chapter II. There is a fine line between an idealizing 
tendency which would render material stuff subordinate to cognitive judgment, and a more 
nuanced conception of sensory data as not merely sensory. The constitutive role of hyletic 
data in both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, however, aligns them more with the latter 
concepetion than the former. Concretely, this means that dress is not the “mere matter” 
upon which judgments are borne because it does not exist either as wholly separate from 
or subordinated to the faculty of judgment.  
 For Husserl, the imagination functions as a medium or a facilitator between hyletic 
data and these “higher order cognitive processes” (Aldea 2013, 372; cf. Hua III/Ideas II 
1989).57 This means that the imagination does not rely on the representative function or 
capacity to “objectify” understood as delineating borders and boundaries by turning 
persons into objects and into images. As Smaranda Aldea writes: “The language of mental 
images invites, in the case of imagining consciousness [Phantasie], significant limitations 
as to what its objects (and powers) may be” (2013, 372). One of the most significant 
hindrances is that of the space of objects, or of their spatialization. Limited to the 
representational medium, a “crippling consequence of this claim is that imagined objects 
cannot exhibit features that surpass the scope of features exhibited by perceptual objects 
(such as spatial determination)” (2013, 372). The “close dependence of imagination on 
perception” elicited by the representational model of the imagination fails to come to grips 
with this facilitator model of the imagination offered here instead.58 That is, it is not the 
 
57 For Husserl, the imagination [Phantasie] functions by modifying direct perceptual presentation (opposed 
to indirect perceptual presentations, or picturing [bildliche]. Imagination is not the same as image-
consciousness; it does not require mental images (Aldea 2013; Hua XXIII). This is in contrast with indirect 
perceptual presentations, also referred to as picturing [bildliche]. As Smaranda Aldea argues, imagination for 
Husserl does not actually require mental images (2013, 374). 
 
58 Even though, as Aldea writes, Husserl is staunch to abandon the import of mental images, he nonetheless 
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case that the imagination is limited to perception, for if this were the case, femininity would 
really be “internalized” in the way that Bartky suspects at her most critical: that is, as a set 
of perceptions from an outside world which fundamentally constitute one’s “inner” world. 
Instead, however, the imagination may function as a mode of resistance to perception, 
including the perceptions which arise from or because of the objectifying vision of others. 
 
Depth and Style 
For Husserl, hyle does not exist representationally, as self-contained and limited. Instead, 
it exists affectively in a “constantly changing flux” (Gallagher 1986, 134). Merleau-Ponty 
misunderstands Husserl’s conception of hyle, and so also misinterprets his conception of 
sensation. On Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl, hyle exists “out there” in the world, and 
therefore is interchangeable with objective properties. This would renders sensations as 
nothing other than “products of analysis” corresponding to “nothing in our experience” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962, 3).59  Merleau-Ponty rejects the distinction between hyle and morphe 
itself, writing that “there is no hyle, no sensation which is not in communication with other 
sensations or the sensations of other people, and for this very reason there is no morphe, 
no apprehension or apperception, the office of which is to give significance to matter that 
has none” (1962, 405; 1964, 256). Essentially, Merleau-Ponty’s critique maintains that 
Husserl considers hyle as void of meaning, whereby Merleau-Ponty maintains that the field 
of sense is “already charged with meaning” (2012, 4).  
 
maintains the role that the imagination plays at “the highest levels of abstract cognition” where the 
imagination does not play a representational role (2013, 373). 
 
59 More specifically, what Merleau-Ponty rejects (or thinks he is rejecting) is a latent hylomorphism in 
Husserl. 
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 Merleau-Ponty’s misreading of Husserl is a productive one, however, since 
Merleau-Ponty’s critique is vital in informing and motivating his later formulation of the 
concept of depth. Even though Merleau-Ponty is wrong to write that Husserl considers hyle 
as “void of meaning,” his criticism motivates a related critique of the concept of “depth.” 
On a view that maintains that the world is formed from a base of “mutually indifferent, 
meaningless sensations,” “depth” would only ever be mere subjective projection (Mazis 
1988, 228). In rejecting the former, Merleau-Ponty also rejects the latter. The “depth” of 
meaning he conceptualizes instead is necessarily bound up in—is unfolded in—both space 
and time, lest it be relegated as externally spatialized and/or temporalized sensations which 
would become discoverable to the subject understood as wholly separate from the depths 
of meaning. This is clearly rejected by Merleau-Ponty, writing that when seeing an object, 
he always feels that there is “still some being beyond what I currently see,” which is “not 
merely more visible being, but also more tangible or audible being, and not merely more 
sensible being” (2012, 224).  
 Merleau-Ponty gives an account of depth—of deep subjectivity—meant to 
juxtapose its “shallow” counterpart, understood as the dualistically-configured subjectivity 
which displaces meaning from matter.60 Shallow subjectivity is discoverable. Merleau-
Ponty thereby aims to conceive of depth as the primary dimension of experience. In 
working to develop a non-dualistic ontology based on the rejection of shallow subjectivity, 
 
60 What Merleau-Ponty later conceives of as “haunting” indicates the residuum of meaning that cannot be 
captured by the conception of sensation which he rejects. Depth thereby becomes conceived as the very 
“haunting of time” which refers to the “peculiar way in which perception proceeds by regression to earlier 
significations” (Mazis 2016, 238). The related concept of the flesh refers to that “depth of experience re-
called and re-membered in memory” (Mazis 2016, 238). It is, as Merleau-Ponty writes in his working notes, 
“because of depth that things have a flesh” (2016, 219). The reversibility of the flesh again indicates Merleau-
Ponty’s rejection of dualist ontology: that “things are the prolongation of my body and my body is the 
prolongation of the world” (2012, 147). 
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itself predicated on his rejection of/critique of Husserlian sensations, Merleau-Ponty 
invokes the red dress. It is worth citing the passage in its entirety:  
The red dress a fortiori holds with all its fibers onto the fabric of the visible, and 
thereby onto a fabric of invisible being. A punctuation in the field of red things, 
which includes the tiles of roof tops, the flags of gatekeepers and of the Revolution, 
certain terrains near Aix or in Madagascar, it is also a punctuation in the field of 
red garments, which includes, along with the dresses of women, robes of professors, 
bishops, and advocate generals, and also in the field of adornments and that of 
uniforms. And its red literally is not the same as it appears in one constellation or 
in the other, as the pure essence of the Revolution of 1917 precipitates in it, or that 
of the eternal feminine, or that of the public prosecutor, or that of the gypsies 
dressed like hussars who reigned twenty-five years ago over an inn on the Champs-
Elysées. A certain red is also a fossil drawn up from the depths of imaginary worlds. 
If we took all these participations into account, we would recognize that a naked 
color, and in general a visible, is not a chunk of absolutely hard, indivisible being, 
offered all naked to a vision which could be only total or null, but is rather a sort of 
straits between exterior horizons and interior horizons ever gaping open, something 
that comes to touch lightly and makes diverse regions of the colored or visible 
world resound at the distances, a certain differentiation, an ephemeral modulation 
of this world—less a color or a thing, therefore, than a difference between things 
and colors, a momentary crystallization of colored being or of visibility” (1968, 
132). 
The red dress is not a thing understood as a discrete entity, since this again would 
effectively limit it to its representative function and inhibit its fundamental involvement as 
a participant in meaning-making processes. The different historical and contextual 
iterations of “red” have all contributed to a vast network of meaning-constellations, 
meaning that the presentation of red in a particular instance is not the same red that presents 
itself in other historical configurations. 
I do not perceive a pure or discrete red. Instead, what I do perceive is red as it is 
configured within a larger network of significations. Since the sensation of color for 
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Merleau-Ponty is not equivocal to the perception of color-data, what I see or otherwise 
experience and perceive is always more and other than a red being or red thing. In 
considering red as one point embedded in or connected to a larger constellation—which is 
itself what I perceive in perceiving the red dress—it is not possible on Merleau-Ponty’s 
account to understood the red as “a chunk of absolutely hard, indivisible being, offered all 
naked to a vision which could be only total or null” (1968, 132). On the view of color 
which Merleau-Ponty rejects, either you see the color red or you don’t, and perception is 
correspondingly either complete or incomplete. On Merleau-Ponty’s alternative view, the 
situated and constellated red becomes an “ephemeral modulation of the world” rather than 
a discrete, objective quality of it. It is therefore not that “red” exists independently and is 
either seen or not seen, but that the perception of “red” is itself configured within a larger 
network of meanings and significations which are themselves both spatialized and 
temporalized. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, the red of a flag does not signify the same 
meanings as the red of a dress. Nor does the red of a particular flag signify the same 
meanings as the red of another flag, and so on and so forth. The insight is a vital one for 
disrupting a conception of (feminine) clothing as a bloc of homogenous and naturalized 
signifiers. 
 In light of this amended view of the perception of sensory qualities as both 
historical and contextual, clothing’s “ephemerality” (wielded as an indictment of its 
relevance or import to philosophical discussion) begins to appear less as a criticism than 
as a vital component of a perceptual ontology. In other words, ephemerality is not the lack 
of meaning (or depth), but a rhythmic state of keeping up with shifting meanings and 
significations. Ephemerality ought not to be synonymous with instability, where instability 
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is itself understood as an antonym of meaning (purportedly “stable,” i.e., existing 
throughout time and space). Instead, it is meaning itself which changes in different contexts 
and throughout different times. Ephemerality is less an indictment than it is the way or 
mode that meaning shows up: as historically-contingent, as changing, and at times, as 
fleeting.  
 Instead of perception understood as the perception of discrete entities, Merleau-
Ponty reconceives of perception as a “living communication with the world.” The 
communication (between body and world, or rather, of body and world) is facilitated on 
the “intentional fabric” of the world (2012, 53). Recall Merleau-Ponty’s charge against 
Husserl that hyle is void of intentionality (a view that, remember, he amended). The phrase 
“intentional fabric” cleary invokes this critique of the early Husserl, while also suggesting 
that hyle are intentional for Merleau-Ponty: that fabric, with its colors and textures, is 
intentional. The term also indicates the tactile nature of perception (perception is 
“palpating” things with our look, “cloth[ing] them with our gaze) conceived in 
juxtaposition to the notion that sense-data (color-data, touch-data, etc.) exist out there, and 
have no intentionality (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 131). “Clothing” things with our “gaze” does 
not mean covering over them (as if capturing them), nor does it mean that the “gaze” is 
hegemonic and objectifying. Rather, it indicates to me that we may see and interact with 
the world as a shifting and ephemeral locus of meanings, where ephemerality does not 
indicate a loss of meaning, but is instead understood as the very condition of possibility for 
meaning. The “intentional fabric of the world” is also the “fabric of the visible” for 
Merleau-Ponty, for whom the “depth” of meaning exists as a chiasmic structure of visibility 
and invisibility. That is, to quote from earlier, there is “still some being beyond what I 
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currently see,” which is “not merely more visible being, but also more tangible or audible 
being, and not merely more sensible being” (2012, 224). The visible world is also an 
intentional world, and does not stand in juxtaposition to, or over and against, the subject.  
 In extending (rather than departing from) Husserl’s elaboration of the affective 
intentional quality of hyletic data and of sensations and their import for perception, 
Merleau-Ponty develops the ontological dimension—the ontological significance—of 
clothing for perception. In writing that the red dress of one context is “literally” not the 
same as in others, Merleau-Ponty affirms that experiences condition perception and, 
through perception, the meaning(s) of what is perceived. It is not the case that the meaning 
or significance of a particular red dress is the same as all or any other red dress, but that 
the meaning(s) only arise—indeed, do not exist outside of—the particular set of 
significations constellated around a specific experience. The “pleasure” one may take in 
one’s own clothing, as I will discuss in the next section, cannot be reduced to or delimited 
by eternal signifiers or “a priori” meanings.  
 Merleau-Ponty adamantly rejects a dualist ontology which would consider things 
to be composites of their objective properties. Recall that this view submits to a 
metaphysics which supplies a notion of things as “shallow,” or, as nothing more than such 
composite characteristics which appear in perception.61 For Merleau-Ponty, the unity of a 
thing is a “unique manner of existing of which its properties are a secondary expression” 
(2012, 333). This “unique manner of existing,” or style, refigures a “thing” from being a 
composite of its objective properties to an existential unity (2012, 333; cf. Matherne 2017). 
 
61 For Merleau-Ponty, it is not only realist or empiricist traditions that produce “shallow” subjects and objects 
alike, but idealist or intellectualist ones as well, which would trade objective properties for concepts or ideas 
as the unifying, underlying, or “essential” substrate of subjectivity. 
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Style is therefore inseparable from things: it inhabits things (333). Style is, as Samantha 
Matherne writes, “that which binds a thing and all its parts together as an existential unity” 
(2017, 710). The embodied and enduring nature of style is essential for Merleau-Ponty’s 
rejection of the intellectualist view (2017, 710). That is, he argues that the sense or style is 
“not a certain ideal … that would only be accessible to the understanding” (2012, 333). 
Style is a “way of existing,” that can only be accessed directly in and through perception. 
Through such direct experience, style opens up a “horizon of sense” understood as the 
“internal horizon” of the object (2012, 476; cf. Matherne 2017; cf. Husserl 1939, 32-36, 
361). In line with the preceding analysis, internal horizon ought to be understood as the 
perceptual field opened by—left indeterminate by—the affective intentional structure of 
sensings. Said otherwise, the internal horizon of a thing or a person is elicited by their style 
as the manifold possibilities contained within it. Such possibilities are not predetermined, 
but always necessarily indeterminate, since hyle are not contained within things (or ideas) 
but come to be in a “living communication.” A horizon “holds out the unknown to you as 
something to explore,” or, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “to promise us always ‘something’ 
more to see” (2017, 712; 2012, 348). 
 For Merleau-Ponty, properties are determined and opened up by style, and not the 
other way around. This is in part because the very description of properties demands the 
invocation of the thing’s “manner of being.” In other words, definitions and descriptions 
demand “the entire subject,” which cannot be given (2012, 337). Indeed, the very 
difficulties that come with describing someone’s style point to its depth, as understood in 
a Merleau-Pontian register. Matherne writes: “if you have two red objects, say a red carpet 
and a red dress, the redness of each will not be the same because each red will be 
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determined by the respective object’s style and the way in which this style binds the redness 
to the object’s other properties” (2017, 720).62 Style is both a non-essentializing and yet 
essential feature of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology. For Merleau-Ponty, not only is style 
inseparable from the person or object, but the person or object is inseparable from its style. 
On this account, clothing’s significations are modified in coordination with the distinct 
style of their wearer, whose perceptions and experiences of dress meaningfully impact the 
“existential unity” of the outfitted person. The dressed body constitutes a particular type of 
lived body, the style of which is impacted by clothing. 
 
The Pleasure of Clothes: Young, Femininity, and Phenomenology 
For Sandra Bartky, femininity undermines feminism and therefore cannot be meaningful 
embraced, either on an individual or collective level. Her critique is cashed out most 
explicitly against liberal feminism. As Bartky puts it, this view understands that “the 
preservation of a woman’s femininity is quite compatible with her struggle for liberation” 
(1990, 78). She writes: “In the language of fashion magazines and cosmetic ads, making 
 
62 For Merleau-Ponty, style, and not objective properties, are what aids both perceptual presence and 
perceptual constancy. The problem of perceptual presence “stems from questions related to how it is possible 
for us to perceive features of objects that are not directly given to our embodied point of view,” such as “when 
I perceive a house as having a back side even though I am looking at its front side” (Matherne 2017, 692). 
Perceptual constantly involves the question of how we can “perceive something as constant in spite of varying 
perspectives and perceptual conditions” (2017, 693). Both views of Merleau-Ponty’s shortcomings amount 
to what Schellenberg has called “the unification problem” or the problem of how we are to have a unified 
experience given the “ephemeral nature” of perceptual appearances according to Merleau-Ponty. For 
Merleau-Ponty, the unification of perception (of places, persons, and objects) is achieved on account of the 
unique style of all that is perceived. He sometimes uses style and sense (sens) interchangeably, such as when 
he writes that “the cafés, the faces, the polars along the quays,” are all “cut out of the total being of Paris” 
which “only serves to confirm a certain style or a certain sense [sens] of Paris” (2012, 294). I accept what 
Matherne calls Merleau-Ponty’s style recognition thesis. The thesis “involves us recognizing the object’s 
style and its horizon in bodily perception and that this makes a particular form of perceptual synthesis possible 
in which we synthesize how the object appears to our current point of view with how it appears from other 
points of view” (2017, 712). The latter part of the thesis concerns amodal perception, or, the perception of 
absences (such as in the example of the back of a house cited above). 
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up is typically portrayed as an aesthetic activity in which a woman can express her 
individuality. In reality, [it] is, in fact, a highly stylized activity that gives little rein to self-
expression” (71). For Bartky, such a feminism is, as she puts it, “incoherent,” since she 
understands femininity (including “conventional standards of feminine body display,” such 
as clothing) as a set of disciplinary practices which subordinate and oppress women in 
particular. She further describes femininity as a process of internalization, and the 
internalization of norms specifically (including those involving how one should look, what 
one should weigh, and so on), as well as the internalization of “pervasive intimations of 
inferiority” (7).63 Internalization is “when [something] gets incorporated into the structure 
of the self” (71). Femininity is always normative for Bartky; that is, there is no femininity 
understood as separate from or differentiatable from normative femininity. This is because, 
as she writes, the feminine subject is a “social construction” that is at base about discipline 
(and disciplinary power) (75).64  
 Bartky takes seriously the poststructuralist understanding of femininity as a 
normative femininity both constructed and regulated by the male gaze and patriarchal 
 
63 These norms make up what Bartky calls the “fashion-beauty complex.” In a passage illustrating the variety 
(and incessentness) of these norms, Bartky writes: “I must cream my body with a thousand creams, each 
designed to act against a different deficiency, oil it, pumice it, powder it, shave it, pluck it, depilate it, 
deodorize it, ooze it into just the right foundation, reduce it overall through spartan dieting or else pump it up 
with silicon. I must try to resculpture it on the ideal through dozens of punishing exercises. If home measures 
fail, I must take it to the figure salon, or inevitably, for those who can afford it, the plastic surgeon. There is 
no "dead time" in my day during which I do not stand under the imperative to improve myself: While waiting 
for the bus, I am to suck the muscles of my abdomen in and up to lend them "tone"; while talking on the 
telephone I am bidden to describe circles in the air with my feet to slim down my ankles. All these things 
must be done prior to the application of make-up, an art which aims, once again, to hide a myriad of 
deficiencies.” (1990, 40) 
 
64 She writes: “Now the transformation of oneself into a properly feminine body may be any or all of the 
following: a rite of passage into adulthood; the adoption and celebration of a particular aesthetic; a way of 
announcing one's economic level and social status; a way to triumph over other women in the competition 
for men or jobs; or an opportunity for massive narcissistic indulgence. The social construction of the feminine 
body is all these things, but it is at base discipline, too, and discipline of the inegalitarian sort. The absence 
of formally identifiable disciplinarians and of a public schedule of sanctions serves only to disguise the extent 
to which the imperative to be ‘feminine’ serves the interest of domination” (75). 
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power. The simultaneous affirmation of both women’s (normative) femininity, and her 
struggle for liberation, is for her ultimately incoherent as a feminism: for if female 
subjectivity has been constituted by “disciplinary practices that construct the feminine 
body,” then femininity itself will have to be both deconstructed and surpassed. And yet 
Bartky simultaneously affirms that “we women cannot begin the re-vision of our own 
bodies until we learn to read the cultural messages we inscribe upon them daily” (78). 
While she rejects femininity (calling instead for a “radical and as yet unimagined 
transformation of the female body”) I heed Bartky’s call for a re-vision as an invitation to 
re-fashion femininity as well (78). 
 Certainly, Iris Marion Young is not one of those liberal feminists so decried by 
Bartky—is she? So much of Young’s career was spent criticizing liberalism. So, how ought 
we to understand Young’s essay, “On Women Recovering Their Clothes,” and its 
encouragement that women find genuine pleasure in their clothing? How shall we talk 
about women’s pleasure in clothes apart from the evaluation and scrutinization by the male 
gaze, which has effectively and historically determined and regulated feminine ideals of 
beauty? Even Young recognizes (and writes of) this formative and constitutive part of 
normative feminine subjectivity. Indeed, crucial to my analysis that follows is the idea that 
the acceptance of the “positive” phenomenological account of femininity bolstered by 
Young and the phenomenological tradition more broadly does not entail (should not entail) 
a rejection of Bartky’s diagnosis and analysis of femininity as a disciplinary power that 
manifests in the “self-policing” effected by internalizaton. It is my intention, then, only to 
suggest that there may be a genuine “pleasure” in clothing that is not wholly or ultimately 
reducible to discourses of femininity and of clothing more broadly. 
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 Before turning to the alternative (or to the positive account) that I locate in Young’s 
essay, “On Women Recovering Our Clothes,” let me first briefly describe her diagnosis of 
feminine norms as oppressive. For example, in “Is There a Woman’s World?,” Young says 
that “the norms of femininity suppress the body potential of women,” and that, in growing 
up “learning that the feminine body is soft, not muscular, passive, incapable, [and] 
vulnerable,” we develop “a sense of our bodies as beautiful objects to be gazed at and 
decorated.” This vision “requires suppressing a sense of our bodies as strong, active 
subjects” (1979; cf. 2005). “Throwing Like a Girl” is similarly concerned with the way that 
feminine body comportment not only inhibits feminine subjects, but results in inhibited 
intentionality. The source of inhibited intentionality is in what Young calls “bodily self-
reference,” or the idea that women specifically experience their bodies as both a capacity 
for agency and also as a thing. Thus, her agency is referred back to a certain objective (or 
object-like) status. Inhibited subjectivity is the state caused by this self-referentiality, which 
results in the inability to act fully and transcendently with one’s body (and the 
corresponding phenomena of throwing “like a girl”) (2005, 147).65 
 For Young, subjectivity is “crucially constituted by relations of looking,” which is 
to say that a subject is constituted through the dual sense of the narcissistic gaze (I am the 
subject that I see) and the negative self-constitution attained through our distinction from 
 
65 Drawing on Beauvoir, Young develops a conception of inhibited subjectivity as a subject between 
immanence and transcendence (2005; cf. Beauvoir 2010). Denied concrete freedoms, women’s subjectivity 
is indeed inhibited wherever their autonomy, creativity, etc., is limited. Certain modalities of feminine body 
comportment (like throwing) may display the very contradiction a woman is forced to live. As Young writes, 
many of these comportments are fostered through socialization, which would include a lack of encouraged 
practice in exploring other possibilities. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, Young argues that in order for a subject 
to exist as transcendental, it “cannot exist as an object” (2005, 123). That is, it cannot be confined to its 
immanence, which is here understood as a way of confining the body to itself (rather than “onto the world’s 
possibilities”) (2005, 38). The realm of the in-itself thereby functions to inhibit the self from moving out, 
beyond itself, into the world: to partake in “living communication” with it, as Merleau-Ponty had put it. For 
Beauvoir and Young alike, it is the dual occupation of women as both subjects and objects that thereby 
“inhibits” the fluid move from one (immanence) to the other (transcendence). 
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others and from objects (I am the subject that is not those others). Women, Young points 
out, have a subjectivity complicated by their dual occupation as both a subject in their own 
right, and object under the male gaze. The way out of this “inhibited” subjectivity, on 
Young’s view, is through the cultivation of a pleasure in one’s own clothes. I see this as a 
movement from an aesthetics characterized by its femininity, to an aesthetics doubly 
characterized by its feminism: a re-covering of a subject position in which one’s dress is a 
part of one’s own proper person, a meaningful for-itself. This is Young’s advocacy of the 
phenomenological approach over and against the post-structural, though she offers no 
account of dress as constitutive of subjectivity, which is where I aim to extend her analysis. 
 So far, I have outlined compatible views of femininity expressed by both Bartky 
and Young. But Young goes on to write that women should “recover” their clothes as a 
site of genuine (and not derivative or internalized) pleasure. She does so by contending that 
there is a “subjectivity that is my own”: that is, a feminine subjectivity not wholly reducible 
to the conception of normative femininity of which both thinkers are weary. The difference 
is, ultimately, one of method. Young’s phenomenological training and orientation commit 
her to a very different position on femininity, or at least, as open to exploring its 
possibilities. Bartky, by contrast, is very critical of phenomenology as a way for examining 
the “embodied consciousness of a feminine subject” (1990, 1). Indeed, she writes, it is 
completely “useless” for this purpose (1). In fact, it is precisely because Bartky rejects the 
notion that “gender and history” are “mere” appearances that she takes offense to the 
phenomenological search for “essences”, “structures,” and invariant features of 
experiences. Similarly as I do, she is weary that the dualism actively subordinates salient 
features of identity as add-ons or addendums, as if gender, race, or class were merely 
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superficial rather than essential or constitutive features of personhood.  
 Bartky’s critique of phenomenology extends to her rejection of femininity. In 
writing that femininity is a “certain style of the flesh” that will “have to be surpassed,” I 
take Bartky to be both invoking and rejecting phenomenology as a method for examining 
embodied consciousness (78). Later, she also writes that “there is no reason to anticipate 
either widespread resistance to currently fashionable modes of feminine embodiment or 
joyous experimentation with new ‘styles of the flesh’” (81-2). I can only presume that 
Bartky is here engaging (and dismissing) Merleau-Ponty here (perhaps as an emblematic 
phenomenologist), for whom style is a “way of existing,” and “flesh” an alternative to a 
conception of “subject” or “subjectivity” which would reify a self/other or self/world 
dualism. For Merleau-Ponty, as indicated in the previous section, “flesh” indicates a 
chiasmic and dynamic subject for whom the world is not wholly separate from the subject, 
but a subject who is constituted in and through their experiences of and with the world. 
Leib, what Merleau-Ponty later goes on to conceptualize as flesh, is not a “sum of self-
touchings” or a “sum of tactile sensations” (1968, 255). The lived body is of the world, not 
identifiably separate from it: hence, Merleau-Ponty describes flesh as being “of the world” 
as “indivis[ible] of this sensible Being that I am and all the rest which feels itself (se sent) 
in me” (255).66  
 Bartky’s claim is neither a serious dismissal of Merleau-Ponty nor a legitimate 
critique of phenomenology, as I see it. I understand the dismissal to indicate a 
dissatisfaction with the phenomenological method more broadly, while also indicating a 
misunderstanding of Merleau-Ponty’s notions of flesh and style, both of which I detailed 
 
66 Merleau-Ponty’s claim operates as a necessary step of his larger project of developing a non-dualistic 
ontology. 
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in the previous section. The dismissal indicates to me that Bartky considers “style” to be a 
mere mode of being which does not fundamentally constitute being. If power “constitutes 
the very subjectivity of the subject,” then there is little room for style to play much of a 
role. What could style be in the face of power but a mere modification (or adornment) of 
the subject? The tension—the incompatibility between the Foucauldian and the 
phenomenological—becomes even clearer when Bartky writes that the understanding of 
femininity as a “style of the flesh” is at odds with the task (her task) of deconstructing 
femininity, or, the critical project of understanding the “cultural messages” that we 
“inscribe” upon our bodies on a daily basis (78, 82).  
 Bartky’s critique nonetheless points to a significant and relevant tension between 
phenomenology and feminist philosophy for the purpose of this project: namely, how does 
one both be a good phenomenologist engaged in the study of appearances, and also be a 
good feminist: questioning those very appearances, their normative status, and the power 
structures that constitute them? In turning to Young, I do not offer a mere “alternative” to 
either Bartky or Young’s own readings of the cultural constitution of normative femininity 
and its disciplinary function. Instead, I consider the phenomenological account to 
supplement and enrich the account detailed above. In this way, I understand (feminine) 
dress as a meaningful part of the constitution of the subject in such a way that does not 
equate a phenomenological analysis of clothing with a kind of crude liberalism. In other 
words, it is not the case that the phenomenological reading I have been developing is 
equivocal with the position that feeling free is the same as being free, or that the 
phenomenological account is somehow a replacement for real social and political change.  
 Drawing on Irigaray, Young argues that an attention to the sensation of touch might 
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offer an avenue by which to affirm women’s pleasure in their clothes. In what follows, I 
suggest that Young’s focus on touch does more than offer a competing, reversed, equally-
problematic alternative to the visual realm which, for Bartky, is already over-coded by 
patriarchal ideals of beauty. This is to say that touch is not a mere escape from the over-
coded, visual world of signification. Rather, I argue that Young’s conception of touch as a 
tool of “taking pleasure” in one’s own clothes functionally reorients perception in affirming 
the primacy of the affective-sensuous in effectuating visual perception. In other words, 
Young’s conception of touch and of the “tactile imagination” which clothing invokes 
suggests that the way we feel in clothing affects the way we see clothing (and see ourselves 
in clothing). Touch and its pleasures are not a mere form of escapism from the broader 
significations of clothing, standards of beauty, and of normative femininity. Indeed, 
Bartky’s critique of phenomenology is precisely that it fosters a kind of subjective 
escapism, or a mere subjectivism, which remains detached from the realities of social and 
political struggle, including the feminist quest for liberation. I develop instead—following 
Young, following Merleau-Ponty following Husserl—a conception of clothing (a 
conception of pleasure in clothing) as a multi-sensory and affective experience.  
My analysis of Young’s essay will show that femininity is not at odds with 
feminism, or, that its embrace does not result in the pitting of individual (feminine) 
pleasures against collective struggle: the critique of the embrace of femininity as a “liberal” 
ploy. Bartky not only deprioritizes or de-emphasizes non-visual senses of perception, but 
gives unyielding authority to the male gaze to make women intelligible. In other words, 
insofar as Bartky is primarily concerned with the constitution of femininity as a discourse, 
she does not consider femininity as it is enacted in individual or embodied perception. To 
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understand a woman’s pleasure in her clothes as always derivative of the male gaze—
indeed, as produced by it—is to affirm the primacy of the visual perception of others over 
and against one’s own affective sensory responses. My analysis of Young will suggest that 
Bartky’s analysis misunderstands the role of touch (and of sensory-affective sensations 
more broadly) in constituting and producing a self-image. Said otherwise, my own bodily 
sensations—the feel of my clothing on and against, or slightly off of my skin—actively 
works to inform my subjectivity.  
Bartky’s account of feminine pleasure—a pleasure in being feminine—capitulates 
to what I call the derivation account of feminine pleasure. The derivation account holds 
that the pleasure women experience in their own clothes is really (or truly) the pleasure in 
men finding them pleasurable. On my view, such an account not only undermines or 
delegitimizes women’s agency, but simultaneously disenfranchises their epistemological 
status as knowers of their own wants and pleasures. To affirm such a view is to “admit that 
for me there is no subjectivity that is not his, that there is no specifically female pleasure I 
take in clothes” (Young 2005, 67). A view like Bartky’s, Young writes, renders 
women’s/feminine subjectivity more broadly as an achievement which can only be reached 
in adopting the “position of the male subject who takes pleasure in the objectification of 
women” (65). There is, then, no authentic feminine subjectivity on this view: femininity is 
instead rendered as a kind of “mirror in which man sees himself reflected” (68). If only 
ever reflective of inherently patriarchal ideals of beauty, femininity is nothing but the 
coordinated effort at upholding such ideals and appeasing and pleasing those who hold 
them. 
The derivative account of femininity relies on a conception of perception as wholly 
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objectifying. In objectifying perception, properties and their limited significations function 
to overdetermine persons as objects without style which may disrupt, modify, or change 
meaning(s). Here I rely on a conception of “style” as conceived by Merleau-Ponty in order 
to suggest that individuals may disrupt and modify meanings and significations that are 
ascribed to them, their clothing, and so on. The suggestion that individuals have this 
disruptive capacity is at the heart of Young’s rebuke of the derivative account, and, from a 
methodological view, crucial to dispel a conception of phenomenology as mere 
subjectivism which does nothing to impact the discourse of femininity which reigns over 
individual “choice.” On this view, the style or embodied existence of a person becomes 
subordinated to a very limited determination of properties under a closed horizon of 
signification. Since, however, objects and persons alike have unique style for Merleau-
Ponty, it is not merely the turning-into-an-object that constitutes the harm of 
objectification. Instead, objectification indicates a failure of perception to consider 
properties, sensations, and significations as animated by the unique style of the subject or 
object of perception.  
 Young rejects the idea that femininity is beholden to the male gaze, and her analysis 
begins in earnest by wondering “if there’s a way we can get him out of the picture” (2005, 
63). She does not deny, but indeed confirms that “structures of femininity” support the 
oppression of women (68). If woman is “well dressed for the male gaze,” and if fashion 
and norms of feminine dress in particular are patriarchal, then her pleasure in these clothes 
“endows” her with guilt. In turning to touch, however, Young’s analysis does not merely 
reverse the vision/touch dyad, which would trade the male gaze or “masculinist vision” for 
“feminine touch.” A reversal of this nature was indeed advocated for by Irigaray, who 
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wrote that the visual is the realm of the masculine while touch is the realm of the feminine 
(1985; cf. Young 2005, 69). Irigaray’s account is problematic for its (continued) 
naturalization of femininity—even in its celebrated or valorized form—with at least a 
certain understanding of passivity. Despite drawing on Irigaray as a theoretical resource, 
Young’s analysis does not capitulate to the same problem of either naturalizing or 
valorizing femininity. On my view, this is owed to the phenomenological resources Young 
draws on, the core of which I explicated in the previous section. 
 For Young, a vision which objectifies its subject by turning them into an object 
(objectifying vision) does function to inhibit subjectivity insofar as it may inhibit 
intentionality. Intentionality may inhibit subjectivity in a number of ways. For Husserl, the 
objective body (Körper) may itself become a part of the consciousness of the lived body 
when brought to consciousness, such as abrupt, objectifying vision can do. This is to say 
that the lived body is not merely or not only the activity or animation of the Körper, but is 
itself affected by a consciousness (including a self-imaging) of the Körper. To put it 
simply, we can objectify our own bodies. Objectifying vision not only makes of the body 
an object for the viewer, but for the viewed. In apprehending one’s own body as an object 
or as objectified, the hyletic stratum is itself modified: affects may be re-regulated along 
the spectrum from repulsion to attraction, and a sensation that once felt good or pleasurable 
(the sensation of a blouse on my skin, for instance), may now feel very differently, after 
realizing that someone has been staring.67  
 
67 This kind of experience, as Young puts it, “tur[n] the body or body parts into fetishes” (2005, 67). And it 
is certainly also the case that the “slit aesthetic”—the aesthetic that “play[s] fabric off against bare skin”—
creates the “image of the sexy clothed body” which is simultaneously the “image of phallic female power” 
(67). As Young writes: “Sweaters cut low in front or back, bathing suits and lingerie cut high on the hip . . . 
. all pattern the clothing cut to focus on bare flesh, and frequently the cuts also direct attention to the fetishized 
neck, breast, stomach, genitals, thighs, calves, ankles” (67). In the desire to conform to the “image of the sexy 
clothed body,” women also desire to “be that sexy woman” (67). 
215 
In all experiences of sensation, however, the hyletic stratum is continually 
modified, and one’s sensings remain one’s own: that is, there is no absolute or total 
passivity. Said otherwise, the objectifying gaze does not only objectify, as if from the 
outside onto the body of another. As Husserl would have it, it is not only that objectifying 
vision puts an end to or inhibits my intentional consciousness (although that may very well 
happen), but that I am reconstituted in my activity on an affective register.  
Let’s consider a few brief examples. For instance, I may feel affectively neutral 
(neither attracted nor repulsed) in an old jumpsuit. A compliment from a friend may bring 
a heightened attention to the feel of the worn linen against my skin, soft from many 
washings. I find that I am elicited by the garment in a new way: not because of any change 
to its hyle, but due instead to reflective attention. It would not be true to say that my friend 
“caused” me to feel this way or caused me to feel myself in my garment in this new way. 
In another instance, draped in loose-fitting, billowy black linen and silk, I feel pleasure. 
The wind, permitted to travel between my top and my skin, generates a positive affect in 
the form of pleasurable sensations. While I am able to name and describe such experiences 
in reflective consciousness, I am not always aware of them when going through my day, 
when my attention—save for the visit by the wind—is mostly turned elsewhere. Yet the 
hyletic datum is there, readied for sensation and for reflective consciousness alike, but itself 
not reliant upon it: since, as sensings, they are always already at work. In its different 
modalities, my clothing is always already informing my subjectivity through sensings or 
through sensations. This is why the idea that my relationship to them is determined from 
without is misguided.  
Touch facilitates a particular mode or means of self-perception that is not always 
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or only derivative (such as the perception of myself as filtered through the gaze of another). 
In touch, I give myself to my body, and Leib (as a “field or spread of sensings”) is animated 
(Al-Saji 2010, 20). This understanding of sensings as operative within a perceptual field is 
meant to contrast a conception of sensation as both objective and objectifying in which 
things are both fixed and extended. As Young writes: “When I ‘see’ myself in wool it’s 
partly the wool itself that attracts me, its heavy warmth and textured depth. Some of the 
pleasure of clothes is the pleasure of fabric and the way that fabric hangs and falls around 
the body” (70). Some clothing “relate[s] to our bodies in specific ways” (70). The pleasure 
elicited by these types of experiences is a relational pleasure: the pleasure of having a 
special relationship with one’s clothes, even of loving them, and as Young suggests, their 
“lov[ing] us back” (70). While most clothing does not attain this “privileged status of the 
beloved,” these experiences nonetheless point to their unique participation in perception: 
in seeing the wool, I “see” myself.  
 However, it is not only through touch that an alternative relationship to clothing 
may be fostered. As I have so far suggested, touch is not a “mere” alternative to possessive, 
objectifying, patriarchal vision. And for that matter, vision is not always or only possessive 
and objectifying. Although itself under-conceptualized, Young introduces the notion of the 
“tactile imagination” which may also help in conceiving of women’s pleasure in clothes 
which does not capitulate to the overdetermination of subjectivity through vision 
specifically. The tactile imagination involves “the simple pleasure of losing ourselves in 
cloth,” which may also involve imagining certain forms that a particular fabric or pattern 
may take (2005, 70). The tactile imagination is invoked when “we wander through yard-
goods stores, stroke the fabrics hanging off the bolts, pull them out to appraise the patterns, 
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imagine how they might be best formed around the body or the chair or on the windows” 
(70).  
 Young’s conception of the tactile imagination is enriched by the explanation in the 
previous section of Husserl’s account of the imagination. Recall that for Husserl, the 
imagination is not a purely mental faculty, but is a medium or a facilitator between hyletic 
data and “higher order cognitive processes” or intentional judgments (Aldea 2013, 372; cf. 
Hua III/Ideas II 1989). In other words, the sensations that may arise through touch, perhaps 
but necessarily in combination with visual sensations, facilitate a conception of the 
imagination as “tactile”: as itself inextricably linked to hyle and to sensations. Analogously, 
the “tactile imagination” as it is conceived in Young is not to be understood as the mental 
imaging or the representation of touch in the imagination understood as a purely mental 
faculty. Instead, tactile imagination relies on tactile experiences and sensations as its own 
mediator between kinaesthetic, hyletic data and imaginative variation.  
 For Young, the pleasure of clothes is related to a distinct pleasure of fabric which 
is itself a non-objectifying and dynamic pleasure. The pleasure of fabric may not 
necessarily involve an objectifying or even self-objectifying pleasure in which the pleasure 
of fabric is related to the particular pleasure of seeing oneself as if through someone else’s 
eyes. The particular “pleasure” of fabric that Young describes instead involves a non-
objectifying (or not strictly representational) relation to affect. The pleasure that takes place 
operates along a spectrum between the hyle, the sensations elicited, and higher-order 
processes of judgments. In other words, the pleasure is not always strictly representational, 
such as a pleasure in imagining a fabric turned into a future garment. The pleasure, as 
Young describes it, corresponds much more to a kind of “getting lost” in the fabric: a non-
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representational, multi-sensory, affective relationship to the fabric which does not function 
to understand the pleasure of getting lost as derivative of the male gaze or of self-
objectification. 
 For Young, “seeing” herself in clothing may involve pleasures both 
representational (objectifying in some register) and otherwise (such as the pleasure of 
“getting lost” described above). “Seeing” oneself thereby does not only signify a visual 
register for Young. When Young writes (drawing on Irigaray) that vision might be 
conceived of as “less a gaze” distanced from and mastering its object, than an “immersion 
in light and color,” she invokes the Gestalt-like nature of perception understood in both 
visual and kinesthetic registers. Just as the tactile imagination may function to stimulate 
pleasure, so too can the visual operate as a realm or a way of “getting lost” in sensations 
which do not necessarily result in the objectification or representation of those sensations. 
What Young describes is not merely an exercise in imagining differently: of interrupting 
processes of representation, categorization, and objectification. Instead, Young describes 
an orientation towards another way of imagining through the expansion of the imaginative 
faculty beyond (objectifying) vision, which is not to say a perceptual experience that 
ignores it or is uneffected by it (as if it were that simple). The tactile imagination involves 
both touch and vision; it is not a mere alternative to a vision which always objectifies or 
seeks to master its object.  
 
Conclusion 
Young’s analysis neither naturalizes femininity nor does it naively laud or celebrate it. 
Instead, “sexist society” is to bear the responsibility for a subjectivity that is “inhibited, 
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confined, positioned, and objectified” (2005, 42). Even though Young is staunchly critical 
of the incapacitating effects of patriarchy for both producing and policing feminine 
comportment, motility, spatiality, and dress, none are to be naturalized or essentialized as 
either defining features of female anatomy or of femininity itself understood as a 
“mysterious feminine essence” (2005, 42). It is worth reflecting on—worth reconciling—
Young’s criticism of feminine comportment in the one essay, and her call for women to 
recover pleasure in their clothes in another. In both, the root cause remains the same, but it 
is important to note that the implication of the former—that women may throw 
differently—does not mean that femininity is inhibiting in the sense that an inhibited throw 
might be (although it certainly can be and is for many). Young’s analysis of comportment 
mainly involves her concern with developing a more expansive notion of (female) 
subjectivity in light of the (literal) compression of the body effected by the internalization 
of norms. Her analysis of clothing, however, seeks to recover a sense of genuine pleasure 
in clothing that does not subordinate it or otherwise invalidate that pleasure as derivative 
or second-order. In other words, it is not just or only the case that the “pleasure” of clothing 
is the pleasure derived either from others or from the fact of seeing oneself in conformity 
with particular norms and ideals.  
 Young’s call for women to recover their clothes from its overdetermination as part 
of a “fashion-beauty complex” which subordinates them is informed by a very different 
understanding of femininity. For Young, the turn to touch and to phenomenology offers a 
rejoinder to the conception of femininity as inherently patriarchal offered by Bartky. 
Sexism, not femininity, continues to be the problem. The re-covery of pleasure in clothes 
thereby also fosters resistance to the objectification of women and feminine subjects. 
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Young provides the resources in which a more dynamic conception of subjectivity is 
formed, or better yet, self-fashioned. In “feeling free,” or “feeling pleasure,” subjectivity 
is indeed fashioned: not only by clothing, but by the feelings and sensations which are 























Throughout the dissertation, I have shown that clothing is much more than a collection of 
objects we drape over ourselves: that it is not “merely” or “only” a surface-level 
phenomenon. Indeed, I have argued that there is much to be learned and understood by 
taking appearances seriously as a starting-point for philosophical inquiry: that is, by not 
relegating them to the back of the proverbial closet as the insufficient or unimportant half 
of the metaphysical dualism between essences and appearances. In doing so, I have not 
subverted the binary. Rather, I have highlighted the relevance of bias and prejudice in 
perpetuating naturalized metaphysical truths and dualisms, while also demonstrating the 
generative insights lying in wait on the “appearance” side of the dyad. Indeed, it is not only 
that bias and prejudice participate in the naturalization of metaphysical truths, but that the 
very import and the often deadly serious nature of the world of appearances becomes 
mystified in the process. When metaphysics guides philosophy, instead of the other way 
around (as Fink cautions) then we as philosophers perpetuate false and often materially 
harmful narratives about the world we inhabit: the world we are responsible for 
understanding. In terms of fashion and clothing, the prioritization or privileging of essences 
actually mystifies the importance of appearances. The question is not, “do appearances 
matter?” but “how and in what ways do appearances matter?” The first question reveals a 
skepticism that, I have argued throughout, characterizes the history of western metaphysics 
and much of philosophy. The second—the question around which I have oriented my 
project—takes as its starting point the position that an attention to lived experience and 
worldly events challenges the metaphysical privileging or favoritism that has guided and 
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informed much of our discipline. 
In other words, life simply challenges metaphysics. While Part I of the dissertation 
took up the dualism between essences and appearances and the characterization of clothing 
as “mere” appearance or veneer, Part II suggested explicitly that it is not only the case that 
appearances matter, but showed that their analysis helps to develop a critical perspective 
on western metaphysics. By showing how clothing and clothing norms have massive 
normative consequences—that appearances are enforced, policed, and punished alike—I 
hope to have drawn attention to the ideological implications of a metaphysics which has 
shrouded or mystified the very serious, often deadly or damning consequences of the world 
of appearances. In this vein, my analysis of the phenomena of fashion and clothing enacts 
a critique of metaphysics. I understand the critique as a specifically feminist one, insofar 
as I have shown how specific notions of the “feminine” and “femininity”—and clothing by 
extension—have not only been reproduced within philosophy (such that they falsely 
become quasi a priori or “eternal” signifiers) but that their programmatic subordination 
continues to wield harmful and often deadly consequences. Metaphysics thereby not only 
“masks an effective ideology of oppression,” as Oksala puts it, but intentionally shrouds or 
mystifies the urgency with which we ought to orient our attention to appearances (2016, 
22).  
Metaphysical binaries neither reveal nor do justice to the import and impact of 
appearances, which themselves challenge the conception of such binaries as useful or 
telling categories by which we live. Contrasted with the violent, oppressive, and even 
deadly force of clothing, its characterization as “superfluous” ought to be understood not 
only as inaccurate, but as intellectually and socially irresponsible. Clothing’s constitutive, 
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even joyful role in the formation of subjectivity can also not be understood unless—until—
it is itself taken seriously as a phenomenon. I do not understand “serious” here as the 
antithesis of the unserious or the playful, but as a mode of paying attention, or of regarding. 
Similarly, I do not conceive of essences and appearances as strict opposites, but as concepts 
created and reproduced by a metaphysics with an ideological agenda, or at least ideological 
implications. I have attended to the dualism so fastidiously in order to mount my critique, 
and not to verify or affirm its existence. Instead, I hope to have shown how pervasive the 
dualism is and the ways that it continues to manifest itself: not as the manifestation or 
“appearance” of real metaphysical truths, but as a host of prejudices, perceptions, attitudes, 
and actions that continue to be justified by an appeal to a ground that does not really exist. 
If we are to take Fink’s provocation seriously, which I do, then it is not metaphysics which 
should guide life (i.e., an appeal to metaphysics that would justify harmful beliefs, 
prejudice, and so on) but the analysis of the repercussions of such attitudes which should 
inform or guide metaphysical inquiry. This is just to say that our experiences of the world 
should govern the production of concepts used, in turn, to understand those experiences.  
In my undertaking, I have not advanced an uncritical acceptance or valorization of 
appearing phenomena. As I suggested in Chapter I, the “mere” reversal of essences and 
appearances—the exchange in valorization of the latter over the former—would do little 
to challenge the very structure of subordination and domination embedded in dualistic 
thinking. There, I suggested that the move to valorize the feminine in particular constitutes 
more of a feminine metaphysics than a feminist metaphysics. I have neither valorized nor 
rejected the feminine, but have suggested instead that “she” is a problematic figure whose 
“essential” features have been constructed. In tracing certain key moments in the history 
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of metaphysics and the history of philosophy as pertains to clothing, I have endeavored to 
redress these histories: and don’t they look better? 
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